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PRIVATE COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE COTTON INDUSTRY:  
CREATING COOPERATION THROUGH RULES, NORMS,  
AND INSTITUTIONS 
 
Lisa Bernstein* 
 
The cotton industry has almost entirely opted out of the public legal system, 
replacing it with one of the oldest and most complex systems of private commer-
cial law.1 Most contracts for the purchase and sale of domestic cotton, between 
merchants or between merchants and mills, are neither consummated under the 
Uniform Commercial Code (“Code”) nor interpreted and enforced in court when 
disputes arise. Rather, most such contracts are concluded under one of several 
privately drafted sets of contract default rules and are subject to arbitration in 
one of several merchant tribunals. Similarly, most international sales of cotton 
are governed neither by state-supplied legal rules, nor by the Convention on the 
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1. For an overview of the origins of the cotton industry’s private legal system, see A.W. Brian 
Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 287, 
293-314, 321 (1989). 
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International Sale of Goods, but rather by the rules of the Liverpool Cotton Asso-
ciation.2 
The institutions that create and administer the industry’s private legal system 
work extraordinarily well. The trade rules are periodically revised to respond to 
technological advancements, market changes, and ambiguities revealed during 
disputes. Their content is known and understood by most market participants. 
The arbitration tribunals that resolve disputes do so expeditiously and inexpen-
sively. Their decisions, which are recorded in written opinions, reveal a distinc-
tive and coherent jurisprudential approach. Within the industry, arbitration 
awards are widely respected and complied with promptly. In short, the industry 
has succeeded in creating and maintaining a private legal system (“PLS”) in 
which transactions costs, error costs, legal system costs, and collection costs are 
low. This system has endured since the mid-1800’s, surviving widespread social 
change, years of extreme price volatility, and substantial changes in the back-
ground public legal regime. 
This Article draws on a detailed case study of contractual relations in the cot-
ton industry to examine the ways that the rules, norms and institutions that con-
stitute the industry’s PLS create value for transactors. Part I describes the formal 
operation of the PLS and discusses the ways that its substantive rules, adjudica-
tive approaches and arbitral procedures improve on those provided by the Uni-
form Commercial Code (“Code”) and the public legal system. Part II describes 
the many steps taken by cotton industry institutions to strengthen the social and 
informational infrastructures of trade. It discusses how these efforts combine to 
make reputation-based nonlegal sanctions a powerful force in the industry and 
explores how the availability of these sanctions makes important features of the 
PLS work better than they would in their absence. It also suggests that the avail-
ability of such sanctions may enable transactors to create value-enhancing con-
tract governance structures that might be either unavailable or prohibitively ex-
pensive if their transactions were governed by the public legal system. Part III 
takes a step back and explores how the industry’s efforts to support the legal and 
extralegal aspects of contracting relationships, together with certain other fea-
tures of cotton institutions, have succeeded in creating conditions that are con-
ducive to the creation, maintenance and restoration of cooperative contracting re-
lationships. Part IV concludes by suggesting that understanding how the cotton 
industry’s institutions create value for transactors may help identify other indus-
 
2. E-mail from Linda Mawdsley, Membership Manager, Liverpool Cotton Exchange, to author 
(Oct. 27, 1997) (noting that the Liverpool Cotton Association trading rules govern approximately 
50% of international cotton contracts). 
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tries and other contexts in which private institutions can play a positive role in 
supporting trade. 
 
I. THE PRIVATE LEGAL LAW SYSTEM 
 
A. The Formal Operation of the Private Legal System 
 
There are numerous sources of private commercial law in the domestic cash 
markets for the purchase and sale of cotton.3 Most merchant-to-mill transactions 
are governed by the Southern Mill Rules (“SMRs”),4 a set of trade rules that is 
jointly adopted by the American Cotton Shippers Association (“ACSA”),5 a trade 
association representing merchants, and the American Textile Manufacturers In-
stitute (“ATMI”),6 a trade association representing mills.7 Most merchant-to-
merchant transactions are governed by the trade rules of one of four regional cot-
ton shippers associations, all of which are members of ACSA,8 or by the rules of 
 
3. A cash market for a commodity is one in which the commodity is bought and sold — on 
any of a variety of payment terms — for actual delivery. 
4. Minutes of the American Cotton Shippers Association-American Textile Manufacturers In-
stitute Joint Meeting (1984) (75-80% of the cotton bought by United States mills is subject to the 
SMRs). 
5. ACSA “is the spokesman for private cotton merchants of the United States.” Am. Cotton 
Shippers Ass’n, Southern Mill Rules, in SOUTHERN MILL RULES FOR BUYING AND SELLING OF 
AMERICAN COTTON 2 (1996), available at http://www.acsa-cotton.org/About_ACSA/Search% 
20Rules/about_acsa.html [hereinafter SMRS]. This rulebook also includes the Rules and Regulations 
of the Cotton States Arbitration Board [hereinafter, CSAB Rules] and an Outline of Services Available 
for Quality Arbitrations By Cotton States Arbitration Board and Technical Arbitrations By the Board of 
Appeals Under Southern Mill Rules [hereinafter, Outline of Services]. Id. 
6. The ATMI is the “trade association for manufacturers of textile mill products . . . [Its] mem-
bers . . . . process some 75 percent of all domestically grown cotton consumed annually in the 
United States.” Id. 
7. The ACSA and ATMI rules committees meet together at least once a year to consider revis-
ing the SMRs. However, because the associations’ interests are often antagonistic, and amend-
ments must also be ratified by the membership of both organizations, the revision process is 
slow. See Letter from R. C. Dickerson, Executive Vice-President and Secretary of ACSA, to R. K. 
Vincent (January 21, 1952), in connection with SEAB Case No. 61 (“With regard to your sugges-
tions about clarifying some of the Southern Mill Rules, beg to say that this is a long and tedious 
process . . . it is very difficult to secure any changes and it usually takes a couple of years at least 
before such changes can be effective.”). 
8. These organizations are the Western Cotton Shippers Association (“WCSA”), the Atlantic 
Cotton Association (“ACA”), the Southern Cotton Association (“SCA”), and the Texas Cotton As-
sociation (“TCA”). A fifth organization, the Arkansas-Missouri Cotton Trade Association, existed 
as late as 1990, but is now defunct. Its former members were absorbed by the other regional asso-
ciations. In the past, there were also numerous local and regional cotton exchanges. Today, with 
4 
the Memphis Cotton Exchange (“MCE”), whose ninety member firms typically 
“handle about 75 percent of the U.S. cotton trade and about 35 percent of the 
world’s cotton trade.”9 
Both shippers’ associations and regional exchanges provide arbitration ser-
vices.10 Most require members to arbitrate disputes with other members as a 
condition of membership.11 In addition, the ACSA and the ATMI have created a 
joint arbitration tribunal, the Board of Appeals (“BoA”),12 to arbitrate contract 
disputes that arise under the SMRs.13 They have also created a separate tribunal, 
the Cotton States Arbitration Board (“CSAB”), to make binding quality determi-
nations.14 Although merchants and mills are not required to contract under the 
SMRs, or to arbitrate disputes with one another as a condition of membership in 
their respective trade associations, most merchant-to-mill contracts nevertheless 
provide for BoA arbitration.15 
 
the exception of the Memphis and Greenwood Exchanges most are either defunct or have greatly 
curtailed their activities. 
9. Charles Conner, Julien Fall Year Ago Changed Industry, COM. APPEAL, Jan. 20, 1991, at C1. 
10. A modest fee is charged for these services, see MEMPHIS COTTON EXCHANGE BY-LAWS, Art. 
IV, § 9 (1993) [hereinafter MCE BY-LAWS] (providing that “[i]n all cases of Arbitration concerning 
cotton, the charges shall be as determined by the Board of Directors”). 
11. See, e.g., id. at Art. IV, § 8 (“Any member refusing to submit to an arbitration when asked 
for by another member or a non-member, providing the Arbitration Committee consider [sic] 
there exist good grounds for an arbitration, or to abide by any award or decision of said Commit-
tee when rendered,” may be expelled from the exchange). 
12. In earlier years, these organizations sponsored two sets of trade rules and two arbitration 
boards. One of these boards, the New England Board of Appeals (“NEBoA”), resolved disputes 
in the New England region. The other, the South Eastern Appeal Board (“SEAB”), resolved dis-
putes in the Southern region. Today, the Southern Mill Rules and the Board of Appeals (“BoA”), 
sometimes referred to as the “Southeastern Appeal Board,” are used to resolve all disputes re-
gardless of where in the country they arise. Am. Cotton Shippers Ass’n, Outline of Services, supra 
note 5. Although these tribunals are referred to as “appeals” boards, they are tribunals of first in-
stance. 
13. The BoA requires each litigant who is a member of ACSA or ATMI to pay a filing fee of 
$400 per case, but refunds the fee to the prevailing party. When cases are filed by non-members 
or their attorneys, a fee of the larger of $800 or the actual cost of the arbitration is charged. Id. at 
38. 
14. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. XI, § 43 (authorizing the CSAB — which is supervised by 
representatives of both ATMI and ACSA — to arbitrate quality disputes between shippers and 
mills). In 1972, however, “[t]he Executive Committee [of the CSAB] made arrangements with the 
Board of Supervising Cotton Examiners . . . now the Quality Control Section, of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture in Memphis, to perform [quality] arbitration services for the industry.” Out-
line of Services, supra note 5, at 34. 
15. Supra note 4. This is usually achieved by incorporating the SMRs into the contract. 
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The formal operation of the cotton industry’s PLS can best be understood by 
looking at the procedural rules, substantive rules, adjudicative approaches, and 
judgment enforcement mechanisms that have been adopted by the two most im-
portant private commercial law institutions in the domestic cash cotton trade:16 
the BoA, which resolves disputes between merchants and mills, and the MCE ar-
bitration tribunal,17 which resolves disputes primarily between merchants. 
 
1. Procedural Rules 
 
The BoA is composed of one arbitrator appointed by the president of the 
ATMI and one appointed by the president of the ACSA.18 Arbitrators are selected 
for their “experience in their respective industry and their reputation for integ-
rity and fairness.”19 The BoA does not hold hearings. It decides cases solely on 
 
16. The importance of these institutions is suggested by, among other things, the fact that the 
MCE Trading Rules and By-Laws, the SMRs and BoA procedures, and the trading and arbitration 
rules of the Liverpool Cotton Association are an important focus of the curriculum at the educa-
tional institute for new industry participants held at Rhodes College each summer. See infra note 
225 and accompanying text. 
17. Unless otherwise noted, the expression “MCE arbitration tribunal,” refers to the Ex-
change’s “regular standing Arbitration” tribunal. TRADING RULES OF THE MEMPHIS COTTON 
EXCHANGE, R. 34, cl. 2 [hereinafter MCE TR]. Since the early days of the exchange, this tribunal 
has handled disputes between members, between members and non-members, and even, on oc-
casion, disputes between two non-members. In 1995, however, in an attempt to create a public 
perception of fairness, the MCE established a separate tribunal for disputes involving non-
members. This tribunal operates under its own, somewhat different, procedural rules. The arbi-
tration panel consists of three arbitrators, arbitrators are chosen by agreement of the parties, and 
there are no appeals. If the claim is for less than $25,000 and the parties agree, only one arbitrator 
need hear the case. Non-binding pre-arbitration mediation is also available if agreed to by the 
parties. 
One of the more striking differences between regular MCE arbitrations and these special arbi-
trations is that the special tribunal’s procedures make it easier for parties to get information from 
one another. See id. at R. 43, cl. 4 (“Upon the request of any party to the arbitration made in writ-
ing with notice to the other party, the Chairman of the Rule 43 Arbitration Committee shall issue 
subpoenas as provided in the Federal Arbitration Act and/or the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration 
Act.”). This provision was considered undesirable by the MCE board, but was adopted on the 
advice of a prominent industry attorney who told the board that it was needed in order to main-
tain the perception that the tribunal was fair to non-members. Telephone Interview with MCE 
Executive (Feb. 1997). 
18. See Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 35. When the arbitrators do not agree, they are au-
thorized to jointly appoint a third arbitrator. From 1975 to 1996, however, the BoA heard twenty-
eight cases, none of which required the appointment of a third arbitrator. See BoA opinions 1975-
1996. 
19. Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 35. 
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the basis of briefs and documentary evidence, most commonly: verified copies of 
confirmations, correspondence, mail receipts, telephone logs, weight slips, qual-
ity determination reports, and affidavits from lawyers and employees who 
played roles in the questioned transaction. All evidence has the names of the par-
ties redacted. 
The MCE arbitration tribunal is composed of seven arbitrators, appointed an-
nually by the Exchange’s board of directors. It holds oral hearings,20 complete 
with the calling of witnesses and cross-examination.21 
Neither the BoA nor the MCE tribunals permit unconstrained party-initiated 
discovery, though both permit the arbitrators to request additional information.22 
The SMRs do not contain a general limitations period, but they do contain rules 
specifying the proper time frame for raising certain types of objections.23 The 
MCE trading rules provide that all claims are to be reported to the arbitration 
committee “within thirty days after the matter in controversy arises,”24 and also 
 
20. See, e.g., Case Record, MCE Case No. 832 (1985) (noting that multiple hearings were held); 
Letter from the MCE Vice-President and Secretary, to the Parties (March 11, 1985), in connection 
with MCE Case No. 832 (informing the parties that they will have to appear in front of the arbi-
tration committee). 
21. MCE arbitrators also take an active role in questioning the parties and witnesses. See, e.g., 
Questions Reference, typewritten sheets filed with the case record for MCE Case No. 835 (1991) 
(listing questions for the arbitrators to ask the parties); MCE Case No. 839 (1991) (revealing in the 
transcript that arbitrators questioned the parties). 
22. See Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 36 (noting that the BoA can “ask either of the parties 
for additional information or clarification of statements made in their briefs”); see also Memoran-
dum of the Arbitrators (Aug. 24, 1953), in connection with SEAB Case No. 71 (referring to a re-
quest for submission of additional information); Letter from ACSA Secretary to Arbitrator (Jan. 
23, 1996), in connection with BoA Case No. 139 (“Should you require any further details pertain-
ing to this case, please contact me and I’ll make every effort to obtain the information re-
quested.”); Letter from Arbitrators to the CSAB Secretary (March 28, 1984), in connection with 
BoA Case No. 118 (requesting additional information); NEBoA Case No. 280 (1929) (declining to 
render a judgment pending submission of additional information); Letter from the MCE Execu-
tive Vice-President and Secretary, to the Plaintiff’s Attorney (March 9, 1988), in connection with 
MCE Case No. 833 (requesting information about the nature of the plaintiff’s business and addi-
tional documents). 
23. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. VII, § 32 (“Claims for loss in weight or payment for gain in 
weight must be made within seven business days from receipt of the cotton, or of the last portion 
of the shipment.”); id. at Art. VIII, § 36 (“Notice of claims for variations in invoice tare allowances 
must be given seller by buyer within twenty business days from receipt of cotton.”); id. at Art. 
VIII, § 37 (“All claims for variations in invoice tare allowances must be filed within nine months 
from receipt of cotton.”); id. at Art. IX, § 39 (“Claims as to quality must be made within ten busi-
ness days from the date of the receipt of the last portion of the shipment except, where cotton is 
deliverable in monthly installments, the claims shall be based on each separate installment.”). 
24. MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 34, cl. 1. 
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specify time frames for raising particular types of objections.25 
Both tribunals produce written opinions. Most opinions include a statement of 
the facts, a short discussion of the rule to be applied, a few paragraphs discussing 
the arbitrators’ reasoning, and an award.26 Some opinions, however, simply state 
the outcome of the case.27 BoA opinions are circulated to all ACSA and ATMI 
members.28 The names of the parties are redacted,29 but the names of the arbitra-
 
25. See id. at R. 5, cl. 5 (“[A]ny rejection for differences in grade and/or staple will only apply 
on cotton if it is shipped out of the point of origin or resampled within ninety (90) days from date 
of payment by Buyer.”); id. at R. 18, cl. 1 (“[When cotton is rejected as being of nonstandard den-
sity], market difference is to be adjusted between Buyer and Seller provided a claim is made 
within 10 days from invoice date.”); id. at R. 22, cl. 1 (“[R]eplacements must be made within ten 
days from date of rejections.”). 
26. BoA Case No. 135 (1992); BoA Case No. 117 (1983); BoA Case No. 121 (1985); MCE Case 
No. 839 (1991). 
27. See, e.g., MCE Case No. 835 (1991) (stating only that “[t]he Arbitration Committee of the 
Memphis Cotton Exchange based on written evidence supplied by both parties as well as the oral 
testimony of both parties rules that [Defendant] is not entitled to carrying charges and [Plaintiff] 
is not entitled to penalties. This decision was the unanimous decision of this Arbitration Commit-
tee”); BoA Case No. 139 (1996); BoA Case No. 129 (1990). It is not entirely clear why the format of 
opinions is so variable. One BoA arbitrator explained that he was not an eloquent man, so when 
he wrote, the opinions were short, while his fellow arbitrator, with whom he served for many 
years, was a “wordsmith,” educated at Yale (actually, a check of alumni rolls indicated it was 
Harvard), who liked to go on at length. Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #2, former 
BoA arbitrator (no date). 
28. The ATMI and the ACSA keep BoA opinions, along with the briefs and evidence submit-
ted, on file for inspection by their members. They occasionally receive requests for further infor-
mation about cases or copies of the supporting papers. See, e.g., Letter from the Chairman of the 
Board of [very large] Cotton Company, to the ACSA Executive Secretary (June 19, 1967), in con-
nection with BoA Case No. 98 (“I think there is something in the libel laws which prevents you 
from naming the buyer and the seller in this case, but I think it is proper for you to give the name 
of the seller on request and I do hereby request that you give us the name of the seller who re-
fuses to be bound by a trade arbitration because an Act of God (crop failure) makes it impossible 
for him to deliver what another seller has offered to deliver at 8¢ higher.”). Such requests are 
more common when the BoA’s opinion does not contain a clear description of the facts found and 
the reasoning used. Telephone Interview with ACSA Executive (no date); see also Entire SMR 
Case No. 130 Sent To Following Active Members Per [ACSA Executive], BoA Case No. 130 (Feb. 
5, 1991) (noting that the entire record of the case was sent to 33 members who had requested it 
most likely because the opinion was brief and unclear). 
In earlier years, the associations routinely circulated briefs and supporting evidence with the 
opinions. See, e.g., ACSA Series A-Circular Letter No. 41 (Dec. 21, 1951) (“We are enclosing here-
with for your information and guidance copies of briefs and summary of question [sic] submitted 
together with decision and minority report in Southeastern Appeals Board Case No. 62. This case 
is rather involved, but we recommend that it be studied carefully by all shippers to domestic 
mills.”). Although the reasons for this practice are unclear, giving transactors access to the same 
information as the tribunal makes it easier for them to determine whether the tribunal was im-
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tors are given. MCE opinions contain the names of both the parties and the arbi-
trators, but they are not made public. Neither tribunal formally accords prior de-
cisions precedential authority.30 
The BoA’s awards are final judgments, but the MCE tribunal gives parties the 
right to appeal to a three-person appeals board in cases where the decision of the 
original panel was not unanimous.31 At the BoA, the rules require the time from 
 
partial. Establishing its impartiality might have been especially important to the BoA, which re-
solves disputes between defined groups of market participants with often conflicting interests. 
Today, these supporting materials are only circulated in exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., 
ACSA Series A-Circular No. 96 (Feb. 25, 1987), addressing BoA Case No. 124 (noting that in addi-
tion to the opinion, the association was “also enclosing ‘Seller’s Statement of Facts’ and ‘Seller’s 
Argument and Brief.’ Supporting documents on pages 15-17 are also provided. We did not deem 
intervening documentation necessary for reproduction”). 
29. Although in important BoA cases, parties’ identities become quickly known through gos-
sip, Telephone Interview with ACSA Executive (June 1996); see also infra note 172, the non-
publication of names may nevertheless be desirable from the perspective of industry insiders. 
BoA opinions often contain information indicating that a firm may be on the verge of financial 
distress (but not yet within the legal preference period). The practice of not revealing names 
keeps this information from industry outsiders — such as railroads, truckers, and insurance 
companies — for as long as possible, while the industry’s well-developed gossip networks help 
to spread it to industry insiders. See infra notes 124-129 and accompanying text (describing these 
networks). The practice may therefore enable insiders to better protect their positions with the 
distressed firm, by, for example, cashing out their position. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. XIX, § 
56 (providing, in part that, “[i]f either party to the contract enters bankruptcy or admits insol-
vency, the other party may cancel the undelivered portion of the contract, with the market differ-
ence to be adjusted between the buyer and the seller, with one-half cent per pound penalty 
against the party in bankruptcy or admitting insolvency”). 
30. In the past, BoA opinions sometimes mentioned prior opinions as persuasive or control-
ling authority. See, e.g., NEBoA Case No. 181 (1924) (citing NEBoA Case No. 97 as controlling au-
thority for the interpretation of Rule 61, defining “receipt of cotton”); NEBoA Case No. 187 (1924) 
(holding that NEBoA Case No. 60 governs). Arbitrators also occasionally attempted to distin-
guish earlier cases. See, e.g., NEBoA Case No. 276 (1929) (rejecting an argument based on an ear-
lier decision, and explaining that the opinion cited, “was based on special circumstances and does 
not apply in this case”). However, references to prior cases gradually became less common and 
are quite rare today. One case explicitly repudiates the duty of the BoA to consider prior deci-
sions. See SEAB Case No. 75 (1955) (noting that “[t]his Appeal Board has recently stated that it 
was not bound by previous decisions of the Board”). Nevertheless, the long service of certain in-
dividuals on the BoA ensures that there is some continuity in the tribunal’s decisions. For exam-
ple, from 1978-1996, the same ACSA representative served in seventeen of the twenty-seven cases 
decided by the BoA and the same ATMI representative served in fifteen of the cases. Mention of 
prior decisions was even rarer at the MCE. From 1944-1991, only one MCE opinion mentions a 
prior case, and even there it is only mentioned because it was raised by one of the parties and the 
arbitrators give it no weight. See MCE Case No. 786 (1951). 
31. MCE BY-LAWS, supra note 10, at Art. IV, § 5. From 1944 to 1991, only four of the ninety-two 
decisions rendered by the MCE arbitrations tribunal were not unanimous. Of these four deci-
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filing to the close of evidence to be between fifteen and thirty days. Decisions are 
rendered as soon thereafter as possible.32 At the MCE, the length of time from fil-
ing to disposition varies, but is typically just over a month.33 Both the BoA and 
the MCE require prompt payment of awards.34 
 
2. Substantive Rules 
 
The BoA decides contract disputes by applying the SMRs,35 a comprehensive 
set of bright-line contract default rules36 that cover contract formation, perform-
ance, quality, delay, payment, repudiation, excuse, and damages, and include 
 
sions, three were appealed. Two of the decisions were affirmed. See MCE App. Case No. 28 
(1952); MCE App. Case No. 29 (1952). One of the decisions was reversed. See MCE App. Case No. 
27 (1947). When an appeal is requested, the “party whose claim differs most from the final 
award” must pay the actual cost of the appeal. MCE BY-LAWS, supra note 10, at Art. V, § 3. 
32. Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 36-38; MCE BY-LAWS, supra __ at Art. XV, § 3 (“Any 
claim [of indebtedness] allowed by the Arbitration Committee and remaining unpaid for ten days 
may then be pressed for immediate settlement by requesting same in writing to the secre-
tary . . . and five days shall be allowed for settlement.”). 
33. Based on information in the moving papers and opinions in all MCE cases decided from 
1978-1991, the average time from filing to disposition was thirty-nine days. The longest case took 
eighty-four days, while the shortest took eleven days. Although the MCE Rules do not dictate a 
precise time frame for resolving a dispute, the fact that a the defendant is given only three days to 
respond to a claim before the committee is permitted to hear the case ex-parte, suggests that the 
Exchange considers prompt dispositions important. MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 34, cl. 1. 
34. The MCE rules also attempt to ensure payment by requiring the defendant to post a pre-
arbitration bond in the amount of the claim. MCE BY-LAWS, supra note 10, at Art. IV, § 4. In the 
past, strict compliance with the rule was enforced, but today bonds are not always required in 
practice. Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (no date). 
35. The SMRs, however, “reserve [to the BoA] the privilege of refusing action on any dispute 
submitted if it feels the case at point has disagreements not involving SMR[s] or it does not have 
sufficient evidence to properly judge the issues.” Outline of Services, supra note 5 at 35-36; see also 
ACSA, Series A-Circular Letter No. 40 (1953) (discussing this privilege). This privilege is occa-
sionally exercised. See, e.g., BoA Case No. 125 (1987) (declining to issue a ruling without giving an 
explanation); SEAB Case No. 64 (1952) (same); BoA Case No. 115 (1981) (declining jurisdiction on 
the grounds that the BoA “should not act as a general referee or become an instrument for mak-
ing general market determinations”); BoA Case No. 114 (1981) (“In the request for a Board of Ap-
peals decision seller did not specify a rule section under which the Board of Appeals might con-
cern itself. Further, the members of the Board of Appeals are not aware of any specific rule 
section which would appropriately apply to the dispute in question, under which it could deter-
mine an allowance as settlement . . . it would be improper for the Board of Appeals to render a 
decision in this case.”). 
36. See SMR, supra note 5, at Art. XVII, § 54 (“Buyer and seller shall have the privilege of in-
corporating any other rules, not in conflict with the spirit of the above rules, in their contracts.”). 
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numerous industry-specific definitions of terms like “prompt,”37 “raingrown,”38 
and “long staple.”39 The MCE decides cases on the basis of the Exchange’s own 
Trading Rules,40 which also define numerous industry-specific terms and contain 
primarily bright-line provisions. Although most SMRs and MCE Trading Rules 
would be enforceable under the Code if included in a contract,41 they nonetheless 
differ from the Code in fundamental ways. 
First, the industry-drafted trade rules do not, for the most part, include the 
types of standard-like words such as “reasonable,”42 “seasonable,” and “without 
objection in the trade,” that permeate the Code. Rather, they contain primarily 
clear, bright-line, rules. 
 
37. Id. at Art. IV, § 16. 
38. Id. at Art. III, § 13. 
39. Id. at Art. III, § 10. 
40. See MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 2, cl. 1 (“These Trading Rules shall apply to all purchases 
and sales between members of the Memphis Cotton Exchange unless otherwise agreed in writ-
ing.”). The MCE Trading Rules contain only two mandatory provisions. Id. at R. 31, cl. 1 (“Any 
exception to these rules can be made by mutual agreement at time of sale excepting Rule 1, 
Clause 4 and Rule 2.”); id. at R. 1, cl. 4 (“Both Buyer and Seller shall be primarily liable to each 
other for the fulfillment of all contracts.”). 
41. Some trade rules, however, would be of questionable validity if included in a contract ad-
judicated under the Code. First, at times when cotton prices were very low, the trade rules that 
provide for the payment of a ½ cent per pound penalty, might, if included in a contract subject to 
the Code, might have been vulnerable to attack under U.C.C. § 2-718 (1991) and the relevant case 
law, on the grounds that they were invalid penalties since they were not a genuine attempt to 
pre-estimate damages. See, e.g., Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 344 N.E.2d 391 
(N.Y. 1976). Today, however, these damage measures, if included in a contract subject to the 
Code, would most likely be enforceable, since their magnitude is, given world cotton prices, in-
significant. Second, SMR Art. XIX, § 56, SMRs supra note 5 which provides that, “[i]f either party 
to the contract enters bankruptcy or admits insolvency, the other party may cancel the undeliv-
ered portion of the contract, with the market difference to be adjusted between the buyer and the 
seller, with one-half cent per pound penalty against the party in bankruptcy or admitting insol-
vency,” might be deemed an invalid ipso facto clause under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. 
42. The SMRs use it once. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. XI, § 47 (requiring the buyer to “exer-
cise all reasonable care of rejected bales”). The MCE Rules use it twice. See MCE TR, supra note 17, 
at R. 43, cl. 2 (requiring complaints filed in arbitration to be written “in reasonable detail”); id. at 
R. 5, cl. 5 (requiring claims of fraudulently packed cotton or false substitutions to be “presented 
within a reasonable length of time”). In addition, from 1944-1991 only one MCE opinion used the 
word “reasonable,” and the case was one that involved the proper time for making a claim for 
fraudulently packed bales, something the MCE rules explicitly state must be done within a “rea-
sonable length of time.” Id.; MCE Case No. 760 (1945) (noting that “in reaching its decision [the 
arbitration panel] could find no evidence of fraudulent packing,” and that (because the buyer had 
failed to inspect the cotton for six months, “the elapsed time cannot be termed ‘reasonable’ in this 
case for making a claim”)). 
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Second, the types of damage measures available in the private system differ in 
important ways from the measures used in the public system. The Code’s dam-
age measures are designed to protect the expectancy interest by putting the “ag-
grieved party . . . in as good a position as if the other party had fully per-
formed.”43 In contrast, the SMR and MCE damage measures tend to be under-
compensatory.44 Under the SMRs, the aggrieved party is entitled only to market 
difference damages plus a one-half cent per pound penalty that is trivial given 
contemporary cotton prices.45 The recovery of consequential damages is not per-
mitted, although the SMRs do impose fixed fines for certain types of misbehav-
ior.46 The MCE uses the same measure for breach of contract,47 and also imposes a 
variety of other fines such as per-day fines for delayed delivery48 and late pay-
 
43. UCC § 1-106 (1991). 
44. See infra note 135 and accompanying text (explaining that the market difference measure is 
so under-compensatory, particularly in merchant-to-mill transactions). 
45. SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. IV, § 18C. See also BoA Case No. 139 (1996) (although the buyer 
claimed $158,500 in consequential damages in its brief, this was not mentioned in the arbitrators’ 
opinion and no consequential damages of any kind were awarded). The rules further provide 
that the market price shall be determined from “three bona fide offers on the identical quality and 
with identical terms to that contracted,” given to the aggrieved party, and that “[a] buyer’s pur-
chase [when the seller breaches] . . . shall be based on the lowest of the three offers. [While a] 
seller’s sale [when the buyer breaches] . . . shall be based on the highest of the three offers.” Id. In 
addition, “[t]he party to receive market differences must present [a] detailed settlement amount 
in writing to the other party within three business days. [And t]he party receiving bona fide set-
tlement invoice must pay with good funds within five business days of receiving [sic] such in-
voice.” Id. In the ACSA-ATMI debates over the adoption of the three-quote rule, the shippers 
“felt it would be better to have an understanding [of the magnitude of damages] at the time [of 
breach], rather than after the fact, and thus avoid referring matters to the Board of Appeals.” 
Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1976). 
46. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. V, § 26 (requiring a penalty of one-half cent per pound in 
addition to interest when the buyer does not pay the draft or invoice within five business days 
after delivery); id. at Art. XVIII, § 55 (providing that if the seller fails to certify the origin or 
growth of the cotton, or certifies “growth other than that contracted for and such certification 
shows the cotton to be of irrigated growth, where raingrown cotton is specified or raingrown cot-
ton where irrigated cotton is specified, the seller shall pay to the buyer a penalty of one cent per 
pound on that portion of the contract”). 
47. See MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 22, cl. 2. 
48. See id. at R. 11, cl. 1 (“The penalty for failure on the part of the Seller to deliver cotton 
within the required time under above rules, shall be 10 ¢ per bale per day minimum to be paid by 
the Seller to Buyer and in no event shall this penalty exceed 25 ¢ per bale per day, but any excess 
over and above the 10 ¢ per bale per day is to be subject to the Buyer’s being able to furnish suffi-
cient proof of loss for such excess.”). 
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ment.49 Neither set of rules requires the aggrieved party to reveal any firm-
specific information — such as profit margins, inventory stocks, or the identity of 
other customers or suppliers — in order to obtain a monetary recovery.50 
Another notable difference between the trade rules and the Code is the ab-
sence of a trade rule equivalent of the Code’s nonwaivable duty of good faith. Al-
though briefs often make arguments based on good faith,51 no such duty is im-
plied by the arbitrators52 and notions of good faith and fairness do not appear to 
affect case outcomes. However, arbitrators sometimes do note in their opinions 
 
49. Id. at R. 11, cl. 2 (“The penalty for failure on the part of the Buyer to pay for cotton or fur-
nish shipping instructions in accordance with the above rules shall be 10 ¢ per bale per day plus 
storage, insurance and interest accumulated against the Seller during delay. Penalties accruing 
against the Buyer shall be added to the invoice, and those accruing against the Seller shall be de-
ducted from the invoice.”). 
50. In addition, the MCE’s sensitivity to transactors’ possible desire to keep information pri-
vate is reflected in MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 11, cl. 1 reprinted in part supra note 48 (providing 
for late penalties a buyer can get without revealing any firm-specific information, and larger pen-
alties he is permitted to seek if he reveals additional information.). 
51. See, e.g., Buyer’s Brief at 23, BoA Case No. 135 (1992); Seller’s Brief at 8, BoA Case No. 135 
(1992) (where arguments relating to “good faith” and “bad faith” are made in the briefs, but are 
not taken into account in the arbitration opinion); Buyer’s Brief at 2, BoA Case No. 126 (1987) 
(“[T]here is an obligation of good faith implied in all contracts and in all commercial dealings be-
tween buyers and sellers.”); Buyer’s Brief at 4, BoA Case No. 85 (1961) (“Seller has failed to live 
up to a contract, made in good faith and binding in every respect.”). 
52. From 1944-1990 good faith was mentioned in only one MCE arbitration opinion. See MCE 
Case No. 816 (1966) (noting that the “[d]efendant acted in good faith and did everything he could 
to expedite the shipment;” the arbitrators ruled for the defendant, but also noted that they were 
ruling as they did because the mill had agreed to take the cotton at a later time). Similarly, from 
1978-1990, the BoA issued eighteen opinions, none of which mentioned “good faith.” It is possi-
ble, however, that in the few cases where compromise decisions are rendered on the grounds that 
both parties behaved badly, notions of good faith may have implicitly influenced arbitrator deci-
sion-making. 
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that they consider a particular outcome to be unjust,53 or that one or both of the 
parties engaged in undesirable business practices.54 
 
3. Adjudicative Approaches 
 
The most important difference between courts applying the Code and cotton 
industry arbitration tribunals applying the trade rules lies in their adjudicative 
approaches. Broadly speaking, the Code directs courts to look to immanent busi-
ness norms reflected in course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of 
trade, to fill gaps and interpret contracts,55 and directs them to take parties’ ac-
tions under a contract as the best indication of what they intended their contract 
to mean.56 In contrast, despite the fact that cotton arbitrators are chosen for their 
 
53. BoA Case No. 122 (1987) (where BoA arbitrators considered the result they reached under 
the rules so unjust that their opinion contained a non-binding “recommendation” that the Seller 
give the Buyer a type of offset that many other sellers in the market were giving to their buyers at 
that time); MCE Case No. 832 (1985) (“This Committee has abided to the best of its ability by the 
applicable rules of the Memphis Cotton Exchange. It is the feeling of this Committee, however, 
that a penalty is being imposed unjustly and even though we were committed to follow the rules, 
it is the very strong feeling of this Committee that, had both parties deligently [sic] and agres-
sively [sic] pursued the committment [sic] of this contract, this Arbitration would not have been 
necessary. Unfortunately, this was not the case.”). 
54. See, e.g., BoA Case No. 137 (1996) (“This Board’s opinion is that the contract was poorly 
handled by both parties under unusual circumstances and that their gross misunderstanding 
should be shared.”); BoA Case No. 130 (1990) (“We feel this transaction was poorly handled by 
both parties and that blame should be shared.”); MCE Case No. 837 (1991) (noting that “[Plaintiff] 
did not exercise dilligence [sic] in the maintenance of the contract in dispute”); MCE Case No. 822 
(1971) (where the committee ruled: “(1) that the Committee take no part in a case involving a 
transaction which was, as admitted in writing in the evidence submitted, in direct violation of the 
regulations governing such transactions; (2) that the parties involved would have been wise to 
settle their differences in this particular case as quickly and as quietly as possible”); MCE Case 
No. 809 (1960) (“This Committee would like to point out that the risk involved in a contract of 
this nature is very great for all concerned.”). 
55. This philosophy is reflected in numerous Code provisions and Official Comments. See, e.g., 
U.C.C. § 1-102 (b) (1991) (“Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are . . . to permit the con-
tinued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the par-
ties . . . .”); id. at § 1-103, § 2-314(2) (a), § 2-504(b), § 2-609(2), § 1-102 cmt. 1; § 1-205 cmt. 1; id. at § 
2-202 cmt. 1(b) (explaining that language is to be given the “meaning which arises out of the 
commercial context in which it was used”); id. at § 2-202 cmt. 2. 
56. See id. at § 2-208 cmt. 1 (“The parties themselves know best what they have meant by their 
words of agreement and their action under that agreement is the best indication of what that 
meaning was.”). 
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industry expertise, they use a relatively formalistic adjudicative approach that 
gives little explicit weight to elements of the contracting context.57 
Cotton trade rules do not contain provisions making course of performance or 
course of dealing relevant to gap filling or interpretation and arbitrators are re-
luctant to take these considerations into account.58 Similarly, unlike the Code, 
cotton trade rules do not have a general provision making usage relevant to the 
interpretation of either contract provisions or trade rules.59 Unlike courts apply-
ing the Code,60 BoA arbitrators do not permit custom to trump or vary trade 
rules or explicit contractual provisions.61 In practice, BoA arbitrators only look to 
custom when there are no trade rules or contract provisions on point.62 On the 
 
57. Given the expertise of these arbitrators, however, these considerations may enter the mov-
ing papers and/or the arbitrators’ decision-making process in ways too subtle to detect. 
58. When ten merchants who had served as MCE arbitrators were asked “if the parties could 
establish that despite what was written in their contract they always behaved in a different way, 
would you apply this different, informal understanding, rather than the relevant trade rule,” two 
said yes, seven said no, and one was uncertain, explaining that it would depend on the identity of 
the parties. Briefs occasionally make arguments based on course of performance or course of 
dealing, but these considerations do not appear to influence arbitral decisions. See, e.g., Record, 
BoA Case No. 122 (1987) (where both briefs contain numerous references to course of perform-
ance and course of dealing, but these considerations are not mentioned in the arbitrator’s opin-
ion). 
59. However the MCE Trade Rules contain one particularized reference to custom, see MCE 
TR, supra note 17, at R. 23, cl. 1 (“Rules 20, 21, and 22 are in no way to change or nullify the pre-
sent rules and customs of handling sales of consigned or F.O.B. cotton when sold on actual sam-
ples.”), and in quality arbitrations conducted by the CSAB, custom may be looked to when there 
are gaps not covered by the contract or relevant trade rules, see CSAB rules, supra note 5. (“All ar-
bitrations will be held strictly in accordance with the letter and intent of contract and in case all 
points of any contract are not covered by the rules . . . such points are to be arbitrated according 
to the general interpretation of the trade in regard to the same . . . .”). 
60. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Imma-
nent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (discussing the ways that courts applying the 
Code permit custom to vary or trump explicit contractual provisions). 
61. See, e.g., SEAB Case No. 77 (1956) (noting the buyer’s contention that when “mills buy cot-
ton from . . . Group B . . . according to precedent and established custom . . . it is understood to be 
compressed cotton,” but rejecting it on the grounds that “while we recognize that precedent and 
established custom play a part in any transaction, the terms of the purchase [in this case] were 
definitely stated as subject to Southern Mill Rules and under Rule XVI, Section 53, DENSITY is 
covered . . . we therefore think Seller is right”); see also BoA Case No. 94 (1964) (“There were 
many contentions in very long briefs from both sides. However, this Board can only rule on the 
contract.”). 
62. In one case decided in 1935, the BoA looked to custom to define a term used but not fully 
defined in the either the contract or the trade rules. See NEBoA Case No. 313 (1935) (holding that 
because the contract used but did not define the term “Western Growth,” and the relevant trade 
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whole, references to custom or usage in BoA opinions are extraordinarily rare,63 
perhaps because given the amount of detail in the trade rules cases involving 
contractual gaps are uncommon. 
The MCE rules are silent on the applicability of custom. Some MCE arbitrators 
express a willingness to consider it, but in practice they do not seem to take it ex-
plicitly into account. Although custom is sometimes mentioned in parties’ briefs, 
from 1944 to 1991, of the ninety-one opinions issued by the MCE, only three con-
tain references to custom.64 
In general, cotton arbitrators decide cases in a highly formalistic manner,65 
even when their sense of fairness suggests that additional considerations are 
relevant or that a contrary result should be reached.66 As one arbitrator ex-
 
rules did not define it either, “the Board must therefore base this decision on trade custom”); NE-
BoA Case. No. 278 (1929) (noting that the terms of the contract were indefinite, and looking to the 
“correspondence submitted and the custom of the trade” in rendering its judgment). However, 
BoA opinions do occasionally refer to custom as an additional justification for a result reached on 
other grounds, or mention it in passing while attaching no particular significance to it. 
A similar approach to the role of custom in adjudication is used at the WCSA. See, e.g., Tele-
phone Interview with WCSA Executive (May 28, 1997) (“Whether [custom and usage] are viewed 
as relevant [in arbitration] depends on whether it relates to a subject about which there is a trade 
rule. If there is a trade rule on point, the custom is irrelevant. If there is not, then it might be 
looked to, to fill a gap, assuming that the contract too is silent on the point.”). 
63. For example, from 1929-1951, only four of the 42 opinions issued by the BoA even men-
tioned custom or usage of trade. See NEBoA Case No. 313 (1935) supra note 63;  
NEBoA Case No. 308 (1931) (rejecting a buyer’s claim that “the custom of the trade requires the 
seller to ship bales not pounds,” on the grounds that the New England Terms [a precursor to the 
SMRs] governed the trade and that Rule 27 of those terms “definitely states that cotton shall be 
delivered on a poundage basis.”); NEBoA Case No. 280 (1929) (a judgment pending submission 
of additional information); NEBoA Case No. 278 (1929) supra note 63. 
64. See MCE Case No. 807 (1960) (holding that the plaintiff prevailed since it shipped on a 
route “usually used by shippers to this destination”); MCE Case No. 791 (1952); (rejecting a posi-
tion based on custom and deciding the case on the basis of the SMRs); MCE Case No. 793 (1952) 
(“In ruling on the staple length the committee took into consideration the custom of the Trade in 
the territory involved . . . . also four affidavits furnished by the plaintiff.”). In addition, custom is 
mentioned in one MCE Appeal, MCE Appeal of Case. No. 787 (1952) (where in affirming the de-
cision below which made no mention of custom, a custom is mentioned in the appellate opinion). 
65. Formalistic adjudicative approaches are not uncommon in merchant-run private commer-
cial law systems. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 60 (describing the formalistic adjudicative ap-
proach of the National Grain and Feed Association’s merchant arbitration system); see generally 
Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS AND 
THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Bernstein, PALGRAVE]. 
66. See, e.g., BoA Case No. 97 (1967) (revised) (“In most appeal cases, there are statements 
made by one side or the other, or both, that should in all fairness be taken into consideration in a 
friendly settlement. However, the Appeal Board must adhere strictly to the rules. To deviate 
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plained, “We look to the contract and then to the trade rules; this is all we have 
to base it [our decision] on. Other things like custom and the background [of the 
deal] are infinitely variable so we don’t look to them.”67 
 
4. Enforcement 
 
The awards of both the BoA and the MCE’s arbitration tribunals can be en-
forced by seeking an entry of judgment in court.68 However, this is rarely neces-
sary. Failure to comply with a BoA award is grounds for expulsion from most 
shippers’ associations, and failure to abide by an MCE award is grounds for ex-
pulsion from the Exchange.69 Expulsions are widely publicized. Because mem-
bership in a shippers association strongly affects the profitability of a merchant’s 
domestic business70 and is essential to participation in the international cotton 
trade, these association and exchange imposed penalties, together with their at-
tendant social and reputational sanctions,71 are usually sufficient to induce mer-
 
therefrom would cause endless confusion and arguments. This Board can rule only upon the 
written contract.”); see also supra note 53 (discussing MCE Case No. 832). 
67. Telephone Interview with Merchant #4, retired BoA arbitrator (Mar. 1997). 
68. See Outline of Services, supra note 5, at 37 (“Should either party seek to have judgement en-
tered upon the award pursuant to the 9USC § 9, they may do so by applying to a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction located in Memphis, Tennessee.”); MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 43, cl. 1 (noting 
that when the MCE enters an award “judgment upon the arbitrators’ award [in a proceeding un-
der the new arbitration rule, see supra note 17] may be entered in any court having jurisdiction 
thereof”). 
69. MCE BY-LAWS, supra note 10, at Art. IV, § 8. The MCE has also implemented another safe-
guard against the judgment-proof problem. In addition to paying the annual membership fee, 
member are required to purchase a membership in the Exchange. The By-Laws provide that 
when a member fails to pay an arbitration award, the prevailing party has a right to make a claim 
against his membership. If the non-complying party still refuses to pay, his membership is auc-
tioned off and the award is paid from the proceeds. At one time these memberships were valued 
at about $20,000, Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997), although their value ap-
pears to have fluctuated widely, at least when sold at forced auctions. See Keyer v. MCE, 135 
Tenn. 414, 420 (1916) (noting that an MCE membership sold for $2,500); MCE v. Pope, 13 Tenn. 
App. 518 (1931) (noting that a MCE membership sold for $4,500); Capps v. Comm’r, 14 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 505 (1955) (noting that a MCE membership sold for $10,000). Today, however, the value of 
membership is approximately $2,500, Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997), so 
this bond offers far less protection than it did in the past. 
70. See infra notes 176-178 (discussing how a merchant’s membership status in these associa-
tions affects mills’ willingness to deal with him). 
71. See infra notes 177-179 and accompanying text (providing evidence that transactors are 
very reluctant to deal with expelled members). 
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chants to promptly comply with arbitration decisions unless they are bankrupt 
or in severe financial distress.72 
 
72.Moreover, even when the non-complying party is in financial distress, the associations, 
most notably the shippers’ associations, have succeeded in creating an implicit bankruptcy sys-
tem that increases the likelihood that intra-industry debts, even those that are discharged in 
whole or in part in the public bankruptcy system, will nevertheless eventually be paid in full. 
When a member of a cotton shippers’ association becomes insolvent or files for bankruptcy, 
his membership in both his regional association and the ACSA is suspended. ATL. COTTON ASS’N 
BY-LAWS, Art. VI, § 2 (1995) [hereinafter ACA BY-LAWS]; S. COTTON ASS’N BY-LAWS, Art. 6, § 11 
(1995) [hereinafter SCA BY-LAWS]; TEX. COTTON ASS’N BY-LAWS, Art. VI, § 10 (1993) [hereinafter 
TCA BY-LAWS]; W. COTTON SHIPPERS ASS’N BY-LAWS, Art. VI, § 6 (1994) [hereinafter WCSA BY-
LAWS]; see also AM. COTTON SHIPPERS ASS’N BYLAWS, Art. 6, § 2 (1999), available at 
http://www.acsacotton.org/About_ACSA/ 
Search%20Rules/about_acsa.html [hereinafter ASCA BY-LAWS]. Members of these associations 
are then notified of the action through association-promulgated circulars. See, e.g., ACSA Letter to 
Members (Oct. 19, 1995) (noting that [name of shipper] filed for reorganization “under Chapter 
11 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act [and that] [t]he Southern Cotton Association has suspended the 
membership of . . . the above firm in accordance to their By-Laws pending further review and 
any action by their Board of Directors.”). If, after going through the public bankruptcy process, a 
merchant wants to reenter the cotton business, he will, as a practical matter, have to gain read-
mission to an association. See infra notes 176-178 and accompanying text (discussing transactors’ 
reluctance to deal with someone who has been suspended or expelled from a shippers’ associa-
tion). However, an affirmative vote of a large percentage of both the board of directors and the 
membership-at-large is required for readmission, and every member has the right both to object 
to a membership candidate and to publicize the reason for his objection at the association’s ex-
pense. As a consequence, a former debtor who applies for readmission without arranging to re-
pay his intra-association creditors in full is unlikely to be readmitted, even though the rules pro-
vide that readmission is formally contingent “upon establishing, through the presentation of 
sufficient proof, that all outstanding financial obligations have been fully satisfied or that the re-
payment schedule for all existing financial obligations is current.” ACA BY-LAWS, supra. There 
have been instances where a former debtor was denied readmission for failure to comply with 
the repayment norm, subsequently paid his former creditors in full, and was then readmitted. 
Telephone Interview with SCA and ACA Executive (July 1996) (describing such incidents at the 
SCA and ACA); Telephone Interview with TCA Executive (no date) (describing such incidents at 
the TCA); Telephone Interview with Merchant #5 (no date) (explaining that being suspended or 
expelled has a large impact on a trader’s ability to do business, and that to be readmitted to an 
association, you would have to pay 100% of your debt notwithstanding any legal discharge). This 
implicit bankruptcy system may also partially mitigate the familiar incentive — which is espe-
cially acute in cash commodities markets — for firms to engage in overly risky activity when they 
are on the verge of insolvency. Because merchants who anticipate wanting to reenter the business 
after bankruptcy know that they will have to pay all of their intra-association (and perhaps intra-
industry) creditors in full before being readmitted, they are less likely to engage in certain types 
of overly risky behavior and end-period opportunism than they would be in the absence of the 
industry’s well-organized associations. The industry’s PLS, and the behavioral norms it encour-
ages, make it possible to impose a sanction that exceeds the wealth of the party in financial dis-
tress (albeit by a finite amount, since a transactor can also become judgment proof with respect to 
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The ATMI does not expel mills that fail to comply with arbitration decisions, 
perhaps because ATMI membership is not a prerequisite for maintaining a prof-
itable mill and such a sanction would have little force. However, in part because 
there are far fewer mills than merchants, when mills do not comply with arbitra-
tion awards, their non-compliance quickly becomes known throughout the mer-
chant and banking communities and the mill typically finds itself either unable 
to purchase cotton, or able to purchase it only at a relatively high price or for 
cash prior to delivery. As a result, noncompliance with arbitral decisions is un-
common unless the mill is in severe financial distress. 
 
B. Comparison of the Private and Public Legal Systems 
 
Some of the more important benefits created by the PLS stem from rather 
straightforward ways that its formal structures improve on aspects of the public 
legal system.73 
 
reputational harm if he engages in enough wrongdoing that he is unlikely to be readmitted to a 
shippers’ association even if he makes good his debts). The availability of these non-momentary 
sanctions, like the punishment of incarceration rather than, or in addition to, a fine in the criminal 
context, in turn, mitigates the incentive of a transactor in financial distress to engage in end-
period opportunism. 
73. Some of the benefits of the private system could be partially captured through the public 
system, or through straightforward public legal system reform. Some of the benefits of the PLS’s 
adjudicative procedures, for example, could be obtained if cotton contracts simply provided for 
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) administered arbitration. However, AAA-
administered arbitration is often as costly and delay-prone as litigation. See Herbert M. Kritzer & 
Jill K. Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing Time, Disposi-
tion Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and in the Courts, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 6, 18 
(1983) (concluding that “[o]ne does not save money by going to the AAA,” rather than state or 
federal court for claims above $5,000). In addition, because the AAA’s general arbitration rules 
give arbitrators wide-ranging discretion to grant continuances, see AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, 
WHAT EVERY ADVOCATE NEEDS TO KNOW — A COMMENTARY ON THE COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 20-21, 27 (1993) (discussing the granting of 
“postponements” and “extensions of time”), and because unlike cotton industry tribunals, the 
AAA cannot put any special pressures on parties to comply with its judgments, both pre- and 
post-award delay would likely remain a significant problem. 
It is possible, however, that careful drafting of an arbitration clause and the adoption of spe-
cial rules regarding the selection of industry-expert arbitrators and avoidance of delay might re-
duce or eliminate these problems. At least one of the AAA’s industry specific tribunals has at-
tempted these sorts of reforms. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, WIRELESS INDUSTRY 
ARBITRATION RULES (1997), available at http://www.adr.org/rules/commercial/wireless_rules.html 
(providing the option of “fast-track” arbitration with a “45- day ‘time standard’ for case comple-
tion” in front of a panel staffed by experts who are “engaged directly in the telecommunications 
industry”). 
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The procedural rules reduce the cost and delay of obtaining and enforcing a 
judgment. They provide a streamlined process that, compared to the public sys-
tem, makes it more likely that transactors will enter into new contracting rela-
tionships,74 makes it easier for large and small firms to transact with each other,75 
makes smaller-sized transactions viable,76 limits the ability of transactors to use 
 
Some of the benefits created by the trade rules could also be obtained if detailed, association-
promulgated, standard-form contracts that contained rule-like provisions and that provided for 
general commercial arbitration were widely used by transactors in a particular market. However, 
if the arbitrators interpreting these contracts did so under the Code, which they would be likely 
to do since they are supposed to apply the law, many of the benefits of the rule-like provisions 
would be diminished. The Code’s non-waivable duties of good faith and reasonableness, see 
U.C.C. § 1-102 (1991) (“[T]he obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care . . . may 
not be disclaimed by agreement”), as well as its highly contextualized adjudicative approach, to-
gether with the AAA’s direction to its arbitrators to achieve equitable results, may have the effect 
of transforming even rule-like contractual provisions into standards and transforming many of 
the transactors’ extralegal understandings into enforceable contractual obligations. In addition, 
although reversal of arbitration decisions for failure to apply the law is quite rare, particularly 
when, as in AAA arbitrations, no opinion is written, an arbitral agreement making it clear that 
the law is not to be enforced would be problematic. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Man-
datory Rules: Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999). 
In contrast, in the industry tribunals, the arbitrators can simply pledge to uphold the trade 
rules, and because their reputations are on the line, they are likely to do so, particularly in indus-
tries like cotton where arbitrators sign their opinions. Moreover, a party who has lost an arbitra-
tion under the trade rules is unlikely to challenge the arbitrators’ decision in court, unless an ex-
traordinary sum is involved or he is planning to leave the industry. Bringing such a legal action 
would likely result in extraordinary reputational harm and perhaps de facto ouster from the in-
dustry. As a consequence, even a general commercial arbitration tribunal charged with interpret-
ing detailed standard-form contracts under expedited procedural rules could not provide all of 
the benefits of a PLS. 
74. By reducing the cost of dispute resolution and increasing the likelihood that arbitral 
awards will be paid, the procedural rules, together with the shipper association membership 
rules, see infra note 167 and accompanying text, may make transactors more willing to initiate 
new trading relationships since they will be better protected in the event of nonperformance. 
75. For example, if a small merchant were forced to contract with a large mill under the public 
legal system, the small merchant might nevertheless decline to file even a meritorious claim, 
knowing that legal costs are generally high and that the mills’ in-house legal staff would be able 
to use many delaying tactics that combined with the delay inherent in the judicial process, might 
put him out of business. As a consequence, large firms would, in effect, be unable to make legally 
enforceable contracts with small firms. 
76. By reducing the cost of dispute resolution, the PLS transforms some meritorious claims 
that would have had a negative expected value in the public system, and therefore would most 
likely not have been filed, into positive expected value claims. As a consequence, the system 
makes it possible to enter into smaller contracts that are more likely to be performed, since each 
party has a credible threat to go to arbitration if they are not. The ability to enter into smaller-
sized transactions, not only helps small firms compete with larger ones but is also beneficial to 
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the arbitral process to engage in strategic behavior,77 and reduces the actual harm 
suffered by transactors who do not have access to capital on reasonable terms 
during the pendancy of a dispute.78 In addition, by providing for the appoint-
ment of industry-expert arbitrators, who can make many factual determinations 
more accurately and less expensively than a judge can, the rules greatly expand 
the “contractible” aspects of an exchange. The use of stream-lined procedures to-
gether with the appointment of expert adjudicators transforms considerations 
that in the public legal system would have been observable to the parties — that 
is, knowable by the parties but not worthwhile for them (from an ex ante per-
spective) to prove to a tribunal in the event of a dispute — into considerations 
that are also verifiable — that is, worthwhile to prove to a tribunal in the event of 
a dispute79 — thereby encouraging transactors to enter into more complete con-
tracts.80 
The substantive rules provided by the PLS also facilitate contracting in ways 
the Code does not. They reduce the cost of entering into an agreement by provid-
ing a comprehensive set of well-tailored default rules that reduce the negotiation 
 
mills. When a mill is able to purchase smaller amounts from multiple suppliers, it is better able to 
diversify away the risk of inadvertent breach, a risk that remains significant even when mer-
chants take the optimal amount of care. See infra text accompanying notes 216-219. 
77. For example, because cotton tribunals do not permit unrestrained party-initiated discov-
ery, transactors have no incentive to bring the type of non-meritorious suit that if brought in the 
public legal system might nonetheless result in a settlement since the defendant would have an 
incentive to settle for any amount below the discovery costs that the plaintiff could credibly 
threaten to impose on him before incurring significant costs herself. See David Rosenberg & Ste-
ven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 
(1985). Moreover, because these tribunals endeavor to keep the existence of a dispute secret, at 
least until a judgment is rendered, the arbitral process discourages the filing of suits solely for the 
settlement value that is created by their cloud on title effect, that is, for the harm that the mere ex-
istence of a lawsuit causes to someone’s reputation during the pendancy of the dispute. See Ed-
ward Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract Lawyer’s 
View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 U. OR. L. REV. 189 (1995) (discussing the cloud on title 
theory of the nuisance suit). Even though the existence of a dispute sometimes leaks out through 
gossip, because disputes are resolved faster, the monetary effect of the cloud will be much 
smaller. In addition, industry arbitrators’ reluctance to grant continuances or postponements of 
hearings and decisions, limits the ability of a party to use the threat of delay to persuade his ad-
versary to accept a lower settlement. 
78. Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997) (“When a little guy [merchant] isn’t 
paid, he may suffer huge financial harm.”). 
79. Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts and the Courts, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1992) (defining 
and discussing the distinction between observable and verifiable information). 
80. Encouraging more complete contracts reduces the number of unprovided-for contingen-
cies, and may therefore reduce the number of disputes. 
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costs, specification costs, information costs,81 and relational costs82 of contracting, 
as well as the risk of transaction breakdown. The clarity of the rules, together 
with the efforts associations make to ensure that transactors understand them,83 
reduce the likelihood that misunderstandings will arise in the first place, and 
helps to promote settlement when disputes do arise by making arbitral outcomes 
easier to predict. In addition, as compared to individually drafted and negotiated 
contracts, where free rider problems and network externalities often lead to the 
under-supply of innovative provisions and the lock-in of inefficient contractual 
provisions,84 the availability of industry trade rules85 facilitates the creation and 
 
81. Information costs are the costs to a transactor of understanding the terms of a particular 
transaction. When deals are concluded against the background of detailed standardized defaults, 
and variations are prominently noted in the special remarks section of a confirmation, transactors 
bear the costs of learning the meaning of the defaults only once and in an individual transaction 
need only take note of the modified terms. When transactors understand the terms of their con-
tracts, they are less likely to seek legal advice before entering into deals, thus reducing legal costs. 
82. Relational costs are costs that arise from the fact that, in many contexts, transactors ap-
proach the task of reaching an agreement “with an idea of how similar transactions are usually 
structured; they have in their minds an implicit form contract made up of clauses such as price 
that are commonly negotiated, boilerplate provisions, and legal default rules [and extralegal pro-
visions]. A party may be wary of suggesting too many deviations from the implicit form contract 
since these might be interpreted as a signal that he is a less reliable or more contentious trading 
partner than the average market participant. . . . [T]his signal might, in turn, lead the other party 
to either propose additional provisions or demand a price adjustment to compensate him for the 
added perceived risk that a dispute will arise. It might also increase the risk of transaction break-
down as well as the likelihood that the transaction will not be consummated by the relevant 
deadline.” Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 59, 71-
72 (1993). Avoiding relational costs is particularly important in merchant-to-mill transactions 
where the value of the transaction as a whole is strongly affected by the ability of the transactors 
to cooperate during its execution. 
83. See infra notes 192-196 and accompanying text (describing the ways the associations try to 
educate member transactors about the content of the rules). 
84. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the In-
teractions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985). 
85. Another advantage of industry-provided trade rules over individually drafted contracts is 
that they may enable transactors in the market as a whole to overcome coordination problems. 
Evolutionary game theory models suggest that, in an environment where two coordination 
achieving norms are initially available, coordination will be achieved over time even when each 
market transactor independently decides which norm to follow. However, there is nothing in 
these models to suggest that these individual choices will necessarily lead to the adoption of the 
more efficient norm. Which norm will ultimately win out depends, among other things, on the 
initial distribution of norm-following strategies selected by members of the relevant group at the 
time the game begins. In such situations, if the less efficient norm wins out, it is likely to retain its 
dominance since the norm will constitute a Nash equilibrium. See Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary 
Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict Strategies, 4 RES. L. & ECON. 1, 13 (1982). 
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introduction of new contract governance provisions. The industry’s private legis-
lative process overcomes the free rider problem by collectivizing the costs and 
benefits of the new provisions and reduces the network bias against new terms 
by ensuring that the new provisions will be incorporated into most industry con-
tracts in the future.86 
The adjudicative approach used by the industry tribunals also benefits trans-
actors. It encourages settlement by making arbitral outcomes easier to predict 
and promotes flexibility in the course of contracting relationships by refusing to 
transform extralegal understandings or patterns of adjustments into legally en-
forceable obligations. This adds significant value to contracting relationships. 
Cotton transactors consider one another’s willingness to make such adjustments 
important. There are often stages in a contracting relationship at which adjust-
ments that create tremendous benefits to one party while imposing minimal costs 
 
In the cotton industry, where coordination of terms and behavior are important, the centralized 
provision of trade rules increases the pace at which norm convergence is achieved, and when 
transactors wind up locked into an inefficient norm, trade rule changes can provide the exoge-
nous shock that moves transactors to the more efficient equilibrium. An examination of trade rule 
amendments in numerous industries that have PLSs demonstrates that adapting to technological 
innovations and other changes that require a coordinated response from market participants is a 
very common reason for trade rule amendments. 
One of the interesting features of these evolutionary equilibria is that the proportion of the ini-
tial population adopting a particular norm does not have to be notably large for the norm to be-
come an evolutionary Nash equilibrium. This suggests that in a market where large firms such as 
cotton mills have a preference for a particular norm and choose to follow it, they may constitute a 
high enough proportion of the initial population of traders to ensure that the norm is adopted 
market-wide. This may be a reason that an industry as a whole may be better off if its rules are 
made through a legislative process in which each firm, regardless of its size, has one vote, thereby 
more nearly equalizing the effect of firm size on the rules creation process. 
86. This benefit is more substantial in the exchanges and shippers associations in which (at 
least at the time the initial sets of rules were adopted) most transactors were buyers one day and 
sellers the next, than it is with respect to the SMRs, which govern merchant-to-mill disputes. A 
review of the minutes of the joint ACSA-ATMI annual meetings devoted to SMR revisions, from 
1947 to 1990, suggests that changing the SMRs is a long and arduous process rife with interest 
group politics. Nevertheless, over that same time period, sixty-six amendments to the rules (some 
important, others not) were passed. 
The availability of well-tailored trade rules may, however, have the undesirable effect of re-
ducing the rate of contract innovation through individually drafted contractual provisions. The 
cost of drafting new provisions will be nearly the same as it would have been were the contract to 
be governed by the legal system, while the marginal benefit of including an innovative term may 
be smaller since the trade rules are already well-suited to the transactions they govern. This effect 
may be reinforced if the terms supplied by the trade rules become part of an embedded reference 
transaction that transactors become increasingly unwilling to depart from. On the other hand, in-
dustry tribunals’ willingness to give effect to contractual language increases the incentive to draft 
and include innovative provisions. 
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on the other can, in fact, be made; yet transactors would be far less willing to 
make these adjustments if there was even a small risk that they might be re-
quired to do so in the future, a risk that is very real in the public legal system due 
to the Code’s course of dealing and course of performance provisions.87 For ex-
ample, in merchant-to-mill transactions, the inventory costs to a merchant of giv-
ing a mill an absolute right to demand early or postponed delivery would be 
prohibitively high, yet there are many instances when, if a mill asks for early or 
postponed delivery, the cost of accommodating the request turns out to be low. 
Indeed, although cotton industry trade rules and contracts provide clearly speci-
fied delivery times, it is understood that when making an adjustment is not too 
costly to the merchant, the adjustment will be made. As one merchant explained, 
it is important to have a reputation for being flexible since “adjustments are a 
common part of doing business. If someone is short of warehouse space, you 
agree to delay delivery; if someone needs a shipment early, you are ready to go, 
 
87. As both mills and merchants have grown into larger, more complex entities, this feature of 
the system has become increasingly important. In many contracting relationships, the people 
who enter into the agreements are not the same people that perform them (such as shipping 
clerks, truckers, and loading dock managers). In such situations, it makes sense for companies to 
give their employees the authority to make one-time adjustments where it seems desirable to do 
so. For example, if a truck arrives an hour after closing one Friday, and the loading dock manager 
happens to be around finishing some paper work, it would be desirable for him to agree to per-
mit unloading of the truck — it does not cost him much and it saves the merchant the cost of pay-
ing the trucker to stay with the load over the weekend. If, however, the loading dock manager 
thought that by agreeing to unload in this particular instance, he would be giving the trucker the 
right to require him or another loading dock employee to keep the loading dock open late on an-
other Friday, he might not agree to unload the truck. Although under the Code, one act does not 
constitute a course of performance, one loading dock employee might not know if another em-
ployee had agreed to a similar adjustment the previous Friday, or if another employee would 
agree to a similar adjustment the next Friday, thereby enabling the trucker to claim that failure to 
accept a late delivery on a Friday was a breach of contract by the mill (assuming the mill did not 
issue a written notice that no late deliveries would be accepted again and that strict compliance 
was required). Alternatively, the loading dock manager could simply be instructed by the com-
pany to have the trucker sign a waiver as a condition of unloading. However, such an approach 
might undermine the “good old boy” aspect of the relationship, which plays an important role in 
reducing the types of frictions that increase the cost of performance. In addition, a system of writ-
ten waivers would impose administrative costs on the firm. If these intra-firm transaction costs 
were high enough, firms might simply instruct their agents not to make these types of accommo-
dations, thereby introducing considerable rigidity into contracting relationships as compared to 
the situation created by the PLS where these adjustments can be made by agents on the ground 
without creating costly risks for their principals. For a more complete discussion of the inflexibil-
ity costs introduced by the Code’s course of dealing and course of performance provisions, see 
generally Bernstein, supra note 60. 
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so you do it.”88 Conversely, on the mill side, “a mill’s reputation for being flexible 
[when the merchant wishes to deliver early or late] is factored directly into the 
price; a much higher price is charged to those who are not flexible.”89 
Finally, the private system has a number of features that are designed to re-
duce the most serious problem facing PLSs generally, namely the risk of arbitral 
bias.90 
 
C. Conclusion 
 
Despite the fact that the cotton industry’s PLS is so well-run and so well-
tailored to the needs of the industry, cotton transactors do not rely exclusively, or 
even primarily, on the easy access to monetary remedies it provides to create the 
desired incentives for contractual performance. Rather, individual transactors at-
tach great weight to the reputations of their transacting partners, and the institu-
tions that create and administer the PLS also engage in many activities that are 
 
88. Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997). 
89. Telephone Interview with Merchant #12 (June 1997). 
90. The PLSs’ adoption of bright-line trade rules that leave less discretion to the adjudicator 
than the Code may help to reduce arbitral bias by making it easier to catch and therefore less 
likely to occur. The effectiveness of bright-line rules in constraining bias depends, in part, on the 
type of bias to be resisted. If, for example, the arbitrators themselves are assumed to be neutral 
actors who are subject to pressure by industry interest groups, being able to justify their decisions 
on the grounds that the result was “required” by a clear rule (and thus not a matter of individual 
choice) may be a way to help them understand this type of pressure. A desire to reduce the incen-
tives of various groups to apply this type of pressure may be one of the reasons that arbitral opin-
ions are not accorded precedential value, and that rule-making authority is clearly allocated to 
the associations’ private legislatures. If, however, the arbitrators themselves are assumed to have 
a preference for rendering biased judgments, rule-like provisions will impose only weak con-
straints. Fact-finding can often be manipulated to make outcomes appear dictated by the rules 
themselves. See supra note 28 (suggesting that the BoA’s old practice of circulating the evidence 
and arguments submitted to arbitrators together with its written opinion might have been moti-
vated by a desire to demonstrate the impartiality of the tribunal). 
Another feature of the system, the fact that BoA arbitrators are not permitted to know the 
names of the parties, is also a way of reducing the likelihood of bias against a particular individ-
ual. It is not, however, particularly helpful in reducing another type of bias that might arise in 
this tribunal, namely industry-segment bias — since the Board does know which party is the 
merchant and which is the mill. Nevertheless, the circulation of BoA’s opinions may discourage 
the Board from systematically favoring one segment over another, since this would become ap-
parent to industry participants, who might then opt not to include BoA arbitration provisions, or 
the SMRs, in their contracts. 
At the MCE, the norm of consensus in arbitral decision making (from 1944-1991, only four of 
the ninety-two cases decided were not unanimous) and the use of seven-arbitrator panels may 
also be ways of attempting to constrain arbitral bias. 
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designed to strengthen the social basis of trade and to promote the flow of repu-
tation-related information through the industry. These efforts succeed in making 
reputation-based nonlegal sanctions (like negative gossip, which may lead to re-
fusal to deal) an important force in the industry. They work in tandem with the 
monetary sanctions available in arbitration to provide desirable breach-or-
perform incentives and to enable transactors to devise better contract governance 
structures than they could in their absence. As a consequence, in order to fully 
understand the ways that cotton industry institutions influence cotton transac-
tions, it is useful to look at the importance of reputation at different stages of a 
typical transaction as well as the myriad of ways that cotton institutions seek to 
strengthen both the social and informational infra structures of trade. 
 
II. REPUTATION AND REPUTATION-BASED NONLEGAL SANCTIONS 
 
A. The Creation and Importance of Reputation-Based NLSs 
 
The importance of commercial reputation in the cotton industry is due, in 
large part, to the type of commodity cotton is, as well as to the ways that stan-
dard trades are structured and financed. Unlike many commodities that can be 
graded objectively, cotton grading has traditionally been a subjective process.91 
There are numerous grades and over forty other features that go into the descrip-
tion of a single lot of cotton.92 The non-homogeneity of cotton, and the difficulty 
of describing a particular bale with precision, is one reason that cotton is often 
sold “on sample.”93 It is also a reason that the commercial reputation of the seller 
 
91. See, e.g., FRANK A. RICHARDS, THE MARKETING OF COTTON AND THE FINANCING OF COTTON 
MERCHANTS 3 (1949) (“The classification [of cotton] is . . . an art, not a science.”); JOHN A. TODD, 
THE MARKETING OF COTTON: FROM THE GROWER TO THE SPINNER 102 (1934) (“The value of cotton 
is judged by its grade, length and strength of staple, and character . . . Grade is largely a question 
of appearance, and judgment is a matter of a good eye . . .[b]ut it is in judging the staple that ex-
pert knowledge is particularly necessary . . . There is no absolute opinion on staple, however, ex-
perts often differing over the same sample; indeed, the same bale will often appear to vary every 
time it is sampled.”). In 1981, however, a more objective grading technique known as High Vol-
ume Instrument (HVI) Classing was introduced. The cost of HVI classing has limited its use in 
small and medium-sized private transactions, but it is widely used in grading cotton subject to 
government-sponsored programs. COTTON COUNCIL INTERNATIONAL 1996 COTTON USA BUYERS 
GUIDE 13 (1996). 
92. See id. § 6 (describing the 69 varieties of American Upland Cotton, together with their sta-
ple lengths, micronaire ranges, and fiber lengths, as well as “25 color grades and five categories of 
below grade color” and “seven leaf grades . . . [and] one below leaf grade category”). 
93. A sale “ ‘on sample’ means the sale of particular bales by the samples drawn from them; 
that is, the purchaser receives the specific bales represented by the samples he selects.” TODD, su-
pra note 91, at 95. Other methods of designating quality include: a sale “on type” which “is prac-
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is so important to the buyer, particularly when the sale is concluded over the 
phone without physical inspection of the goods. As one merchant put it: “You 
want to do business where you know people and can depend on what they say 
about quality, since it is so subtle and so subjective. You are more likely to rely 
on quality when you know the guy.”94 The short-term volatility of cotton prices, 
the high volume, low profit margin nature of a typical merchant’s operations, 
and the fact that many agreements are not confirmed in writing until days after 
they are made, make all transactors concerned about the reputations of the peo-
ple they deal with. As one market participant explained: “reputation is essential 
in this business. Millions of dollars of business will be done on the basis of a 
thirty-second phone call. Agreements are essentially oral; they are documented 
for tax, invoice, or customs reasons.”95 And, as another noted, “Reputation mat-
ters because you conclude sales one day, and the confirmations do not follow for 
as much as a week or ten days, so during that time period, the integrity of a per-
son’s word is the only thing that bonds the contract.”96 
Commercial reputation is particularly important in merchant-to-mill transac-
tions. When a mill needs a particular type of cotton to keep its looms running, 
and this type of cotton may not be readily available on the spot market, the mill 
must rely on the merchant’s reputation for timely delivery of the precise type of 
 
tically equivalent to sale on private brands. The type samples are not offered as representing spe-
cific bales, but as the type of cotton the merchant can deliver,” and sale “on description,” which 
“means the sale of cotton with a certain designated grade and staple, without the presentation of 
samples.” Id. 
94. Telephone Interview with Merchant #8 (July 1996). 
95. Telephone Interview with Merchant #4, retired BoA arbitrator (Mar. 1997). Oral contracts 
are enforceable irrespective of their size. See SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. I, § 2 (noting that a con-
tract may be formed orally but “all contracts for the sale of cotton must be confirmed promptly in 
writing by both parties to the contract”). However, it is difficult to establish the existence of an 
oral contract since arbitrators are reluctant to rule on the basis of conflicting oral testimony alone; 
MCE TR, supra note 17, at R.1, cl. 1, 3 (“A contract for the sale of cotton shall be deemed final 
when the price, quantity, quality, time and place, or places, of delivery and terms of sale have 
been agreed upon between the Buyer and Seller and no contract can be rescinded without the 
mutual consent of both Parties thereto” but “[w]ritten confirmations of all sales shall be pre-
sented or mailed by Sellers to member Buyers within twenty-four hours after the sale is made.”). 
96. Telephone Interview with Merchant #5 (no date); see also Telephone Interview with Mer-
chant #6 (no date) (noting that the cotton industry is “a community of people who are in the busi-
ness of trading with one another, which requires that more integrity must exist. . . [you] don’t 
need explicit contract[s] or confirmation to backup what you said. What you say is key to the 
buyer . . . face to face, telephone conversation, fax machines, long distance, by voice; you have to 
be able to know the person you are dealing with [and] in markets of our size this is possible”). 
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goods promised.97 Similarly, mills can take many actions that strongly affect the 
value of the transaction to the merchant, but are not strictly prohibited by either 
the governing trade rules or most merchant-to-mill contracts, such as refusing to 
accept delivery outside of narrowly defined times, thereby forcing merchants to 
incur the cost of holding cotton in trucks over nights and weekends.98 
The way cotton transactions are financed also contributes to the importance 
attached to commercial reputation. Most merchants operate on a slim cash flow 
margin.99 Typically, more than eighty-five percent of the operations of all but the 
largest merchants are financed by one of three banks. This type of merchant 
banking is very personal. Banks inquire directly into the commercial reputations 
of their borrowers, and a merchant’s reputation, along with the reputations of the 
mills he sells to, strongly affects the interest rate he will have to pay.100 As one 
merchant noted, “Banking institutions have veto power over who merchants do 
business with.”101 And, as a prominent industry banker explained, “[w]hen ap-
proached by a merchant for credit, a bank lending officer’s first task is to become 
intimately acquainted with the merchant’s character, background, experience, 
and conservatism.”102 
Given these considerations, it is not surprising that cotton transactors view 
commercial reputation as an essential business asset, whose value will often be 
 
97. Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #8 (Aug. 13, 1997) 
(“[P]erformance on fulfilling contracts is what determines reputation — basically quality, on-time 
delivery.”). 
98. For more examples of these costs, see infra notes 135-136 and accompanying text. 
99. Moreover, mills typically pay merchants ten days to two weeks after delivery, leaving 
merchants to finance this cash gap which in turn makes a mill’s reputation for prompt payment 
very important to the merchant. 
100. See, e.g., FRANKLIN W. RYAN, THE COTTON MILL SALE-NOTE: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE 
VIEWPOINT OF BANK CREDIT ADMINISTRATION, 5 (1921) (explaining that when a bank lends to a 
merchant there is “an indirect credit extension to the cotton mill. The bank lends to the merchant 
to enable him to sell cotton to the mill on credit. The bank looks to the merchant primarily for the 
final payment of the loan but the biggest element in the loan is the moral risk and the mill man-
agement is an important factor in the moral risk when the cotton is stored in the mill’s own 
warehouse as is the usual procedure”). 
101. Telephone Interview with MCE Merchant #10 (no date). 
102. See Cotton Financing, typewritten pages with the card of C.W. Butler III, First Vice-
President, National Bank of Commerce Memphis, stapled to it; see also RICHARDS, supra note 91, at 
37-38 (“As the cotton business is highly specialized, the merchant’s experience and competence 
are important factors to be considered,” and “[Many] bankers make a regular practice of extend-
ing more liberal credit to established, reputable merchants than they ordinarily extend to bor-
rowers in other types of business ventures.”). 
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reflected in the selection of transactional partners103 as well as in the transaction 
price,104 the transaction structure, and other terms.105 
The most important determinants of a cotton transactor’s reputation are his 
record for prompt payment of his debts, his willingness to meet his contractual 
commitments (that is, not to “lay down” on a contract),106 his willingness to be 
flexible in work-a-day interactions,107 and his willingness to renegotiate commit-
 
103. Telephone Interview with TCA Executive (no date) (“In this business, you just won’t deal 
with folks you don’t know; you need a really large price differential to take a chance.”). 
104. Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date) (“Mills get a reputation about how 
flexible they are when certain circumstances arise [and] a merchant considers this very valuable 
business knowledge, this information about how flexible a mill will be. Some mills are more 
stringent about adjustments, and are very strict about demanding exact conformity to the con-
tract. These mills have to pay more for cotton than mills who are willing to be more flexible. The 
market knows.”); Telephone Interview with Merchant #7 (June 1997) (“Reputation is figured dis-
creetly into the price someone has to pay for goods.”); Telephone Interview with Merchant #8 
(July 1996) (“One’s reputation is an integral part of the price another is willing to pay for his 
goods . . . If a merchant has a bad reputation, there are mills who won’t deal with him, and other 
mills who might deal with him, but only at a discounted price.”). 
105. Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997) (explaining that mills 
who refused to work with merchants after severe weather affected the micronaire of a crop that 
had been sold for forward delivery “found that now merchants do not want to enter into long-
term contracts with the[se] mills although they are still willing to enter into shorter-term con-
tracts with them”). See Telephone Interview with Merchant #9 (July 1996) (noting that the influ-
ence of reputation on the section of contracting partners depends on the length of the contract). 
106. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #1 (July 17, 1997) 
(citing “laying down on a contract, bankruptcy, [and] not paying a debt,” as actions that would 
lead him not to deal with someone); Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant 
#2 (July 18, 1997) (explaining that you get a bad reputation when you “book a head and can’t pay 
for it,” or when you “lay down on a contract”); Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE 
Merchant #4 (Aug. 8, 1997) (explaining that “past history determines reputation,” adding that he 
wouldn’t deal with someone who would “lay down on the contract”); E-mail from merchant par-
ticipant to author, to Cotton-L Listserv (Sep. 29, 1997, 2:33:26 PM) (“A cotton merchant or buyer 
who has a good reputation is one that honors his word, whether it be in writing or is oral. He 
does what he said he’d do. If something goes to arbitration in a dispute, he agrees to go along 
with the decision. He expects to be treated fairly. A bad reputation comes from not honoring 
one’s word, lying, or failing to fullfil [sic] on a commitement [sic]. This can be done by either of 
the parties involved. An example is changing the class on cotton traded to reflect a quality differ-
ence. Another is selling one type of cotton, and knowingly delivering another quality that has a 
different value.”). 
107. Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date) (“Reputation is key. I care about how 
long someone has been in the business, and I care about whether, if there is a problem, they come 
to me immediately and try to work it out.”); Telephone Interview with Merchant #12 (June 1997) 
(“A mill’s reputation for being flexible is factored directly into the price; a much higher price is 
charged to those who are not flexible.”); see also supra text accompanying notes 87-89. 
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ments when circumstances change or adverse events occur.108 Other important 
attributes include a merchant’s record of on time delivery of the precise quality 
of goods specified109 and a mill’s reputation for promptly accepting delivery. The 
rules of most cotton associations as well as the rules governing merchant-to-mill 
transactions implicitly recognize the importance of each transactor’s reputation 
by making cotton contracts non-assignable.110 
The importance of reputation and the industry’s reliance on reputation-based 
NLSs goes back to the early days of the industry when NLSs were a rather inex-
pensive way to support exchange.111 Deeply rooted social forces, such as the cul-
ture of honor in the Old South and the close-knit nature of many small town mill 
communities,112 helped to ensure that a transactor’s sense of self-esteem, his posi-
tion in the community, and his social connections were intertwined with his 
business reputation, making breach of contract something that would hurt not 
only his business prospects but also his standing in his social community.113 As 
one transactor explained, “the head of a mill used to be a senior citizen in the 
community. His self-esteem depended on how he did business.”114And, as an-
other noted, “Until quite recently, most of them [MCE members] had their offices 
on Front Street in Memphis; they saw one another each day and viewed them-
selves as being part of the same club.”115 
 
108. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #2, former BoA arbitrator (no 
date) (“When I deal with an honest man, I know whatever happens we can work it out. If a guy 
has a tarnished reputation, I can’t count on this and will not deal with him!”). 
109. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #8 (Aug. 13, 1997) 
supra note 97. 
110. See, e.g., SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. IV, § 21 (“All contracts for the sale of cotton must be 
filled and received by the parties making the contracts.”); MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 9, cl. 1 
(“No order for the delivery of cotton is transferable without the knowledge and consent of 
Seller.”). 
111. Another consideration that might have motivated the industry to actively promote the 
availability of NLSs in the early days of the PLS is that prior to 1920, arbitration awards were not 
legally enforceable, so the reputational harm of being known as a welcher and being expelled 
from an association was the only force that motivated transactors to comply with arbitral awards. 
112. See generally JACQUELYN DOWD HALL ET AL., LIKE A FAMILY: THE MAKING OF A SOUTHERN 
COTTON MILL WORLD (1987). 
113. See generally GEORGE S. BUSH, AN AMERICAN HARVEST: THE STORY OF WEIL BROTHERS-
COTTON 421-39 (1982) (exploring this theme in the chapter Now I Lay Me Down to Cheat). 
114. Telephone Interview with Merchant #9 (July 1996). 
115. Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997). 
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Although these background social and communal forces which have gradu-
ally become weaker,116 over time cotton industry institutions have sponsored a 
variety of activities designed to recreate and maintain the types of deeply inter-
connected business and personal relationships that made social trust-based repu-
tation enforcement mechanisms effective. Over the years, the MCE has spon-
sored the local debutante ball, an annual civic cotton carnival that came to be 
viewed as the Mardi Gras of Memphis,117 golf tournaments, a Cotton Wives Club 
with its own publication, “Cotton Tales,”118 a well-known domino tournament, 
and numerous other civic events.119 And, to this day, regional shippers associa-
 
116. Despite the weakening of these social and communal forces, industry publications con-
tinue to romanticize the values of the south. See, e.g., Mac Isaacs, Editorial, Despite It All, People 
Are Still the Industry’s Most Important Asset, TEXTILE WORLD, May 1999, at 9 (observing that the 
“senseless acts of violence [in Littleton, Colorado] turns [sic] one’s thoughts to yesteryear in the 
annals of this great textile industry. Time was, in those days of family owned and operated com-
panies and mill villages, the company not only provided employment, but offered safe havens 
that met the needs of most families as well . . . Above all, [there was] a genuine care and con-
cern”). 
117. See, e.g., EVERETT R. COOK, MEMPHIS: COTTON’S MARKET PLACE 11, 12 (1942) (describing 
the 1931 origins of the MCE sponsored cotton carnival which by 1942 had grown to “include an 
Indian fight with De Soto on the levee, a parade taking for its theme ‘Way Down South’ . . . a pet 
parade, a marathon race. . . . [and a] horse drawn carriage . . . holding the King and Queen . . . 
[that] ranks now only next to the New Orleans Mardi Gras in its spectacular exhibition and at-
tendance”). 
During Carnival’s heyday, “[t]he arrival of the royal couple at the river front” would be “fol-
lowed by a series of parades . . . interspersed by beauty pageants, sporting competitions, lunch-
eons, fashions [sic] shows, and public and private dances.” Robert McLean, Cotton Carnival and 
Cotton Makers Jubilee: Memphis Society in Black and White 8 (1994) (unpublished thesis, George 
Mason University). All of this glittering activity was sustained by “[t]he business and social elite 
from the tri-state area,” many of them cotton men, of course. These, “joined by local residents, fel-
low members in one of Carnival’s ‘secret societies,’ . . . sponsor[ed] many of Carnival’s events, 
especially those not open to the public.” Id. at 3. Over time, however, the Cotton Carnival began a 
decline, suffering from “charges of class and racial elitism.” Id. at 170. For the next three decades 
after the death of Martin Luther King Jr. in Memphis, the process of dissolution continued. “The 
concept of mock royalty by those who in many ways, were in charge of the ‘kingdom,’ became 
ludicrous. Carnival ceased to entertain and instead became the embodiment of the divisions — 
social, economic, and racial — that prevented the city from developing.” Id. at 148. Today, the 
Carnival is scarcely a visible presence. 
118. By 1979, over 80 cotton wives clubs existed nationwide. Letter from the Club President, to 
Friends of Memphis Cotton Wives (Oct. 17, 1980). 
119. Forrest Orren Lax, The Memphis Cotton Exchange From Beginning to Decline 128 (1970) 
(unpublished thesis, Memphis State University) (“Because the Memphis Cotton Exchange was 
composed of the most influential men in Memphis it was easily the most important institution in 
the city. For many years the Exchange was not only an organization of cotton men but also civic 
minded men who used the Exchange to help the city. City problems were discussed in many Ex-
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tions continue to encourage social interaction among their members and their 
families by making their annual conventions family events, complete with spe-
cial entertainment for children and “the ladies.”120 The interweaving of business 
and social identities is further encouraged by the light-hearted social tidbits that 
can still be found in industry-sponsored publications.121 The close connection be-
tween transactors’ business and social relationships is aptly summed up by one 
merchant who explained that: 
Merchants take mill buyers on hunting trips just like in any other business . . . 
In the process, relationships . . . develop[]. Over time, a buyer gets the idea 
that he wants to deal with me not just because of our business relationship, 
but also because of our personal relationship. So you tell me, when you want 
 
change meetings with little mention of cotton. At times one gets the impression that the Memphis 
Cotton Exchange ‘was’ the city of Memphis . . . . It was probably the first organization in Mem-
phis to actively participate in charity drives for the poor of the city. It certainly was a leader in 
combating disease in Memphis. Many victims of floods also had reason to hold the Exchange in 
high esteem.”). 
120. See, e.g., Convention News, Newsletter (WCSA, Feb. 1, 1984) (billing the special offering for 
“the ladies” as a “very exciting presentation of music, gowns and dance”). 
121. For example, the Cotton Digest International has maintained a focus on industry personali-
ties. In the past, typical covers displayed the portraits of association executives, and a short bio 
was printed somewhere in each issue. An edition of the Digest devoted to the Diamond Anniver-
sary of ACSA included a history of the association — a list of its presidents, with photographs — 
and a quiz entitled Bits and Pieces About ACSA Presidents and Personalities. COTTON DIGEST INT’L 37 
Vol. 58, No. 12 (May 12, 1984). Questions from the quiz included the following: “Which ACSA 
President graciously accepted the President’s gift of a silver service, returned home and turned it 
in for a pair of bird dogs?”; “Which ACSA President, corrected extensively while reading a reso-
lution from the Chair, threw his pencil down in disgust and said, ‘O.K., some of you educated 
sons-of-bitches write it’?”. For several years, a column called Facts, Fiction and Rumors reported 
retirement regrets, see, e.g., Facts, Fiction and Rumors, COTTON DIGEST INT’L 38 (April 8, 1978) 
(mourning the loss of WCSA’s executive vice-president, Dick Doan, who “is hanging them up af-
ter more than a decade of service on the job. He’ll be missed! When Dick (and his wife) arranged 
a convention, they included wax for the dance floor”), tidbits on social events, see, e.g., id. (ex-
claiming: “Man, this is (or was) a busy week-end. Conventions in Costa Mesa, Charleston, Aus-
tin, followed a few days with meetings in San Francisco and Hot Springs. A man could stay 
loaded (from drinks) and broke (from expenses) trying to make all of them”), and legislative ru-
mors, see, e.g., id. (“As for farm bill changes, looks like Secretary Bergland and the administration 
are trying to ‘cut them off at the pass,’ with the 10 per cent acreage diversion plan. But congress 
will be back this week, and they’ll have the final word on farm legislation.”). In earlier years, the 
magazine Textile Industries, had a column Personal Notes about Men You Know containing similar 
sorts of information. 
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to do business, who will you call, the guy you like, or the guy you don’t 
like?122 
Cotton industry institutions’ efforts to maintain and strengthen social trust-
based group solidarity and to facilitate the informal flow of reputation informa-
tion were also greatly aided by the organization of shippers groups into close-
knit regional associations and exchanges with their own well-developed social 
groups123 and gossip networks.124 These gossip networks remain active today. As 
transactors explain, “Front Street [the main cotton trading street in Memphis] is 
worse than a bunch of old women;”125 “it is like a sewing circle;”126 “most 
breaches of a serious nature are known within a day.”127 These networks are so 
effective that “[m]ost [transactors] know of each other or can call someone that is 
in the region to verify some information on a person/firm they are considering 
doing business with. They rely on past experience/knowledge of that per-
son/firm.”128 
Over time, cotton institutions also began to encourage the emergence of a less 
personal form of trust, information-intermediary based trust. They created for-
 
122. Telephone Interview with Merchant #8 (July 1996); Telephone Interview with Mill Asso-
ciation Executive (Oct. 1996) (“The identity of merchants is important. [There is] tremendous loy-
alty between mills and merchants who literally know one another and are friends who work to-
gether in their relationship.”). 
123. See supra text accompanying note 115-119; see also Donna Rogers, Original Blackboard Dis-
covered During Restoration, AUGUSTA CHRON., (June 21, 1996), available at http://www.cris.com/ 
~pgarber/exchange.html. (“Besides serving as a place of business, [until the 1920s, the Augusta 
Cotton Exchange] was a place to play checkers, gamble and visit during the day and witness 
cockfights and bet on football games after hours — a man’s getaway, because women were not 
allowed.”); MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent #6 (Jun. 17, 1997) (listing “social benefit” as a 
main benefit of MCE membership); See, e.g., Wayne Risher, Museum may be in Future of Cotton Ex-
change, COM. APPEAL, Feb. 11, 1999, at CC1 (describing the MCE as “a rule-making body and a so-
cial organization,” and noting that it was “a big component of the story of why Memphis is what 
it is, socially and economically”). 
124. Times Change for Memphis Cotton Mart, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., April 25, 1989, at AA10 
(noting that in the past, “buyers and sellers packed into the downtown Cotton Exchange [in 
Memphis] to haggle over prices or trade gossip”). 
125. Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date). 
126. Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997). 
127. Telephone Interview with Merchant #5 (no date). 
128. E-mail from Association Administrator, to Mary LaBrec (Nov. 15, 2000, 9:45:21); see also 
Telephone Interview with Merchant #6 (no date) (that “We [the cotton industry] learn about 
[transactors’ reputations] from constantly talking with people and trading with people. Informa-
tion is passed word of mouth from friend to friend. We all know if there is a problem person”). 
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mal methods for transmitting reputation information,129 such as circulars report-
ing the names of transactors who refused to arbitrate or to comply with an award 
rendered against them, and, in some associations, information bureaus. At the 
ACSA, for example: 
Members desiring information as to the moral integrity, ability to judge cot-
ton, or financial responsibility of any cotton firm or commission buyer in the 
cotton belt may ask the Secretary to secure this data for them. The informa-
tion is obtained, in confidence, from sources which [ACSA] believe[s] to be 
accurate and authentic; it is passed on to the inquiring member without iden-
tifying the source of such information.130 
These association-sponsored information channels were also supplemented 
by an active trade press that covered all aspects of the industry’s operation as 
well as information provided by the banks who financed most of the industry 
and were quite willing to share creditworthiness and other soft information 
 
129. Several private publications aided in this effort. One such publication was The Interna-
tional Cotton Buyer and Cotton Seller and Reference Book, which, according to an advertisement for 
the work, furnished “information regarding the financial responsibility of cotton shippers and 
exporters in America, as well as the selling agents and merchants abroad,” but did not, like many 
similar publications in this or other industries, “depend upon correspondence or run lists of dead 
names. We send high-priced and competent men to every town in the South with enough cotton 
to sustain one shipper or exporter. These men procure the information necessary to the rating of 
these shippers or exporters while on the ground.” COTTON FACTS 210 (1926). Another such publi-
cation, The American Wool and Cotton Reporter’s Guide, also provided credit-related information. 
The 1950 edition included information for each company on the number of its employees, the 
amount of capital, balance sheets, and earning statements, as well as its name, address, products 
and company contacts. 
130. http://www.acsa-cotton.org/Become_a_Member/become_a_member.html; see also TCA 
BY-LAWS, supra note 72, at Art. VII, § 7-8, 10 (authorizing the creation of a “Bureau for Exchange 
of Confidential Information,” requiring that “[a]ll members of the Association shall hereafter re-
port to the Secretary. . . any unsatisfactory transaction had with any person, firm or corporation 
engaged in the business of buying or selling cotton . . . and upon request of the Secretary . . . 
members shall furnish any and all information which they may have touching the credit, qualifi-
cations, character and general reputation of any such persons, firms or corporations,” and grant-
ing all members access to the information); see also REPORT OF THE SEC’Y TO FIFTH ANNUAL 
CONVENTION OF THE ATL. COTTON ASS’N (April 2-3, 1928) (“I wish to take this opportunity of sug-
gesting that when our members take on a connection with a firm with whom they are not thor-
oughly familiar that they make inquiry of the Association regarding them. Precaution of this na-
ture will probably result to the benefit of our members.”); REPORT OF THE SEC’Y TO THE SIXTH 
ANNUAL CONVENTION OF ATL. COTTON ASS’N (April 2-3, 1929) (noting in connection with the pre-
vious year’s suggestion that members contact the association for reputation-related information 
that, “[m]any of our members have made inquiries, which have resulted to their benefit”). 
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about their customers with other market participants.131 However, despite the 
creation of these formal and informal information intermediaries, social trust-
based reputation sanctions remained important.132 Today, the industry continues 
to rely on both social trust and information-intermediary based trust to support 
exchange. As one mill association executive explained: 
In the past, a lot of cotton was sold on a handshake, with no documentation. 
This tradition has changed; still many transactions continue to be done on the 
basis of reputation and your word. Having a buyer-seller relationship you 
are proud of continuing with, with someone you like socializing with, is still 
important. The old ways are the silent partner of the written agreement; there 
is a real desire to work out problems.133 
Together, the social connections and information channels encouraged by in-
dustry institutions have succeeded in making so much reputation-related infor-
mation available, that reputation-based nonlegal sanctions are able to play an 
 
131. When asked how they got information about mills’ reputations, many merchants men-
tioned bankers. See, e.g., MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent #4 (May 30, 1997) (“Agents, my 
competitors, the subjects [sic] competitors, banks, trade journals”); Telephone Interview by Con-
nie Rogers with MCE Merchant #4 (Aug. 8, 1997) (“[M]y banker.”); Telephone Interview by Con-
nie Rogers with MCE Merchant #5 (Aug. 8, 1997) (“[B]ank references.”). 
132. Mill Survey, Respondent #1 (Aug. 11, 1997) (Reputation “means everything to me. A 
merchant with a bad reputation has little chance at business with me. No time has not changed 
the importance — that was part of my learning as I grew up”); Mill Survey, Respondent #4 (Aug. 
6, 1997) (reputation is a “high priority and this has not changed over time”). Some older transac-
tors, however, feel that the importance of reputation has diminished as the social ties that pre-
served business relationships and encouraged transactors to amicably resolve disputes have be-
gun to disintegrate. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Merchant #3 (no date) (observing that in 
the 1940’s, “reputation counted for more. Today there is more emphasis on price. Back then, eve-
ryone knew our prices were higher but wanted to do business with us anyhow. We were the Tif-
fany of the cotton business”). 
133. Telephone Interview with Mill Association Executive (Nov. 1996). It is difficult to trace 
the demise of the purely handshake based trade with any precision. However, an executive of the 
Southern Cotton Association noted that until 1987, most members traded on a handshake 
whereas now they tend to use written contracts. She attributes the shift not to any breakdown in 
reputation but rather to an increased bankruptcy rate in the mill sector, and merchants’ realiza-
tion that legally enforceable contracts were needed to enforce their rights in bankruptcy. See 
Telephone Interview with SCA Executive (no date). Similarly, in the diamond industry, where 
handshakes and intonation of the phrase “mazel U’bracha” (luck and blessings) have tradition-
ally been used to seal deals, written consignment agreements are now sometimes used to protect 
the consignors rights in the event the consignee goes bankrupt. The writings are still viewed as 
unnecessary as between the two parties to the agreement. Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal 
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 121-22 
(1992) [hereinafter, Diamonds]. 
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important, and generally positive, role in commercial transactions, a role that 
transactors recognize and manipulate quite explicitly.134 
 
B. Benefits of Reputation-Based Nonlegal Sanctions 
 
The wide variety of efforts cotton industry institutions have made and con-
tinue to make reputation-based NLSs available to transactors despite the exis-
tence of their extraordinarily well-developed and well-run PLS, suggests that 
reputation-based NLSs may play a role in cotton transactions that the PLS cannot 
replicate through its formal structures. It is therefore useful to explore some of 
the ways that reputation-based NLSs complement the monetary sanctions avail-
able through the PLS. 
To begin with, in the absence of these NLSs, the under-compensatory market 
difference based damages provided for in the trade rules would lead to ineffi-
ciently high levels of contractual breach.135 This is something that would be par-
 
134. The records in MCE cases reveal instances where damage to reputation appears to have 
been used as a threat by one or both of the parties. See, e.g., Letter between Parties indirectly in-
volved in the case (Mar. 1, 1980), from MCE Case No. 831 (1980) (“With regard to the Quality set-
tlement, we assure you to do best to settle pending amicably while still maintaining your reputa-
tion well in (foreign textile co.’s) group, i.e. . . (foreign names), meantime, we wish that you will 
do utmost to push your ginners friend to settle best possible too, so that your reputation will be 
well maintained well in this market.” An additional communication (dated March 7) records this 
request: “Pls tk actn to protct ur reputatn.”); Letter from Defendant, to MCE Executive Vice 
President and Secretary (Nov. 26, 1973), in connection with MCE Case No. 825 (1973) (Where 
“one of the contracts in question was called to (Defendant’s) attention,” and the Plaintiff told the 
Defendant that “we would have to take the cotton or he (Plaintiff) could not show his face on the 
street. He further stated that (Defendant’s Memphis Rep) would not be able to trade on the street. 
We agreed to take the cotton and he proceeded to invoice us cotton on all our contracts”). Similar 
allusions to social and business reputation harm can be found in moving papers submitted to the 
BoA. See, e.g., Seller’s Brief at 4, BoA Case No. 94 (1964) (quoting a copy of a letter from Seller to 
Buyer (July 27, 1964): “I believe that we should settle this dispute as gentlemen considering what 
is right and wrong and arriving at the dictates of our conscience . . . I would like to point out the 
fact that, as far as I as an individual am concerned, the outcome of our dispute placed with the 
Appeal Board will have very little effect on my personal life. This also is true as far as you as an 
individual are concerned. The real crux of the matter is — are we able to settle our differences 
man to man or do we have to ask outsiders who have absolutely no interest in neither [sic] your 
business nor my business to settle our difficulties . . . I appeal to you again to consider this dis-
pute in the light of right and wrong and let us get along with properly being friends and business 
associates. This thing has caused wounds much too deep than mere money will ever justify”). 
135. In merchant-to-mill transactions, both mills and merchants often suffer significant conse-
quential damages that are not recompensed under trade rule damage measures if the other 
breaches. First, if a merchant delivers defective goods and the defect is not detected before the 
cotton is used, the cotton may damage machinery (which due to technological changes is becom-
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ticularly undesirable in the cotton industry. As one transactor explained, “You 
want performance, not payment for nonperformance. [Payment] is not fulfilling 
your deal.”136 And, as another transactor put it, “you do not just breach and pay. 
This is not done.”137 
Transactors attitude towards breach of contract is understandable given the 
high velocity of transactions in the market as a whole, the low profit margin on 
most trades, and many transactors’ limited access to financing during the pen-
dancy of disputes. In such contexts, keeping the number of disputes low and 
minimizing the frictions and uncertainties involved in trade are essential to run-
ning a profitable concern. As one industry participant noted, “any departure 
from the ‘my word is my bond’ method of doing business [is] viewed as intro-
ducing uncertainty into the contract process, something that is viewed as per se 
undesirable . . . [T]he desire to run a smooth business is key to mills and people 
prefer to deal with reliable folks [for whom] they are sometimes willing to take a 
 
ing more sensitive to even small deviations in quality) and slow down the production process. 
See, e.g., BoA Case No. 127 (1989) (where the “Buyer allege[d] losses resulting from increased la-
bor costs, slow down of operations, and inferior yarn,” and while ruling on other grounds, the 
arbitrators noted that the “Southern Mill Rules do not provide for damages of this nature”). Sec-
ond, if a merchant delivers late, a mill might be forced to suspend or curtail its production (while 
continuing to meet its payroll) due to the increasing prevalence of just-in-time inventory meth-
ods. Third, because merchants operate on a tight cash-flow margin, if a mill refuses a shipment or 
accepts it and refuses or delays payment, the merchant may be forced to suspend or curtail its 
operations. Finally, whichever transactor arranged for the transportation will have to make good 
to the carrier, another unrecompensed and often unsalvageable expense. See Telephone Interview 
with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997) (When asked why breach, even with payment of money, upsets 
someone, he explained that “most of the contracts in the cash market involve a merchant buyer 
who has or will contract with an end-user, or are transactions directly to end-users. These end-
users need to get trucks and rail cars and scheduling unloading at particular times, all of which is 
very complex”). 
136. Telephone Interview with Merchant #9 (July 1996). The rules of several shippers’ associa-
tions and exchanges show a similar hostility to the idea that breach, even when accompanied by 
the voluntary payment of damages, is acceptable commercial behavior. For example, following 
several provisions setting out penalties for late delivery and payment, the MCE Rules state that: 
It is not contemplated in prescribing these penalties [for delay] that either Buyer or Seller 
shall intentionally be the cause of delays in carrying out the delivery within the time pre-
scribed and a continued or repeated violation will be the cause of the party, or parties, violat-
ing this rule, to be brought before the Board of Directors of the Memphis Cotton Exchange 
[and suspended or expelled from membership]. 
MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 12, cl. 1; see also SMRs, supra note 5, at Art. V, § 26 (setting out 
penalties for late payment by the buyer, but cautioning that the rules do not “give buyer any 
right to delay payment and any failure to pay within the prescribed period will entitle seller to 
relief for breach of contract”). 
137. Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date). 
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loss.”138 Although renegotiation in certain types of situations where breach is ef-
ficient is not uncommon,139 when it fails, transactors want to be able to rely on 
getting performance. As one transactor explained, renegotiation is sometimes 
okay, but when a mill says, “I’ve gotta have it now — when you have to have it, 
you have to have it, and the merchant generally delivers.”140 And, as another 
merchant noted, while some agreements are renegotiated willingly when doing 
so is mutually beneficial, “sometimes. . .the other guy is not willing to do this. He 
is just in a bind and will say no, and in that case, a person of integrity takes his 
word for it and just delivers.”141 More generally, as a prominent industry lawyer 
explained, even if transactors have to forgo the benefits of an occasional profit-
able breach in situations where attempts to renegotiate fail, doing so is worth-
while so long as they can count on their transacting partner to do the same when 
the shoe is on the other foot.142 
Although the industry could attempt to regulate transactors’ breach-or-
perform decisions through the award of fully compensatory expectation dam-
ages, its decision to rely instead on hybrid monetary and nonlegal sanctions of-
fers several advantages. First, as compared to a rule that provided for fully com-
pensatory expectation damages, the use of a market-based measure of damages 
that does not rely on firm-specific information, reduces the cost of litigation by 
eliminating the need for damages-related discovery.143 Second, the use of a mar-
ket difference based damage measure makes it unnecessary for the parties to in-
troduce complex valuation evidence on lost profit.144 Third, because the damages 
that would be awarded in arbitration can be calculated by both parties shortly af-
 
138. Telephone Interview with ACSA Executive (Mar. 25, 1997); see also Telephone Interview 
with Merchant #3 (no date) (“Your word is your bond, and any departures from this way of look-
ing at things bring uncertainty to the process; uncertainty of any kind is viewed as very undesir-
able.”). 
139. See infra note ___ (describing the industry’s renegotiation norms in some detail). 
140. Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997). 
141. Telephone Interview with Merchant #4, retired BoA arbitrator (Mar. 1997). 
142. Telephone Interview with ACSA Executive (no date). 
143. Since lost profit is a key component of fully compensatory expectation damages, and it is 
calculated by reference to revenues less costs, discovery is needed to ensure accuracy. In the ab-
sence of discovery, a plaintiff would have an incentive to introduce evidence that overstated 
revenue and understated costs in ways that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to detect. 
144. See generally ROBERT L. DUNN, MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., INC., RECOVERY OF 
DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS (5th ed. 1998) (discussing the wide variety of information relevant to 
proving lost profit under the numerous valuation methods accepted by some courts).  See also 2 
ROY RYDEN ANDERSON, DAMAGES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 11:27 (1991). 
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ter breach,145 the likelihood of pre-arbitration settlement is higher than it would 
be under an expectation measure. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, by 
adopting a damages provision that does not condition on firm-specific informa-
tion, the trade rules enable transactors to avoid revealing certain types of infor-
mation that they prefer to keep private. In cotton transactions, transactors’ inter-
est in keeping certain information private (their “secrecy interest”)146 may, in 
some instances, be even stronger than their interest in receiving full compensa-
tion for their losses in a particular dispute (their “compensatory interest”). 
Consider, for example, a contract between a merchant and a mill who, as is 
quite common, either transact on a repeat basis, or enter into numerous different, 
but overlapping contracts, each of which is for installment delivery over a period 
of months. At the time any one of these contracts is breached, the mill would not 
want to reveal its cost structure, profit margin,147 shipping arrangements, the 
identity of the other merchants it buys from, or other information relating to its 
vulnerability to non-delivery, to either the merchant or the market as a whole, 
something it would need to do to recover fully compensatory expectation dam-
ages as traditionally defined. Revealing this information might give the merchant 
additional bargaining power in subsequent transactions. It might also enable him 
to engage in hold-up with respect to other outstanding executory contracts be-
tween the parties, since, among other things, he would know the mill’s vulner-
ability to non-delivery.148 For example, if a merchant who had entered into sev-
 
145. The SMRs require the aggrieved party to get three actual price quotes within three days 
and give the breaching party five days to respond with payment. See supra note 45. 
146. For a detailed discussion of how the existence of a “secrecy interest” might affect transac-
tors’ litigation decisions, contracting decisions, breach-or-perform decisions, and suit or settle-
ment decisions, as well as the desirability of various damage measures, liquidated damages, and 
specific performance, see Omri Ben-Shahar & Lisa Bernstein, The Secrecy Interest in Contract Law, 
109 YALE L.J. 1885 (2000). 
147. Telephone Interview with Merchant #11 (2000) (describing mills’ and merchants’ profit 
margins as “very private information”). 
148. Similarly, because many merchant-to-merchant contracts are between competitors, a mer-
chant would not want to reveal his profit margin or, more importantly, the identity of the mills 
and other merchants to whom he sells, both pieces of information that would be needed to 
properly calculate the expectation measure. See Telephone Interview with WCSA Executive (July 
1996) (“The arbitrators at the WCSA do write opinions, but these opinions are only given to the 
parties. The Board has, on numerous occasions, considered and rejected proposals to publicize 
arbitration results. . . . [taking the position that because most disputes are among competitors, 
and most deals are kept secret, so should the results of arbitrations.”). Although liquidated dam-
ages clauses might seem to provide an alternative solution to this problem, the process of bar-
gaining for them often reveals information. See Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra note 146, at 1902-04 
(discussing the information revelation and secrecy compromising effects of bargaining for liqui-
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eral forward contracts with a mill for “old crop” cotton learned a month before 
delivery on the last contract that the mill needed only old crop to produce the 
last shipment of a particular kind of cloth for a valued customer, and the mer-
chant knew that old crop was not readily available on the open market, he might 
threaten not to deliver the cotton to the mill unless it agreed to pay a higher 
price. More generally, in the cotton industry, most firms are privately held and 
are extraordinarily reluctant to release basic balance sheet information to anyone 
but their bankers. In such contexts, if expectation damages were the only remedy 
available, and a merchant contemplating breach knew that a potentially ag-
grieved mill was likely to have a substantial “secrecy interest,” the merchant 
might view the mill’s threat to sue in the event of breach as incredible and there-
fore breach in situations where it was inefficient for him to do so.149 In contrast, if, 
as in the cotton industry system, the aggrieved mill had the right to obtain a 
measure of damages that did not require it to reveal any firm-specific informa-
tion, its threat to sue would be credible. In such situations, if the merchant 
breached, the mill would go to arbitration and collect market difference dam-
ages, whereas under a regime of fully compensatory expectation damages, it 
would not sue and would therefore obtain no recovery. The market-difference-
based measure of damages therefore protects both the mill’s secrecy interest and 
its compensatory interest better than the fully compensatory expectation meas-
ure. However, because the market difference measure is so under-compensatory, 
it would not, standing alone, adequately deter breach. This is one of the most 
important reasons industry institutions have gone to such lengths to maintain 
the availability of reputation-based NLSs. 
In practice, across the market, the NLSs supplement the damages available in 
arbitration so that a cotton transactor contemplating breach is well aware that he 
must take into account both the monetary damages he will be ordered to pay and 
the reputational harm he will suffer. As a consequence, if these NLSs are high 
 
dated damages clauses, and demonstrating that, while they are not as severe as those associated 
with seeking expectation damages, they may nevertheless be significant). 
149. Alternatively, the industry could try to set the damage measure (perhaps through 
manipulation of the per pound penalty) at some approximation of “average expectation 
damages” so as to provide more efficient breach or perform incentives. Indeed, it is possible that 
this was the original intent of SMR drafters. However, as the minutes of the ATMI-ACSA Trade 
Rules Committee meetings from 1947-1990 suggest, raising the penalty amount has proved to be 
extraordinarily difficult, since an increase would be more beneficial to mills than to merchants. 
As a consequence, augmenting these monetary remedies with NLSs may have been the best 
available way to increase the sanction faced by a would-be breacher. For an extended discussion 
of the desirability of awarding average expectation damages in a context where one or both 
transactors have a secrecy interest, see Ben-Shahar & Bernstein, supra note 146, at 1894-96. 
40 
enough (and in practice it seems that they are) the system of sanctions as a whole 
may discourage inefficient breach, and, because renegotiation is not uncommon, 
the loss from inefficient over-performance is unlikely to be large.150 
 
150. In theory, the use of NLSs to supplement monetary sanctions may lead to inefficiently 
high levels of performance, because it is difficult for the transactor imposing them to accurately 
calibrate their size. In practice, however, in the cash cotton trade, high levels of contractual per-
formance are considered desirable by market participants and voluntary renegotiation is consid-
ered appropriate (though not obligatory), in the contexts where the gains from efficient breach are 
likely to be the largest and most frequent. More specifically, the cost of renegotiation is lowest in 
situations where breach is efficient due to an increase in the seller’s cost of performance that is at-
tributable to a market-wide or regional event, like bad weather that makes cotton of a particular 
quality largely unavailable. As one merchant explained, although “[y]ou don’t breach with a mill. 
There are exceptions; if you contract for a particular kind of cotton a year in advance, and then 
everyone knows little of the quality was produced, there will be an adjustment.” Telephone In-
terview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997). In such situations, because the event that triggered the 
increase in the cost of performance is both outside the seller’s control and observable to the 
buyer, requesting renegotiation is not perceived to be opportunistic and is not damaging to a 
seller’s reputation. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Renée Liu with MCE Merchant #15 (Aug. 
1997) (noting that he is willing to “renegotiate if the quality of cotton [contracted for] is not 
grown”); Posting of Participant, to Cotton-L@listserv.aol.com (Jan. 27, 1998) (“Most of the cotton 
we book is on a 75% pre-harvest fixation, and the merchants are typically very understanding 
about crop failures or failure to plant due to weather as long as they are notified as early as pos-
sible.”). Indeed, a mill (or a large regional merchant vis-à-vis a producer) that insists on perform-
ance in such circumstances may find it more difficult to purchase on the forward market for a 
significant period of time. For example, one year in the early 1990’s, many merchants and mills 
entered into contracts to deliver cotton of a particular micronaire (a feature of quality) that turned 
out not to be plentiful in the crop due to weather conditions. This resulted in a large increase in 
the price of that type of cotton. If mills had insisted on delivery, it would have imposed huge 
losses on merchants. Many mills, however, worked with their merchants, and agreed to take de-
livery of a different type of cotton at a different price. There were, however, some mills that either 
could not or would not make these types of adjustments. As a consequence, merchants became 
reluctant to enter into long-term contracts with these mills, although they remained willing to en-
ter into short-term contracts with them. Telephone Interview with Mill Representative #1 (Apr. 2, 
1997). 
On the other hand, proposing renegotiation when an opportunity to sell to a higher valuing 
purchaser arises is considered more problematic, perhaps because the amount being offered by 
the higher valuing user is largely unobservable to the original buyer. See, e.g., Telephone Inter-
view by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #3 (Aug. 8, 1997) (explaining that he “would not re-
negotiate a contract because the seller found a better price. Word is important”); Telephone In-
terview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #4 (Aug. 8, 1997) (explaining that he “wouldn’t 
renegotiate because the seller [farmer] found a better price because I have already sold the cotton 
elsewhere and am obliged to deliver it”). However, profitable opportunities to sell to a higher 
valuing purchaser are uncommon. See Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Mer-
chant #2 (July 18, 1997) (noting that the opportunity to make money by selling to a higher valuing 
purchaser “doesn’t happen very often”). Cotton is generally available on spot markets. When it is 
not, as the price increases, the value of the goods increases to all purchasers simultaneously, mak-
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The second major benefit offered by the industry’s decision to maintain the 
availability of NLSs is that it enables transactors to enter into extralegal under-
standings that are backed by NLSs and are therefore likely to be performed over 
a range of market conditions. These extralegal understandings can add signifi-
cant value to contracting relationships. Even when contracting within the indus-
try’s well-run PLS, there is a limit to the amount of value that transactors can 
create through the use of legally enforceable contract provisions. Rational trans-
actors will only agree to legally enforceable commitments that condition on veri-
fiable information — that is, information that from an ex ante perspective trans-
actors would find it worthwhile to prove to a third-party in the event of a 
dispute. Although the PLS makes more information verifiable than would be 
verifiable if cotton contracts were adjudicated in court, the need for legally en-
forceable contract provisions to condition on verifiable information remains a 
significant constraint on transactors’ ability to create value-maximizing contract 
governance structures. Although some verifiable information is also observable, 
sometimes the most desirable contract provision conditioning on verifiable in-
formation will condition on information that is either not observable or is more 
costly to observe than the information required for a provision that conditions on 
information that is only observable. As a consequence, when transactors are able 
to supplement their legally enforceable contracts with extralegal understandings 
that condition on information that is observable to them but may not be verifi-
able by a third-party,151 they can create more valuable contract governance struc-
 
ing breach and resale to a higher valuing third-party largely unprofitable after the payment of 
damages. Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date). Although most transactors strongly 
condemn routine renegotiations that are proposed to facilitate sale to a third-party, in the rare in-
stances where the gains from renegotiation in such contexts are particularly large, transactors do 
in fact renegotiate, typically splitting the surplus, especially where they have a long-standing re-
lationship. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #7 (Aug. 8, 1997) 
(expressing reluctance to be bought out of a contract, but noting that he “guess[es]” that he 
would be willing to be bought out. “It depends on the person or relationship. If the person was a 
constant pain to deal with, I wouldn’t. But with a good relationship, I’d be more willing”); Tele-
phone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date) (discussing a time when a new employee of his sold 
cotton very cheaply, someone else offered a lot more for it, and they renegotiated). In sum, de-
spite the strong condemnation of unilateral breach, voluntary adjustments are not uncommon. As 
one transactor explained, “the reason for . . . requesting an adjustment is key. If there is a good 
reason, a shortage, financial problem, etc., the other guy will typically work with you on the 
problem. On the other hand, if you were to sell to someone at a higher price, and this ever be-
came known, which it would very fast, no one would want to deal with you.” Telephone Inter-
view with Merchant #5 (no date). 
151. Indeed, a comparison of the importance of reputation-based and other NLSs in diamond, 
cotton, and grain markets (all of which are governed by PLSs) suggests that the importance of 
these sanctions is closely linked to the importance to the value of a standard transaction of provi-
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tures than they could create if the extralegal sanctions that support these under-
standings were unavailable.152 
Moreover, the availability of these NLSs may also increase the value of the 
terms of transactors’ written contracts, not only by augmenting the damages im-
posed in arbitration, but also by making it more likely that interior contractual 
provisions — that is, provisions whose violation, while costly, would neverthe-
less not make it worthwhile to bring suit — will be performed.153 Given the low 
profit margin in most cotton transactions and the large number of these interior 
 
sions that condition on information that is observable but not verifiable. Although the types of 
events that can disrupt a cotton or grain transaction are similar, reputation is far more important 
in the cotton market. As one merchant observed, “Reputation is still as important to doing busi-
ness [in the cotton industry] as it was 30 years ago, far more so than in grain.” Telephone Inter-
view with Merchant #7 (no date); see also Bernstein, supra note 60 (presenting a case study of con-
tracting relationships in the grain and feed markets). Unlike grain, which can be objectively 
graded, cotton is graded on a highly subjective basis. Cotton buyers must therefore rely more 
heavily than grain buyers on a seller’s integrity for delivering the quality promised, especially 
where the sale is concluded over the phone. Even when cotton is sold on USDA type, the seller’s 
reputation may remain important to the buyer since there are nuanced aspects of quality that are 
not fully taken into account in official descriptions. More generally, until the introduction of the 
more objective HVI classing method a few years ago, even a more detailed contract description of 
the quality of cotton promised would not have been even a partial substitute for the seller’s repu-
tation for accurately describing goods. Reputation is even more important in diamond markets 
than cotton markets, at least in part because there are even more aspects of a diamond contract 
that cannot be adequately dealt with through state-contingent contracting. For example, it may 
not even be possible to describe a rough diamond with sufficient precision to enable a third party 
neutral to determine whether or not the stone contracted one day is actually delivered another 
day; yet a buyer will know if the stone delivered is not the stone contracted for. In a diamond 
transaction, reputation is also used to bond the seller’s warranty that the stone has not undergone 
one of several treatments to disguise flaws. Although these flaws can be detected through labora-
tory tests, the tests are too expensive to use in every transaction. See Bernstein, Diamonds, supra 
note 133, at 115. 
152. See Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self Enforcing Range of Contractual Relation-
ships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444, 455 (1996) (arguing that there is a “fundamental complementarity 
between court enforcement and private enforcement. . . . The two enforcement mechanisms work 
better together than either of them do separately”). 
153. In the absence of NLSs, if only monetary damages were available, interior contract provi-
sions might not be performed, because while breach of interior provisions imposes costs on the 
promisee, these costs are small in relation to the value of the transaction (and perhaps the con-
tracting relationship) to the parties, making any threat to sue if such a provision is violated in-
credible. As a consequence, breach of these provisions would be common and a lot of contractual 
value would be lost. However, when NLSs are available, and can be imposed even after a trans-
action has been completed (and at a much lower cost than money damages), the threat to impose 
them for breach of an interior provision is more likely to be credible, and the provision is there-
fore more likely to be complied with. 
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provisions (mostly relating to quality and delivery terms), increasing the likeli-
hood that they will be performed, while at the same time reducing the frictions of 
trade, can add significant value to contracting relationships.154 
In sum, the cotton industry has succeeded in creating a private legal system 
and a social and informational infrastructure of trade that improves on the sub-
stantive rules and adjudicative procedures in the public system and is well-
designed to maximize the value of transactors’ legally enforceable and legally 
unenforceable commitments. Yet to fully understand the reasons that the indus-
try has found it advantageous to opt out of the legal system, it is useful to con-
sider how the system as a whole is structured to create the conditions under 
which cooperative contracting relationships are most likely to arise and endure. 
 
III. FACILITATING COMMERCIAL COOPERATION 
 
1. Conditions for Creating Cooperation 
 
One of the most striking aspects of the cotton industry’s PLS is the small 
number of disputes requiring third-party adjudication. The BoA and the MCE 
each decide an average of only two cases a year.155 This relatively small number 
of arbitrations,156 combined with evidence that the incidence of work-a-day con-
tractual opportunism is low,157 that most transactional relationships are long-
 
154. Although reputation-based NLSs in the cotton industry are strong, they would not create 
nearly as much value in the absence of the PLS and would not, standing alone, be able to support 
efficient levels of trade or induce efficient breach or perform decisions. The PLS’s money dam-
ages, while under-compensatory, do succeed in bonding the price-risk aspect of cotton contracts 
by ensuring that a mere change in the price level will not make breach attractive. Given the vola-
tility in cotton prices over the length of a typical relationship, if it would be difficult, if not impos-
sible, for the industry to create reputation-based NLSs that were strong enough to control the 
price-risk aspect of transactors’ behavior. Moreover, the existence of the PLS puts a check on the 
amount of damage baseless gossip can cause, since at a certain point, the person being gossiped 
about can defend himself by pointing out that because the gossiper has not taken him to arbitra-
tion, his actions could not have been so bad. 
155. Despite the small number of cases arbitrated by the MCE, its member merchants consider 
arbitration to be an important benefit. When twenty-two MCE members were asked whether ar-
bitration was an important benefit of membership in the exchange, ten answered “yes” and 
twelve did not reply to the question. 
156. The SCA and the ACA arbitration tribunals each hear less than one case per year, Tele-
phone Interview with SCA and ACA Executive (October, 2000), the WCSA arbitration tribunal 
hears three to four cases a year, Telephone Interview with Merchant #8 (no date), and from 1993-
95 the TCA hears about three cases per year, Telephone Interview with TCA Executive (no date). 
157. See Telephone Interview with Merchant #6 (no date) (“I’ve been in the business near sixty 
years and there are only two or three people I won’t deal with anymore, and they are people who 
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term and repeat, and that contracts tend to be renegotiated when doing so leaves 
both transactors significantly better off,158 suggests that one of the more impor-
tant ways that cotton industry institutions create value is by providing a social 
and institutional transactional framework that effectively constrains opportun-
ism and promotes commercial cooperation in its shadow.159 
Supporting the emergence and maintenance of repeat-dealing cooperative 
contracting relationships is particularly important in industries like cotton where 
prices are volatile, transactional velocity is rapid, profit margins are slim, and 
execution costs, that is, the transaction costs of performing the contract, tend to 
decrease over the life of a contracting relationship (particularly in merchant-to-
mill relationships) as transactors become more familiar with one another’s busi-
ness needs, standards, and operations.160 
 
were marginal to begin with.”). See generally BUSH, supra note 113, at 436-37 (“Over the genera-
tions, the cotton business has been exceptionally honorable, with the trite but true aphorism of a 
man’s word being his bond applying equally to mills and agents, merchants and farmers. . . . con-
sidering the tens of thousands of transactions taking place in any given year, and the millions of 
bales sold, transgressions were remarkably rare. As a result, the cotton business operated in an 
aura of trust without which it could ill function: two parties to a contract could make commit-
ments at a firm price as much as a year or more in advance, and there was never any question 
that both parties would live up to the letter and spirit of the contract, thus enabling each other to 
plan future actions within an established framework.”). 
158. See supra note ___ and accompanying text. 
159. See supra notes 73-86 and accompanying text (discussing several features of the PLS that 
encourage settlement and decrease the likelihood that misunderstandings will arise). 
160. There are numerous sources of the execution costs savings in repeat-dealing relation-
ships. For example, when a merchant has sold to a mill for years, and the mill’s quality needs 
have remained stable, the merchant will know the quality range of cotton that the mill will be 
able to use. As a consequence, if the merchant consistently delivers quality in this range, the mill 
may no longer feel the need to spend the money to class (that is, to grade and inspect) its deliver-
ies. This can result in significant cost savings, some of which are passed on to the merchant in the 
form of a higher price. Telephone Interview with Merchant #11 (no date). Another important 
component of execution costs is coordination costs. As one mill buyer explained, these costs are 
now more important due to consolidation on the merchant and mill sides of the business, which 
has given rise to a “need to coordinate more in terms of deliveries since there are coordination 
problems . . . [you n]eed greater precision in getting bales from warehouse to mill . . . as mills 
have become larger, the timing and scheduling of deliveries has become a more complex opera-
tion, and this is now part of the merchant’s reputation.” Telephone Interview with Mill Represen-
tative #1 (Apr. 2, 1997). The significance of the problems caused by lack of coordination and/or 
standardization in delivery times and practices is also evident from the minutes of the annual 
ATMI and ACSA rules committee meetings. The need for some rules and regularities in this area 
is a regular subject of discussion, and while no rules on the subject have been adopted, both asso-
ciations have repeatedly agreed to circularize their members about the contours of acceptable be-
havior. See, e.g., Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1976) (where the ACSA again re-
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This Part explores the many features of the cotton industry’s PLS that, to-
gether with a variety of activities sponsored by industry-run institutions, as well 
as some social and economic path-dependent features of the transactional setting, 
have succeeded in creating the types of conditions that are generally associated 
with the emergence of sustainable cooperation among market participants.161 
In general, in order for cooperation to emerge in a particular market, transac-
tors must each adopt strategies of cooperating at the beginning of each contract-
ing relationship and thereafter responding to cooperative behavior with coopera-
tion and responding to uncooperative behavior (defection) with punishment 
(such strategies are called “tit-for-tat” strategies). Each transactor must also be 
able to obtain information about the reputations of other market participants, 
and reputation must be at least partially dependent on how a transactor behaved 
in previous transactions. In addition, each transactor must be able to observe 
whether the person he is dealing with has cooperated or defected. 
Cooperation can emerge under these circumstances because transactors have 
an incentive not to behave opportunistically. Although a transactor can still ob-
tain a short-term benefit from defection, he will realize that an act of defection 
will likely trigger a sequence of non-cooperative responses (most likely, refusals 
to deal) both from his transacting partner and, depending on the type of breach, 
from a certain number of other market participants. Because these non-
cooperative responses tend to reduce his future trading opportunities, the long-
run cost of defection will often be greater than the short-term gain from defec-
 
quested cooperation from the ATMI in “urging their members to receive cotton five days a week, 
thus utilizing to a greater degree our transportation facilities,” and the mills’ representatives re-
sponded that they were glad to recircularize this message). Finally, as compared to dealing with a 
new transactor, an additional advantage of dealing with the same firm on a repeat basis is that it 
may be easier to detect financial distress. When a firm is familiar with another firm’s payment 
patterns in situations where it is not in distress, and understands more about other aspects of its 
operations, it is more likely to be able to detect deviations from its usual practices that indicate 
financial trouble. 
161. For more formal discussions of the emergence of cooperation and compliance with arbi-
tral awards in historical merchant-run PLSs, see Paul R. Milligram et. al., The Role of Institutions in 
the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 J. ECON. AND POL. 
1 (1990) (describing the institutions that resolved disputes and enforced arbitral judgments in the 
medieval Champagne fairs and demonstrating that “[e]ven in a community in which any particu-
lar pair of people meet rarely, it is still possible . . . for an individual’s reputation in the group as a 
whole to serve as a bond for his good and honest behavior toward each individual member”); 
Avner Greif et. al., Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, 102 J. 
POL. ECON. 745 (1994) (drawing on formal models of repeat play games to explain the operation 
of merchant guilds in the late medieval period). 
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tion, so a transactor who is not in financial distress is more likely to cooperate 
than to defect.162 
In essence, when information about past transactional behavior is available to 
a significant number of participants, breach of contract as to one transactor is 
transformed into breach of contract as to numerous market transactors for the 
purposes of a transactor’s commercial reputation. As the reputational penalty for 
breach of contract increases, more commercial commitments are transformed 
into self-enforcing obligations,163 and cooperation can emerge as a long-term 
equilibrium. 
 
2. Creating Conditions that Promote Cooperation 
 
In the early days of the cotton industry, the types of trusting interpersonal re-
lationships that created an initial expectation of cooperative behavior were com-
mon. In the Old South, the culture of honor was strong. “Laying down on a con-
tract” or violating the maxim “my word is my bond” would result in social as 
well as economic ostracism.164 As a consequence, even in transactions between 
strangers, each transactor had a well-founded reason to believe that if he acted 
honorably (that is, cooperatively), his transacting partner would do the same. As 
one merchant explained, the market evolved “as an old boy network, a club of 
sorts. There was this idea that a Gentleman’s honor is his bond. Period. Once it 
started this way, anyone who didn’t honor his word would not get any busi-
ness.”165 
 
162. The ability of the aggrieved transactor to credibly threaten to seek a monetary recovery 
through an arbitration proceeding reduces the short-term benefit of defection. It therefore re-
duces the incentive to engage in opportunistic behavior, as well as the magnitude of the reputa-
tional penalty required to induce cooperation. 
163. For a more formal discussion of self-enforcing contracts, see generally Benjamin Klein & 
Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 
(1981). 
164. See generally SHIELDS MCILWAINE, MEMPHIS DOWN IN DIXIE 293 (1948) (“A man’s word 
had to be good on Front Street and that’s still true. But until recent years the Memphis trade 
couldn’t have been conducted on any other basis, since there were no written contracts or legal 
binders. A trader simply said to a factor, ‘I’ll take that stuff at nine and a quarter.’ The factor jot-
ted it down in his memorandum: 1500 bales, 9¼; the buyer, the same in his. Or they trusted their 
memories until the sale was put in the account books. And woe unto the man who claimed to 
have misunderstood the oral sale or was found guilty of dishonest dealing. Mr. Bill remembers 
that the Exchange expelled a man, and that the trade ostracized him, for selling reginnings for 
regular cotton.”). 
165. Telephone Interview with Large Merchant, Merchant #7 (June 1997). 
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Today, while transactors engage in more pre-contractual investigation than 
they used to, this initial expectation of cooperation remains common. The indus-
try’s active gossip networks continue to provide valuable reputation-related in-
formation.166 Transactors can supplement this information by making inquiries of 
industry bankers and by using the information bureaus maintained by some of 
the associations. In addition, because the associations’ membership rules, voting 
rules, and application procedures are designed to screen out untrustworthy or 
financially shaky transactors,167 the mere fact of association membership com-
municates valuable information about a transactor’s willingness and ability to 
meet his commercial obligations. As MCE members explained, when dealing 
with another member you have “the feeling of security in dealing with someone 
who is supposed to be responsibility [sic];”168 membership “shows a standard of 
ethical performance and acceptance by your peers as an acceptable trading part-
ner;”169 it is “like a fraternity.”170 As a consequence, when two association mem-
 
166. E-mail from Large Cotton Merchant, to the author (Oct. 30, 2000) (“Reputation is 
EVERYTHING . . . The cotton industry is a very small industry. Within any sector and any re-
gion, a substantial number of the industry is personally acquainted. So initial reports move by 
word of mouth.”). 
167. The membership applications used by associations and exchanges require applicants to 
be sponsored by several current members. See, e.g., SCA Application For Membership, attached 
to SCA Directors’ Letter No. 106 — 1983/84 (Mar. 21, 1983), (requiring each applicant to be spon-
sored by three members in good standing, or five members if the applicant has been in business 
for less than one year). Applicants are also required to establish that they are of good character 
and commercial standing, and to provide detailed financial information. For example, the TCA 
application requires applicants to, among other things, answer the following questions: (1) “State 
your experience in the cotton industry, include firms you have been associated with or employed 
by, functions performed, reasons for leaving such employment, and references who may be con-
tacted regarding your experience and qualifications;” (2) “Have you ever filed for reorganization 
under any of the several chapter proceedings of the Federal Bankruptcy Act? . . . Explain the 
status of any such proceeding . . . Are there any unpaid past due claims, or claims in controversy, 
now outstanding against you? (If so, please give particulars).” In addition, the form asks the ap-
plicant for “[t]he name of your bank,” and the “name of the bank officer authorized by you to 
discuss your financial ability to engage in the cotton business.” TCA Application For Member-
ship, attached to SCA Directors’ Letter No. 106 — 1983/84 (Mar. 21, 1983). Similar application 
forms are used by other associations. 
168. MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent #5 (no date). 
169. MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent #3 (May 27, 1997); see also Telephone Interview by 
Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #1 (no date) (noting that membership in an exchange gives a 
merchant an “aura of respectability,” and “lend[s] strength to [his] reputation,” in part because 
the “standards are reasonably high for membership, so [it] is evidence of a company with high 
standards, integrity”); Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #6 (Aug. 8, 
1997) (an important benefit of association membership is “to define who you do business with . . . 
The exchanges encourage members to do business only with other members”); Telephone Inter-
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bers trade with one another, each is likely to begin the contracting relationship 
by cooperating and thereafter to respond to cooperation with cooperation.171 
More importantly, however, by joining an association, a transactor implicitly 
binds himself to make more aspects of his commercial behavior in future transac-
tions observable to market participants. All merchant associations and exchanges 
require members to arbitrate disputes with other members and the outcomes of 
most cases become quickly known within the association or exchange.172 Mem-
bers who either refuse to arbitrate when they are obligated to do so or who do 
not comply with an award rendered against them, may be either suspended or 
expelled from their exchange or association, and will have their names posted at 
the exchange and/or mentioned in the association’s newsletters.173 Transactors 
who are suspended or expelled from a regional shippers’ association will also 
have their membership in the ACSA either “suspended or terminated,” and the 
ACSA will notify all of its individual members and all of the other regional asso-
 
view by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #7 (Aug. 8, 1997) (“[Membership] gives [you] some 
legitimacy.”). 
170. Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #6 (Aug. 8, 1997). 
171. The membership rules also create an incentive for some non-members who are dealing 
with members to be true to their word. Because association membership is a valuable business 
asset, most non-members hope to be admitted to membership. However, because only a few 
votes are needed to block a candidate’s admission, see MCE BY-LAWS, supra note 10, at Art. VII, § 
1, non-members are particularly wary of breaching contracts with members. As a consequence, a 
member dealing with a non-member also has a reasonable expectation that the other will behave 
honorably at the outset of a contracting relationship. 
172. See Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date) (noting that at the MCE, although 
“opinions may not be published or any information about the arbitration given out. . .it [the re-
sult] does become generally known”); Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (no date) (same). 
At the MCE, seven arbitrators hear each case, which ensures that 7.7% of the 90 member firms 
learn the result. In addition, the nine officers and directors who sit on the board will also know 
the results. If these board members are all from different companies, 17.7% of member firms will 
learn the information even though it is not published and even if no gossiping occurs. 
173. In addition, association circulars sometimes report suspensions for reasons other than 
failure to arbitrate or comply with an award, see, e.g., ACA Circular Letter No. 18 — 1992/1993 
(Apr. 7, 1993) (reporting an ACA suspension for non-payment of bale fees), or resignations under 
suspicious circumstances, see Letter to ACSA Members from General Counsel (Aug. 20, 1996) 
(advising that the resignation of [a shipper] “came within two days of their being advised that 
pending quality and weight claims, on shipments to the People’s Republic of China, had been 
brought to the attention of ACSA by the U.S. agent of the buyer and that ‘if requested an imme-
diate review will be undertaken by the Rules, By-Laws & Fair Practices Committee pursuant to 
ACSA Special Rule 18’ ”). The Southern Cotton Shippers Association [early name of the SCA] 
also adopted the practice of publishing the names of members delinquent in paying dues. See, 
e.g., Minutes of the SCSA Annual Meeting (April 28, 1943). 
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ciations of its decision.174 It is also likely that a transactor who is suspended or 
expelled from one shippers’ association for these reasons will be suspended or 
expelled from other shippers’ associations he belongs to. Three of the four re-
gional shippers’ associations make “any willful refusal to abide by any final arbi-
tration or award made by this Association, or by any other Association or Ex-
change,”175 grounds for suspension or expulsion. This provision for the reciprocal 
enforcement of suspension and expulsion decisions, with the attendant publicity 
provided by each association, greatly increases the magnitude of the expected 
reputational effect of these sanctions. As a consequence, transactors who are sus-
pended176 or expelled may suffer so much reputation harm that they will be un-
able to remain in business. Although most transactors are willing to deal with 
non-members (albeit somewhat reluctantly and on slightly different terms) as 
long as they have good reputations,177 they are extremely reluctant to deal with 
someone who has been expelled from an association.178 As one mill explained, for 
 
174. ACSA BY-LAWS, supra note 72, at Art. 6, § 2. 
175. SCA BY-LAWS, supra note 72, at Art. 6, § 1. 
176. See Telephone Interview with Merchant #5 (no date) (noting that “being suspended has a 
tremendous impact on a trader’s ability to do business. Mills do not want to take the added risk 
of non-delivery; no one would”). 
177. Some firms, however, steadfastly refuse to deal with non-members of any kind. Tele-
phone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #9 (Aug. 13, 1997) (“We shy away from 
non-members of one of the associations or exchanges.”). 
178. Of thirteen mills surveyed, twelve said that they would be willing to deal with a non-
member of a shippers’ association or exchange, one said he probably would not. Of those who 
would deal with a non-member, three mentioned that they would want more information before 
doing so, and all but one said they cared about whether the merchants they dealt with were 
members of a shippers’ association. In contrast, when asked whether they would deal with a mer-
chant who had been expelled by a shippers’ association, six mills said they would not, three said 
that they would be unlikely to, two said that it would depend on the reason for the expulsion, 
one did not answer the question, and one said that he certainly would not deal with someone 
who had been expelled from the Liverpool Cotton Association, but did not comment on domestic 
associations. The reputational harm of being expelled from a shippers’ organization is augmented 
by the fact that most foreign buyers will not buy from a merchant who is not a member in good 
standing of the ACSA or one of its federated associations. As a consequence, a transactor who is 
expelled for a domestic default will also lose his international business. See, e.g., Letter from the 
ACSA Executive VP and Secretary to the WCSA Executive VP and Secretary (Jan. 5, 1981) 
(“[M]any importing countries look to the ACSA members for their supply of cotton . . . The 
ACSA sends a copy of its membership list and changes therein and its list of exporting members 
to domestic and foreign cotton organizations and this is constructive notice to these organizations 
of our current membership. A number of foreign countries require a certificate from some of our 
exporting firms that they are a member in good standing of the ACSA before they will be consid-
ered for tenders, sales of cotton, etc.”). On occasion, however, a transactor will continue to deal 
with someone who has been suspended, if it is the only way he can expect to be paid. This is most 
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a merchant, “be[ing] expelled [from a shippers association] is usually a death 
blow to [his] business.”179 In addition, when a transactor is expelled from an as-
sociation, he must forfeit his membership fee as well as other tangible benefits of 
association membership such as price sheets, technology circulars, and access to 
the group’s information services.180 
Although mill associations do not have similar membership rules and do not 
expel members who either refuse to arbitrate or default on arbitration awards, 
when mills contract under the SMRs and provide for BoA arbitration in their 
contracts, they also increase the reputational consequences attached to certain 
types of misbehavior. BoA opinions are circulated to all ACSA and ATMI mem-
bers. Although the identities of the disputing parties are not revealed in the opin-
 
common when the reason for the suspension is bankruptcy and the transactor thinks he will get 
more in a reorganization if he helps the debtor remain a going concern. See Telephone Interview 
with Merchant #1 (no date) (describing a situation in which, in an effort to obtain some payment, 
a large merchant continued dealing with a small merchant after he had been expelled for non-
payment of an arbitration award). 
179. Mill Survey, Respondent #1 (Aug. 11, 1997). One of the main differences between con-
temporary PLSs and the historical PLSs whose operations have been rigorously modeled by 
game theorists, see supra note 161, is that the antitrust laws prevent contemporary PLSs from 
adopting rules that punish transactors who deal with transactors who have themselves been ex-
pelled or suspended from the group for bad behavior. This limitation on secondary boycotts 
weakens the enforcement mechanism sustaining cooperation, but has two partially offsetting ad-
vantages. First, if secondary boycotts were available, the effective size of the sanction created by 
suspension or expulsion would increase and associations would likely limit the situations in 
which they could be imposed to those where the risk of erroneously imposing them is low, such 
as non-payment of an arbitral award. If the sanction remained available for all of the offences that 
currently lead to its imposition, see infra note 183, it is likely that increased procedural safeguards 
would be demanded before it would be imposed. Adding these safeguards to the PLS, however, 
would likely erode some of its speed, cost, and secrecy-preserving benefits. In the absence of the 
secondary boycott, market transactors’ individual attitudes towards dealing with the individual 
in question determine the magnitude of the sanction, placing a check on the power of the arbitra-
tors. If transactors think a decision was improper, they can continue to deal with the sanctioned 
transactor as before. Second, in contemporary commodities markets that move as fast as the cot-
ton markets, if a transactor viewed himself as being at an absolute end-game stage relevant to the 
market as a whole forever, he would have an incentive to engage in extraordinarily risky behav-
ior that might lead to widespread harm if it did not result in financial gains, behavior that he 
might not engage in if he thought that over time he could restore his good name and reenter the 
business. 
180. The TCA, for example, restricts its information service to members. See TCA BY-LAWS, 
supra note 72, at Art. VII, § 9 (“All information so received by the Association . . . [under the rules 
relating to the information bureau] shall not be divulged or disseminated except to mem-
bers. . .and shall be by them treated as confidential.”). Similarly, transactors who are expelled 
from the ACA must also forgo the use the association’s debt collection bureau. See ACA BY-LAWS, 
supra note 72, at Art. VI, § 1(a) (describing the operation and benefits of this bureau). 
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ions, they often become known throughout the industry.181 These opinions have 
the potential to damage a transactor’s reputation. They often criticize the busi-
ness practices of one or both of the disputants, and can be particularly harsh on a 
party who prevails on a technicality.182 They also commonly mention settlement 
offers, if any, and while these offers do not appear to influence the amount 
awarded, they may have strong reputation effects since they may signal to the 
market which transactor behaved more unreasonably and was responsible for 
the need for arbitration. 
Thus, for these and other reasons, by joining an association and/or contracting 
under the Southern Mill Rules, a transactor greatly increases the value of the 
reputation bond he posts in each transaction.183 This, in turn, reduces the likeli-
 
181. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Merchant #3 (no date) (noting that, “sometimes [BoA] 
disputes stay quiet; some are well known”); Telephone Interview with Merchant #11 (2000) 
(same); Telephone Interview with Merchant #1 (no date) (explaining that at the MCE, “opinions 
may not be published or any information about the arbitration given out, yet it does become gen-
erally known”); see also supra note 172 (discussing how many MCE members learn about out-
comes due to their roles in association affairs). 
182. See supra notes 53-54 (providing examples of BoA decisions that criticize transactors’ 
business conduct). Being mentioned in a negative light in an arbitration opinion is likely to cause 
more reputational harm than being mentioned in a negative light in a court opinion. Unlike court 
opinions which are written, if at all, five or six years after a dispute arises, making their reputa-
tion-related information of little predictive value, arbitration opinions are rendered very quickly, 
so any information they reveal will be viewed as current and relevant. In addition, arbitrators’ 
opinions are more likely to cause reputational harm than court opinions, since they are written by 
highly respected industry members who understand the ins and outs of the business. 
183. Joining an association further increases the value of the reputation bond a transactor 
posts in each transaction, since by becoming a member he exposes himself to the sanctions of 
suspension and expulsion with their attendant reputational and material consequences, for cer-
tain types of commercial behavior that are prohibited by the association By-Laws, but not neces-
sarily actionable in a claim for breach of contract. Most association by-laws prohibit certain types 
of “fraudulent trading practices” and other sorts of uncommercial conduct, and suspend or expel 
those who engage in them. Conduct for which these sanctions can be imposed includes “the adul-
teration or misrepresentation of the official USDA class in the form of green cards, computer 
printouts, or tag lists . . . [T]he shipment of Foreign Cotton against any contract specifying U.S. 
growth . . . [T]he shipment of reginned, blended or recleaned cotton which reginning, blending or 
recleaning shall have taken place after its original baling, unless specified and described as such 
in the contract, “ TRADING RULES OF THE WESTERN COTTON SHIPPERS ASSOCIATION § 2, R. 2 (1994) 
[hereinafter WCSA TR], as well as “conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of 
trade or of misconduct or of fraudulent breach of contract or of willfully violating the Constitu-
tion, By-Laws or Rules of this Exchange.” MCE CONST., Art. IX, § 1. When a complaint alleging 
fraudulent practices is filed, the board of directors holds a hearing. If two-thirds of the board 
members present find that the rules have been violated, the accused is suspended or expelled 
from the association. The accused then has a right to appeal in a hearing before the whole Asso-
ciation, but three-fourths of the votes cast are required for reversal. WCSA BY-LAWS, supra note 
52 
hood that he will defect and more credibly signals to other industry members 
that he is a cooperative trading partner.184 
The likelihood that cooperation will emerge in this market is further increased 
by the fact that most transactors view contracting relationships as long-term and 
indeterminate in length.185 Many trading relationships span entire careers and 
transactors strongly prefer to deal with people they have done business with in 
the past.186 In addition, because many firms are passed down from fathers to 
sons, fathers are unlikely to engage in end-of-career opportunism.187 Even trans-
 
72, at Art. VI, § 1. Claims of fraudulent breach are infrequent, see, e.g., Telephone Interview with 
SCA and ACA Executive (Aug. 1996) (noting that over the past 5 years, only one person was ex-
pelled from the association for fraudulent breach of contract, when he shipped “gin motes” 
(trash) in place of bales), perhaps because they do not result in the aggrieved party obtaining a 
monetary recovery. Nevertheless, they may have a strong deterrent value because the penalty for 
violating them is high. 
184. The reputation-bond-enhancing effects of exchange membership were even stronger in 
the past when social ties among members were even stronger and most business among mem-
bers was done fact-to-face on an exchange floor. In those days, membership made even more as-
pects of a transactor’s business behavior observable to other transactors, and the fact that mem-
bers saw one another every day increased the speed with which gossip was transmitted, thereby 
increasing the strength of reputation-based NLSs for misbehavior. See MCILWAINE, supra note 164, 
at 302 (“The hundred and seventy-five members of the Exchange see each other every day. About 
nine or ten o’clock in the morning they drop into the Exchange to get the quotations off the board 
and read the cables. The factors or sellers then go to their firms and the buyers make the rounds 
of the sample rooms. The pace is slow. Like Robert Frost’s New England farmer they’ve got time 
to talk. During the off season, afternoon sessions of dominoes and checkers with occasional night 
sessions of poker and ‘craps’ weld the men into a sort of cotton fraternity. They have a common 
life of work and play — and also a common stock of traditional pranks like an initiation.”). In ad-
dition, in these earlier times, an expelled transactor would also lose access to information that at 
the time was too expensive for transactors to purchase individually, but today can be obtained 
cheaply, such as crop reports, weather forecasts, spot prices and futures prices. See Interview by 
Mary LaBrec with MCE Executive (July 27, 1999) (explaining that in the early days of the indus-
try, the cost of the information wire carrying quotations from New York and Liverpool alone ne-
cessitated a cooperative investment in an exchange). 
185. Most formal, game theoretic, explanations of the emergence of cooperation in repeat play 
contexts are based on the assumption (which, as the text indicates, holds in the cotton industry) 
that transactors view their contracting relationships as being indeterminate in length. See ERIC 
RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 121-23 (1989). 
186. See Telephone Interview by Renée Liu with MCE Merchant #17 (Aug. 1997) (noting that 
his father dealt with a “certain handful of people . . . stayed with them. That’s what’s desired.” 
He [the son] would “shop” until he got the price he wanted, but “stick with the same people”); 
see also Telephone Interview by Renée Liu with MCE Merchant #12, buyer for mills (July 21, 1997) 
(stating that he dealt with “the same merchants all the time — approximately 26 or so”). 
187. Conversely, a transactor’s incentive to engage in opportunism when dealing with some-
one nearing retirement may be similarly constrained by a desire to retain the firm’s business 
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actors who do not work in family-owned firms, may consider the social and in-
terpersonal costs of end-of-career opportunism to be prohibitively high. Retired 
merchants often seek honorary membership status in their associations so that 
they can remain involved in association-related business and social affairs.188 
Most spend a significant portion of each year in the small southern communities 
where they spent their working lives. Their wives are likely to be active in the 
industry’s women’s groups189 and may suffer social ostracism if their husbands 
behave dishonorably. 
In sum, the industry has succeeded in creating a contracting framework that 
facilitates the emergence of cooperation in its shadow by “making the future 
more important relative to the present; changing the payoffs to the players of the 
four possible outcomes of a move; and teaching the players values, facts, and 
skills that will promote cooperation.”190 
 
3. Maintaining Cooperation 
 
In most contracting contexts, cooperation, once established, is vulnerable to 
breakdown. When the stability of cooperation is facilitated by transactors’ deci-
sions to follow a tit-for-tat type of strategy, there is always a risk that one trans-
actor will misclassify an act of cooperation as an act of defection and thereby 
trigger a series of defections and counter-defections that might well lead to the 
 
when it is passed down to the son. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Renée Liu with MCE Mer-
chant #17 (Aug. 1997) (explaining that he “deal[t] with people who [his] father dealt with,” peo-
ple that he had “known for almost [his] entire life,” and that he knew who to do business with 
since he “paid attention” to who his father dealt with). 
188. MACILWAINE, supra note 164, at 293 (noting that a merchant who “had worked on Cotton 
Row for forty years explained “I wouldn’t have been in any other business. I never cheated any-
body in a deal, and most cotton men can say the same . . . It’s interesting, fine business for any 
man. When I retired I was made an honorary life member of the Exchange. I’m proud of that, I 
can tell you”); see also SCA BY-LAWS, supra note __, at Art.I, Sec. 1 (d) (creating the status “honor-
ary member”). 
189. See supra note 118 (discussing the Cotton Wives Clubs). More recently, the Cotton Wives 
have reconstituted themselves into state and regional associations of “Cotton Women.” Although 
the stated purpose of these groups is to assist the National Cotton Council with its “Grown and 
Made in the USA” consumer awareness campaign, they have continued many of the Cotton 
Wives’ Clubs more traditional activities. Recently, the Cotton Women’s Committee co-sponsored 
the first ever U.S. Cotton Champion Award, an updated replacement for the old Maid of Cotton 
Pageant. See Texas Firm Receives Cotton Champion Award, COTTON DIGEST INT’L (Feb. 2000), available 
at http://www.utexas.edu/depts/bbr/natfiber/natnews/2000/Apr.2000.nat.htm# TEXAS FIRM 
RECEIVES COTTON CHAMPION AWARD. 
190. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 126 (1984). 
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unraveling of the contracting relationship.191 These misclassifications may be due 
to disagreement about the content of the governing trade rule or norm, dis-
agreement about what actually took place (for example, whether the cotton 
shipped conformed to the contract specifications) or the difficulty of determining 
whether, if an undesirable outcome occurred, it was a mistake or an act of willful 
defection. Cotton industry institutions take a variety of actions that are designed 
to reduce the likelihood of these types of misclassifications and thereby increase 
the likelihood that cooperative contracting relationships, once established, will 
endure. 
First, the industry devotes significant resources to activities that reduce the 
likelihood that transactors will disagree about what types of behavior are to be 
classified as cooperation and what types are to be classified as defection. Associa-
tions go to great lengths to draft clear trade rules and to ensure that industry 
members know and understand them. Association circulars and reports com-
monly include discussions aimed at clarifying the meaning of rules.192 Rule 
 
191. See, e.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT & BARRY NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE 
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 106-15 (1991) (explaining why a 
pure tit-for-tat strategy is so vulnerable to cooperative breakdown and suggesting some ways 
that it can be modified to make cooperation more likely to endure). 
192. See, e.g., Report of the Committee on Rules, By-Laws and Fair Practices, Adopted at the 
43rd Annual Convention of the ACSA, San Francisco (1967) (“Your Committee wishes to ac-
quaint the membership with the ‘INTERPRETATION OF RULE 9 OF THE ASSOCIATION’S 
SPECIAL RULES’ passed this year by the Board of Directors, a copy of which is attached 
hereto.”); Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1951) (where, in response to a complaint by 
the mill representatives of trouble caused by the use of cement sacks, camouflage cloth, and simi-
lar materials for bale coverings, the meeting unanimously resolved that ACSA “circularize its 
members and [other cotton groups] . . . calling attention to Southern Mill Rule 37-A and to the 
fact that the Cotton Committee of the American Cotton Manufacturers Institute, Inc., according to 
its interpretation, states that Rule 37-A is being violated; that cement sacks, camouflage cloth, etc., 
do not come within the provisions of this Rule; and that no cotton bagging does come within the 
provisions of the Rule except that specified in U.S. Government Specification . . . that further no 
allowances would be paid except for bagging meeting this government specification” ); Minutes 
of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1974) (where ACSA agreed to circularize its members to 
“draw[] attention to responsibility of the respective parties on all ‘on-call’ sales”); Minutes of the 
ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1969) (noting that both ACSA and ATMI agreed to circularize their 
membership to remind them of the requirements of CSAB Rule 14 concerning size and represen-
tative quality of samples for arbitration). In addition, from time to time the rules are republished 
and sent to the memberships of both ACSA and ATMI. In the past, strips of paper that could be 
pasted into old rulebooks over revised rules were mailed to members between reprintings of the 
rules. 
The MCE also has a Committee on Trade, which has the duty “to consider, and from time to 
time report, such rules and regulations regarding the purchase, sale, transfer, etc., of cotton, as 
will be convenient to all parties concerned, and thereby facilitate and increase business.” MCE 
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changes are announced at annual meetings, publicized through association circu-
lars,193 and are sometimes discussed in the trade press.194 New merchants are 
strongly encouraged to attend the eight-week summer Cotton Institute that in-
cludes courses on the content of the most important sets of trading rules. The as-
sociations also urge their members to come to informal understandings on sub-
jects not dealt with explicitly by the rules,195 and sometimes encourage firms to 
educate their employees about certain aspects of the rules.196 In addition, the 
BoA’s practice of circulating its arbitration opinions, which often contain preachy 
statements about what is and is not acceptable business behavior,197 and the 
 
BY-LAWS, supra note 10, at Art. IX, § 1. Circulars are sent out to the membership to acquaint them 
with amendments passed by the Board of Directors. See, e.g., To the Members, MCE Circular, Dec. 
17, 1951 (reporting the rewrite and its effective date and explaining the rationale for the change). 
193. See, e.g., Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1970) (noting that both associations 
committed themselves to circularizing their memberships about the changes in Rule 23 and Rule 
26); Letter to All Members, ACSA Series A-Circular Letter No. 43 (Dec. 21, 1970) (“Six changes in 
the Southern Mill Rules were approved . . . Please place these [copies of the new rules] in your 
copy of the rule book for ready reference.”); Letter to All Members, ACSA Series A-Circular Letter, 
No. 5 (June 18, 1969) (reporting that at the 45th Annual Convention, Rule 5 and Rule 6 were 
amended and the following new Rule 11 was added: “RULE 11: THE SPECIAL RULES WILL 
APPLY ONLY WHERE A U.S. GROWTH IS SPECIFIED IN THE SALES CONTRACT. THE 
SPECIAL RULES WILL NOT APPLY WITH RESPECT TO YEAR OF GROWTH”). The associa-
tions also undertake systematic efforts to inform members about rules changes. After each ACSA-
ATMI Joint Meeting on the SMRs, a report is distributed to the members of both associations. 
194. See, e.g., Cotton Traders To Change Rules, COM. APPEAL, June 9, 1992, at B5 (reporting that 
“[c]otton trading rules that apply to members of the Memphis Cotton Exchange will change from 
Rule 3 to Rule 5 . . . . Under Rule 3 . . . cotton merchants or brokers pay warehousing costs. . . . 
Rule 5 . . . shifts those costs to cotton growers”); Exchange to Keep Cotton Sales Rule, COM. APPEAL, 
Sept. 26, 1991, at B8 (noting that unlike the MCE, the Greenwood Exchange had no plans to 
change its trading rules); Charles Conner, Agricultural Briefs, COM. APPEAL, Mar. 8, 1992, at C4 
(discussing the change from Rule 3 to Rule 5 trading and changes in the “Rule 19 penalty for 
light-weight bales”). 
195. The WCSA Rules, for example, contain a non-binding note that follows the rules dealing 
with the quality of tender. The note states that “[b]uyers and sellers should be careful to agree 
among themselves as to the tolerances of qualities deliverable under the contract, when the qual-
ity is guaranteed through as stated. While it is almost impossible to preclude variances of quali-
ties in a shipment from the quality stated, sellers should be cognizant of buyers expectations in 
this regard, and in keeping with fair and reasonable practices of the trade, should disclose to 
buyer any severe variance in quality of the intended shipment.” WCSA TR, supra note 183, at § II, 
R. 1, cl. 1. 
196. See, e.g., Letter to All Members, ACSA Series A-Circular Letter, No. 5 (June 18, 1969), circu-
lated with a copy of the amended rules (“We wish to call forcefully to the attention of the mem-
bership the practices which are listed in the Special Rules and to advise that principals of firms 
review these rules with their employees.”). 
197. See supra note 54 or 182. 
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many ACSA and ATMI circulars that try to use moral suasion to induce transac-
tors to adopt particular practices not required by the rules,198 further contribute 
to the creation of a rough consensus as to the contours of acceptable behavior. 
Second, the industry has created a separate tribunal, the CSAB, to deal with 
the most common type of fact-based misunderstanding, namely disagreements 
over whether a delivery conforms to the contract’s quality specifications. Quality 
is an aspect of performance that, in the absence of the CSAB, might lead to the 
breakdown of many relationships. Even in the absence of opportunism, two cot-
ton transactors, each acting in good faith, might well disagree about how to 
grade a particular shipment, and each might therefore conclude that the other 
has defected. The ability to submit the goods to a neutral tribunal at a low cost 
and to obtain a quick ruling on the subject without filing a claim for breach can 
play an important role in preventing contractual relationships from unraveling.199 
 
198. ATMI and ACSA have each gone to great lengths to persuade the other organization to 
circularize its members asking (but not requiring) them to act in particular ways or to comply 
with particular rules. This suggests that each believes that these nonbinding recommendations 
have enough force to add at least some value to transactions. See, e.g., Minutes of the ACSA-
ATMI Joint Meeting (1981) (where the ATMI expressed its reluctance to approve any changes to 
Rules #22, 46 or 47, but pledged instead to “attempt to influence all mills to live up to [Rule #22] 
as written,” by publicizing the rule in “Textile Trends,” [an association sponsored publication] 
and indicated that it was also willing to “consider on the matter” a special mailing from the 
Chairman to mill principals); Minutes of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1976) (where ACSA 
“requested cooperation again from the ATMI in urging their members to receive cotton five days 
a week, thus utilizing to a greater degree our transportation facilities,” and the mill representa-
tives responded that they would be glad to recircularize this message); Minutes of the ACSA-
ATMI Joint Meeting (1974) (where ACSA “again requested that the ATMI circulate a memoran-
dum to its members pointing out the problems incurred by some shippers by failure of the mill to 
properly care for rejections,” and ATMI responded that it would be “happy to do this again, as it 
was definitely the responsibility of the mills to properly care for rejections”); Minutes of the 
ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1973) (where ATMI agreed to circularize its membership about re-
turning rejected bales to the shippers in the same condition in which they had arrived); Minutes 
of the ACSA-ATMI Joint Meeting (1966) (where ATMI and ACSA failed to agree on a rule deal-
ing with Friday delivery, but the ATMI agreed to try to enlist “the cooperation of everyone” by 
circularizing its own membership on the subject). 
199. The importance of resolving this type of disagreement quickly is reflected in the MCE 
trading rules. See MCE TR, supra note 17, at R. 34, cl. 2 (“In any case relating to the classification 
and delivery of cotton where it is shown that an immediate decision is desirable, the President . . . 
may . . . appoint a special committee of three members with full power to waive all bond and for-
malities and render an immediate decision.”). In addition, in merchant-to-mill transactions, the 
availability of CSAB arbitration creates an incentive for merchants not to make opportunistic use 
of the cure provision in the SMRs. When the CSAB determines goods to be nonconforming, 
gossip based on this verified fact can be at least mildly damaging, thereby increasing the cost of 
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To understand why, suppose that a seller (S) ships what he thinks are conform-
ing goods to a buyer (B) who claims that the goods arrived in a nonconforming 
state. If B calls S and says the goods are nonconforming, S will have no way of 
knowing if this is true. Although he knows that he shipped conforming goods, 
there is always the unavoidable and not insubstantial risk that they were dam-
aged in transit, which makes it difficult for him to tell whether B, by complain-
ing, is cooperating or defecting. In such a situation, S can request that the cotton 
be sent to the CSAB. If the arbitrator says the goods are nonconforming, S will 
realize that she in fact defected. She might then offer to cure, an option given to 
her as of right under the trade rules,200 or she might attempt to reach a price ad-
justment with B (most likely, one at least slightly favorable to him). However, 
even if these attempts fail, and B responds with defection, S will conclude that 
B’s second defection is merely in response to her own defection, and that if she 
decides to respond with cooperation, B may do the same, thereby preventing the 
breakdown of the relationship.201 In general, transactors do not view asking for 
quality arbitration as damaging to their commercial relationship as long as it is 
not done too often. It is widely recognized that two cotton men acting in good 
faith may well grade a particular lot of cotton differently.202 
Although the quality intermediary can determine whether a shipment con-
formed to the contract, it does not reveal any information about whether the 
seller intentionally or mistakenly shipped non-conforming goods or whether the 
buyer genuinely thought the goods were nonconforming or attempted to reject 
them for opportunistic reasons. Despite the fact that the industry has taken nu-
merous steps to reduce misclassification risk by promoting widespread agree-
ment on the meaning of rules, the vagaries of weather and agriculture, as well as 
 
cure to the breaching party and giving him an increased incentive to avoid intentionally sending 
nonconforming goods in the first place. 
200. SMR, supra note 5, at Art. III, § 9 (“All cotton rejected by buyer against contract must be 
replaced by delivery of an equal quantity as the cotton rejected, and of the quality of cotton speci-
fied in the contract, within fourteen business days of mutual agreement regarding rejections, or 
of final decision by arbitration as herein provided for.”). 
201. For a more technical discussion of this type of strategy, known as “contrite tit-for-tat,” see 
ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND 
COLLABORATION 34 (1987) (noting that a contrite tit-for-tat strategy is one that “has three states: 
‘contrite,’ ‘content’ and ‘provoked.’ It [the strategy] begins in content with cooperation and stays 
there unless there is a unilateral defection. If it was the victim while content, it becomes provoked 
and defects until a cooperation from the other player causes it to become content. If it was the de-
fector while content, it becomes contrite and cooperates. When contrite, it becomes content only 
after it has successfully cooperated”). 
202. Telephone Interview with WCSA Executive (July 1996) (opining that most traders view 
quality disputes as just a routine part of doing business). 
58 
the complexities of cotton storage and transportation, nevertheless result in 
many situations in which it is difficult if not impossible for the promisee to de-
termine whether an undesirable outcome reflects an act of defection, or simply 
bad luck. Across the market, the risk of inadvertent breach, even after optimal 
precautions have been taken, is high. In such situations, cooperation is more 
likely to be maintained if transactors do not respond to every bad outcome by in-
flicting a punishment. Transactors might, for example, adopt a strategy of at-
tempting to negotiate adjustments in such situations, either until a particularly 
severe bad outcome occurs, or until a pattern of frequent bad outcomes leads a 
transactor to conclude that he is dealing with a defector and should therefore 
terminate the relationship. Alternatively, transactors might adopt a strategy that 
punishes the defector for a limited number of transactions or until he starts co-
operating again.203 Such strategies are commonly followed in the cotton mar-
ket.204 
Negotiating forgiving adjustments until the relationship is terminated is 
common in transactions between mills and merchants.205 Transactors typically 
adjust or attempt to adjust their obligations several times before initiating an ar-
bitration,206 an action that sometimes, but not always, ends their contracting rela-
 
203. See DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 191 (discussing the conditions under which modified 
tit-for-tat strategies are desirable); AXELROD, supra note 201, at 34 (explaining that in a repeat play 
prisoner’s dilemma in a noisy environment, reciprocal strategies can be improved upon by incor-
porating “generosity,” that is, by “allowing some percentage of the other player’s defections to go 
unpunished”). 
204. The “tat” move dictated by these more forgiving strategies — typically either refusing to 
deal for a specified period of time, or terminating the relationship after a series of defections — is 
a form of bilateral NLS that is unlikely to be imposed in an opportunistic manner. Because the 
execution cost savings of a repeat-dealing relationship accrue to both transactors, neither has an 
incentive to suspend or terminate the relationship unless the other has done something that sug-
gests that he will behave poorly in the future. Thus, while these sanctions can lead to deadweight 
losses when they are mistakenly imposed (an action more forgiving versions of tit-for-tat strate-
gies are designed to reduce), they are unlikely to be opportunistically imposed. 
205. See, e.g., Record, BoA Case No. 136 (1995) (revealing that the seller modified the payment 
schedule numerous times and that the buyer consistently failed to meet the modified schedule, 
leading the seller to file a claim in arbitration); Record, BoA Case No. 121 (1985) (where the buyer 
gave the seller many extensions on delivery before filing for arbitration). 
206. When mill representatives were asked what they did when a dispute arose, most stated 
that they would try to work it out with the merchant, see, e.g., Mill Survey, Respondent #5 (Aug. 
8, 1997) (“Work out with merchant.”); Mill Survey, Respondent #4 (Aug. 6, 1997) (“[T]ry an ami-
cable settlement; go to arbitration when all else fails.”); Mill Survey, Respondent #3 (July 28, 1997) 
(“[T]ry to work it out.”); Mill Survey, Respondent #7 (July 31, 1997) (“We try to work things out 
between ourselves. If not we will go to arbitration.”); Anonymous Mill Survey (Jul. 31, 1997) 
(“Contact individual in which [sic] agreement was made and discuss all facts pertaining to the 
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tionship.207 Members of the MCE commonly ignore defections or make forgiving 
adjustments in response to a certain number of defections, and then respond to 
defections thereafter with punishment of a limited variety, such as going to arbi-
tration to obtain a monetary recovery,208 perhaps refusing to deal for a specified 
period, or spreading a little negative gossip,209 and then returning to cooperation. 
Similar responses to defections have also been adopted by some mills.210 
The cost of adopting relatively forgiving strategies is lower in the cotton in-
dustry’s PLS than it is in the public legal system. In the public legal system, the 
 
dispute and try to seek a reasonable agreement for both parties. To take a merchant to arbitration 
would be the result of absolute disregard to a contract or verbal agreement. Circumstances re-
quiring arbitration would be for extremely poor performance, non-delivery of cotton and failure 
to make compensation.”). 
207. A significant percentage of the disputes reaching the BoA appear to be absolute end-
game disputes, that is, disputes where the parties do not intend to deal with one another in the 
future. Between 1975 and 1996, for example, 54% of the cases heard by the BoA, were clearly ab-
solute end-game disputes. Most commonly, the event triggering the end-game was the insol-
vency or financial distress of a party, the closing of a cotton office, a change of control of one of 
the entities involved, or the retirement of a person directly involved in the transaction, all events 
that upset settled expectations. Another 18% of the cases involved disputes that might fairly be 
classified as end-game. They involved disputes over the effects of a government subsidy program 
that made large sums turn on who had possession of cotton on a particular day. These cases were 
ones in which an event took the contract out of the self-enforcing range and made it worthwhile 
for one of the parties to end the contracting relationship. The remaining 27% of the cases involved 
primarily factual disputes about late payment and late delivery. 
208. A look at the opinions, written evidence, and moving papers (but not necessarily the 
transcripts which were mostly unavailable), in all MCE cases from 1944-1990 provides evidence 
that transactors routinely make forgiving adjustments — they accept late payment or late deliv-
ery, extend the time for payment or delivery, cancel deals or accept substitute goods — and that 
the filing of a claim in arbitration is often proceeded by several such adjustments; see also sources 
cited supra note 205. 
209. See, e.g., Telephone Interview by Connie Rogers with MCE Merchant #9 (Aug. 13, 1997) 
(noting that in “a friendly arbitration, [with] both sides a little wrong and a little right, the ani-
mosity may wear off after a few months and they’ll probably deal with each other again”); see also 
Letter from Defendant, to MCE Executive Vice-President and Secretary (Mar. 15, 1976), in connec-
tion with MCE Case No. 828 (“[The plaintiff] and I have been friends a long time and regardless 
of the outcome we expect to remain such.”). 
210. For example, in response to the question “If you go to arbitration against a merchant and 
he complies with the award, will you do business with him in the future? If so, would you do so 
immediately?” one mill answered, “should we go to arbitration and it was settled and the award 
complied with we would likely do business again — probably we would wait one or two sea-
sons,” Mill Survey, Respondent #5 (Aug. 8, 1997), another said, “yes . . . would wait a year or 
two,” Mill Survey, Respondent #7 (July 31, 1997), and another said, “I would carefully weigh the 
situation and depending on the seriousness determine the time factor for relations to be re-
established.” Anonymous Mill Survey (July 31, 1997). 
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Code’s course of performance and course of dealing provisions increase the cost 
of agreeing to forgiving adjustments. They create a significant risk that a series of 
such adjustments will be found to constitute a course of performance or course of 
dealing that will operate as a waiver or modification of the terms of transactors’ 
written contracts and will therefore limit the ability of the breached-against party 
to impose formal sanctions in the future for breach of the contract’s explicit terms 
if the breaches turn out to have been a series of willful defections.211 In contrast, 
the refusal of cotton tribunals to permit course of dealing or course of perform-
ance to vary or modify contractual provisions eliminates the risk that forgiving 
adjustments will be interpreted as waivers or contractual modifications.212 It 
therefore increases the likelihood that transactors will find it worthwhile to be-
 
211. The fact that transactors are aware of this approach and can therefore adjust their reliance 
on extralegal understandings in accordance with their view of their likelihood that they will be 
voluntarily performed, together with the short statute of limitations at the MCE and the other 
deadlines for objections written into the rules, helps to mitigate the likelihood of the types of op-
portunism that such an adjudicative approach might lead to. For example, a buyer who always 
takes late delivery under a contract then suddenly wants to end the relationship and tries to sue 
for past deviations will not be able to go so far back in time if he chooses to do so. 
212. The BoA has also consistently refused to uphold oral modifications of written contracts. 
See SEAB Case No. 80 (1957) (where the seller claimed that Buyer’s employee said that Seller 
“could take all the time needed to make delivery;” the Board held that “this does not enter into 
this case since the contracts specify a definite delivery date, and if there had been any different 
agreements they should have been embodied in the contracts”); SEAB Case No. 66 (1953) (“The 
Appeal Board is interested only in the contract or in written statements affecting the conditions of 
said contract. We do not find any changes agreed to in writing altering the original contract.”); 
SEAB Case No. 56 (1950) (noting the seller’s contention that an employee of the buyer orally 
agreed to a modification of the contract, the arbitrators held that “[i]t is our opinion that the 
terms of the contract stand for themselves and the conditions set forth therein are the only condi-
tions which would pertain to the fulfillment of the contract”). In addition, the BoA does not look 
to evidence from precontractual negotiations to determine the scope of the parties’ agreement. See 
NEBoA Case No. 318 (1940) (“The Board . . . finds the parties both bound by the terms of the 
signed purchase orders and that prior negotiations are not entitled to consideration as the terms 
of the purchase orders with respect to grade and staple are not ambiguous.”). The MCE arbitra-
tors take a similar approach. See MCE Case No. 789 (1952) (concluding “[t]hat while the trade was 
originally [orally] made under Rule 7 of the Exchange Trading Rules, which rule provides that 
payment shall be made free of Exchange in Memphis funds or the equivalent, and that exchange 
to final destination shall be deducted from the invoice, due to the fact that seller’s written confir-
mation made a change in the exchange provision and as buyer made no objection to the change 
outlined in said written confirmation, the written confirmation became a mutually agreeable con-
tract and buyer is bound by its terms”). These aspects of the tribunals’ adjudicative approaches 
increase transactors’ confidence that extralegal aspects of their behavior and communications will 
not be transformed into legally enforceable commitments. 
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have flexibly and encourages them to adopt the types of forgiving strategies that 
are most likely to promote commercial cooperation.213 
There is an additional efficiency benefit to using a forgiving version of the tit-
for-tat strategy, particularly when the “tat” punishment is costly for the defected-
against transactor to impose. The most common “tat” moves in cotton transac-
tions — some combination of terminating the contracting relationship, seeking 
arbitration, and/or imposing a reputation-based NLSs like widespread negative 
gossip — are often costly to the person imposing them.214 In such situations, 
more deterrence can be obtained by imposing a larger sanction less frequently 
than by imposing smaller sanctions more frequently. When negative gossip is 
based on one transaction going poorly, others might dismiss it, since it is difficult 
for them to be sure that it was not either an inadvertent breach after sufficient 
precaution or a breach due to simple bad luck. Even if the sanction is imposed 
several times in sequence, it will be less effective and more costly than a larger 
sanction imposed after several defections. Consider, for example, three instances 
of negative gossip, each of which, if imposed in isolation, would impose $X in 
reputational harm. If such gossip sanctions were imposed three times in close 
proximity to one another, the harm to the defecting transactor’s reputation 
would be more than $3X because each instance of gossip gains credibility from 
the one subsequent to it. However, when NLSs are imposed seriatim, the cost of 
imposing them has to be borne three times, and as more time passes between in-
cidents, the cumulative impact of the sanctions will decline—transactors are 
more likely to forget previous incidents if they seemed minor at the time—and, 
since the flow of gossip is hard to predict, it is not clear that the same people will 
necessarily hear about all three incidents, thus decreasing the impact and increas-
ing the cost of imposing the sanction. In contrast, when the gossip is based on 
several incidents, both the person contemplating imposing the sanction and the 
 
213. For a more detailed discussion of how formalistic adjudication can support flexible con-
tractual relations in its shadow, see Bernstein, supra note 60. 
214. Spreading negative gossip takes time and a transactor must be judicious in deciding 
whether to do it. A transactor who spreads negative gossip too often, or is too harsh in his judge-
ments, risks being viewed as being difficult to work with. In addition, there is a strong norm 
against baseless gossip. A transactor who is found to have fabricated gossip will suffer tre-
mendous reputational harm. In addition, the availability of low cost access to the PLS puts a soft 
check on the extent to which baseless gossip can damage a transactor’s reputation. At a certain 
point, the victim of the gossip can defend himself by asking why, if he acted so badly, the gos-
siper did not take him to arbitration. As one merchant explained when asked why people bother 
to gossip about wrongdoers, “no one wants to see the industry hurt by an unscrupulous person.” 
Telephone Interview with Merchant #11 (no date). Others explained that it was an industry 
where emotions ran high and notions of honor and avenging honor motivated behavior. 
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others who are told of the wrong doing, will be more confident that the breach-
ing party is a defector deserving of a “tat” response.215 In such a situation, the ac-
 
215. Another advantage of this approach is that it will often result in willful breaches being 
punished more severely than inadvertent breaches. In contexts like cotton transactions, where the 
risk of inadvertent breach even after optimal precautions have been taken is high, and where ab-
sent successful renegotiation, transactors want performance, not payment for non-performance, 
see supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text, they might find it desirable to impose high mone-
tary sanctions for willful breach and moderate sanctions for inadvertent breach — in an effort to 
encourage performance without encouraging over-investment in precautions against breach. 
However, a legal system (whether private or public) that imposed different monetary sanctions 
on willful and inadvertent breach would face formidable barriers to implementing. First, in any 
one case, the willfulness or non-willfulness of a breach may not be verifiable by a tribunal, or 
even observable to the parties. Nevertheless over a period of time and a series of breaches, the 
willfulness or inadvertance of his transactional partners actions may become clearer to an ag-
grieved party. As a consequence, given the inability of a judge or arbitration panel to distinguish 
between willful and inadvertent breach in a particular case, the higher measure of damages 
would, in practice, have to be available for all breaches. Such an increase in the damage measure, 
however, would likely lead to an over-investment in precautions against inadvertent breach. Sec-
ond, given that the industry has adopted something akin to the perfect tender rule with cure (al-
beit within the industry’s designated allowances on a variety of quality dimensions) buyers can 
nonetheless usually find a way to claim breach under the rules. As a consequence, if very large 
monetary damages were available in arbitration, buyers might have an incentive to declare 
breach in many situations where they would otherwise simply have accepted the goods. In con-
trast, where hybrid monetary and NLSs are used to sanction willful breach, a lower level of 
monetary sanctions can be combined with a NLS imposed only after the willfulness or non-
willfulness of breach becomes clear, thereby decoupling the amount “paid” by the breaching 
party (the monetary damages ordered by the arbitrator plus the NLS imposed by the aggrieved 
party), from the amount “received” by the aggrieved party (the monetary recovery plus any 
small deterrence advantage of imposing the NLS, see infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text) 
which in turn eliminates (or at a minimum greatly reduces) the aggrieved party’s incentive to de-
clare breach when there is a minor nonconformity in tender simply to get the larger monetary re-
covery. 
There is a great deal of evidence that extent of gossip (and hence the magnitude of the NLS 
imposed) is highly dependent on transactors’ perceptions of the willfulness or non-willfulness of 
the behavior at issue. See MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent #4 (May 30, 1997) (When asked 
whether and under what conditions he would spread negative gossip, a merchant replied, 
“sometimes yes: when defendant refused to honor I’d publicize that fact. Sometimes no: when an 
honest mistake was made, I wouldn’t talk”); MCE Merchant Survey, Respondent #3 (May 27, 
1997) (noting that he had been involved in two arbitrations. “One case involved a party who did 
not deliver in a timely manner,” but because the breaching party “did not understand the impor-
tance, [he] would probably deal with him again in time,” and he did not gossip after the arbitra-
tion. In contrast, the second case dealt with “a party who was looking for any loop-hole to avoid 
a financial loss.” In this instance, he did talk about the case. He explained that, “in the case of 
willful non-fulfillment . . . [I talked] as [I] did not want this party to continue his poor practices”). 
Moreover, this system of decoupled hybrid sanctions is particularly well-suited to ferreting out 
opportunistic transactors and transactors who act in what one industry executive called “the arbi-
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curacy of the decision to impose the sanction is improved, and the magnitude of 
the sanction that can be imposed also increases since negative gossip will be 
more credible and transactors will give it more weight in deciding whether or 
not to deal with the defecting party. Thus, when transactors decide to follow a 
forgiving version of tit-for-tat they can obtain more efficient deterrence. 
More generally, recognizing the importance of reducing the likelihood of 
misunderstanding in any relationships in which valuable cooperation is sus-
tained through both transactors following a variant of the tit-for-tat strategy sug-
gests that in deciding which provision to include in a contract or what type of ex-
tralegal understandings to reach, the transactors must assess the 
“misclassification risk” of the provision or understanding. As their relationship 
develops, execution costs will decrease and switching costs will increase, making 
the misclassification risk an increasingly important feature of their contracting 
relationship. This, in turn, may lead them to adopt contract provisions that in the 
absence of a need to maintain cooperation would not be chosen. Alternatively, 
either because at the outset of a contracting relationship transactors may not 
know whether their relationship will be discrete or repeat, or because a company 
enters into hundreds of contracts a day and therefore finds it cheaper always to 
do business using a single standard form,216 recognizing the importance of mis-
classification risk might not necessarily lead to the use of different contract terms. 
Transactors may prefer instead to vary or supplement some of their contracts’ 
written provisions through extralegal understandings (made credible through 
NLSs) that can reduce misclassification risk, perhaps because they condition on 
information that is more cheaply observable to the transactors at the relevant 
time. By using written contracts and varying them through extralegal under-
standings that may be better tailored to the needs of work-a-day interactions, 
transactors may be able to capture execution cost savings and reduce the likeli-
hood of relationship breakdown (for this reason, these understandings are some-
 
trage way,” rather than the “gentlemen’s way.” Telephone Interview with ACSA Executive (no 
date). It confronts such a person with escalating sanctions, both because each instance of gossip 
gains credibility from the one after it (especially if it is from a different person), and because as a 
person gradually acquires a bad reputation, transactors are likely to watch the person more care-
fully, thereby detecting more instances of wrongdoing. 
216. The best verifiable term for a contract may be quite similar across relationships since the 
factors that determine verifiability are unlikely to be vastly different in different transactions. In 
contrast, what is observable, varies a great deal from relationship to relationship and even varies 
over time within a given relationship. As a consequence, transactors may always find it desirable 
to use the same or substantially the same written provisions while varying their extralegal under-
standings depending on who they are dealing with and the stage of their contracting relation-
ship. 
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times referred to as relationship-preserving norms) while at the same time retain-
ing their right to insist on strict adherence to the terms of their written contracts 
if their relationship breaks down.217 
Using this two-tiered structure enables transactors to write a contract with the 
provisions best suited to third-party enforcement while varying these provisions 
using relationship-preserving norms that are well-suited to reduce misclassifica-
tion risk and promote cooperation. There is suggestive evidence that cotton 
transactors may view themselves as conducting their everyday interactions ac-
cording to a set of flexible understandings that requires them to make many ad-
justments, and ignore minor deviations in ways not required by their contract’s 
written provisions, yet preserves their unfettered right to insist on strict per-
formance of their contract when they think their contracting partner is behaving 
badly. As one mill executive explained, “SMR is [sic] used as an outline only in 
most cases. . . but if disputes arise — both parties fall back on SMR [sic] to re-
solve” them.218 And, as another explained, when asked whether everyday prac-
tices varied from the SMRs, “yes, I would say many, especially related to late 
delivery, late payments, notification of claims, etc. Most mills and merchants 
work with each other and have informal unwritten understandings to a limit. If it 
became apparent to me that a merchant had bad intentions, I would immediately 
 
217. It is important to note that even in selecting the terms conditioning on verifiable informa-
tion that they view as most desirable in the event that a dispute requiring third-party adjudica-
tion arises (a so called end-game situation of one sort or another, see Bernstein, supra note 60), 
transactors may, in some instances, be influenced, at least in part, by their desire to provide the 
most desirable terms for the relationship-preserving phase of their interactions as well. To see 
why, consider transactors’ choice between two provisions: provision A, that conditions on infor-
mation that is verifiable but not observable, and provision B, that conditions on information that 
is both verifiable and observable. Further assume that the cost of verifying the information under 
provision B is greater than the cost of verifying the necessary information under provision A. If 
only the end-game were to be considered, provision A would be better (assuming that in end-
game the two provisions had the same payoff if performed, and would give rise to the same 
damages if breached) since the information it conditions on can be obtained at a lower cost. 
However, in their every-day-repeat dealings, provision A would present difficulties. Because 
transactors would have difficulty figuring out whether the provision had been satisfied (some-
thing that by definition would not be observable to them), its use might therefore increase the 
likelihood that an instance of performance would be misclassified as an instance of breach and 
lead to the breakdown of the relationship. As a consequence, while provision A would be 
cheaper to invoke if a dispute arose, the probability of a dispute arising would be higher. In con-
trast, while the cost of adjudication if a dispute arose is higher under provision B, the risk of 
breakdown would be much lower since the information provision B conditions on is observable 
to the transactors. Taking the risk of breakdown and the benefits of avoiding it into account, the 
transactors might prefer to include provision B in the contract. 
218. Mill Survey, Respondent #1 (Aug. 11, 1997). 
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came apparent to me that a merchant had bad intentions, I would immediately 
invoke SMR rights.”219 
Once transactors have established a contracting relationship, they will often 
structure their contracting relationships in a way that further increases the costs 
each will suffer if either defects, thereby making cooperation the preferred 
choice. Most merchants and mills, rather than entering into one large long-term 
contract with numerous installment deliveries, instead enter into multiple con-
tracts with overlapping performance times.220 For example, on Jan. 1, they might 
enter into a contract for delivery on February 1; on Jan. 15 they might enter into a 
contract for delivery on February 15th and another for delivery on March 1, and 
so on. Each time the transactors enter into an additional contract to be performed 
in the future, they increase the cost to both of them of either of them misbehaving 
today. If one transactor defects and the other responds by defecting, relations be-
tween them will quickly deteriorate. In the subsequent contracts, each transactor 
is likely to demand exact compliance with the contract, thereby greatly increas-
ing execution costs and requiring both transactors to forgo all of the value cre-
ated by their extralegal agreements. By putting these future gains at risk in each 
transaction, the transactors create what has been called “private enforcement 
capital.”221 In effect, they create an implicit performance bond (whose magnitude 
is further increased by reputation-based NLSs) that they will sacrifice in the 
event of breach. They thereby increase the likelihood of cooperation by increas-
ing the cost of defection. 
Cotton trade associations also take numerous other steps to increase the like-
lihood that cooperation will endure and that the residual opportunities for op-
portunism will be minimized222—including promoting altruism, encouraging 
 
219. Mill Survey, Respondent #5 (Aug. 8, 1997); ); see also Telephone Interview by Renée Liu 
with Mill #12 (Oct. 7, 1997) (noting that there are differences between everyday practices and the 
SMRs in that “payments are looked at loosely . . . fixation term is obsolete . . . time deadlines [are] 
often winked at . . . wouldn’t buy in cotton sometimes [even if delivery is late] if we didn’t need it 
badly . . . [we] dance around that”); Telephone Interview by Renée Liu with Mill #13 (Oct. 8, 
1997) (noting that the biggest variation from the rules relates to payments); Mill Survey, Respon-
dent #5 (Aug. 8, 1997) (explaining that these differences relate to “late delivery, late payment, no-
tification of claims”); Mill Survey, Respondent #6 (July 30, 1997) (noting that most divergences be-
tween SMRs and practice “have evolved through the continued partnership of vendor — 
customer”). 
220. See, e.g., Record, BoA Case No. 139 (1976) (illustrating the existence of multiple separate 
and overlapping contracts between the parties). 
221. See generally Klein, supra note 152 (exploring the creation and use of private enforcement 
capital). 
222. See AXELROD, EVOLUTION, supra note 190 (discussing steps that increase the stability of co-
operation). 
66 
people to incorporate the welfare of the group (or others) into their utility func-
tion,223 creating social connections between members and their families, and ex-
plicitly teaching transactors about the importance of reciprocity and commercial 
reputation.224 These efforts, many of which are undertaken at the association 
level, provide benefits for all group members. The more widely norms of recip-
rocity are diffused throughout the relevant population, the better will be the abil-
ity of the group to “police the entire community by punishing those who try to 
be exploitative,” which in turn “decreases the number of uncooperative indi-
viduals [any one trader] will have to deal with in the future,”225 thereby lowering 
the transactions costs of trade. 
 
4. Restoring Cooperation 
 
Although there are certain types of disputes that are likely to end even long-
standing cooperative contracting relationships, there are others in which it may 
be possible to restore cooperation even after it has broken down and parties are 
negotiating in the shadow of their legal rights. In this latter class of disputes, the 
industry’s decision to maintain the availability of both monetary and nonlegal 
sanctions may make the restoration of cooperation at least slightly more likely by 
giving transactors who are contemplating arbitration an additional incentive (be-
 
223. Cotton industry institutions go to great lengths to instill a sense of solidarity or joint pur-
pose in their members. See, e.g., Dr. Orley B. Caudill, Interviewer, An Oral History with Mr. W.D. 
Lawson, III, Mississippi Oral History Program of the University of Southern Mississippi, vol. 126 
at 15 (1980) (“We would have meetings as merchants, in fact we think we were better organized 
than any group there because we even had meetings before meetings. We were in constant com-
munication with one another. Being a smaller group, we could do this and we spoke with one 
voice.”). To encourage international solidarity, cotton firms around the world have long educated 
each other’s apprentices or “squidges.” See BUSH, supra note 113, at 13 (relating that “[a]mong the 
firm’s half-dozen samplers and sample-room porters, there’s nearly always one foreign squidge; 
this is a time-honored practice in all cotton houses and has made the cotton world a club. Family 
connection often plays a part”). 
224. The industry sponsors a college for new members that encourages young traders to in-
quire closely into the reputations of their trading partners. See Neal P. Gillen, Resolution of Con-
tract Disputes in the Commerce of Cotton Within and Without the U.S., Lecture at Rhodes Col-
lege (July 20, 1995) (transcript on file with author) (“I urge each of you to deal only with those 
who you know and trust. If you do not know the producer, the ginner, merchant, or textile mill 
check them out thoroughly. If the price or terms are too good to be true, they usually are. This is a 
competitive business and when your contract price and terms are significantly better than the 
norm in the market, something usually goes wrong and the losses far exceed the potential profit 
you thought you would realize.”). In addition, in many large firms, retired traders come in a few 
days a week to serve as mentors and teachers to younger traders. 
225. AXELROD, supra note 190, at 139. 
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yond mere avoidance of the deadweight cost of dispute resolution) to settle their 
differences and enter into another transaction, thereby increasing the likelihood 
that their trading relationship will continue. 
Consider a situation where a contract is breached, liability is clear, and the 
parties know that if the case goes to arbitration, the breaching party will be or-
dered to pay $D in damages and the aggrieved party will be able to impose a re-
putational loss of $L on him as well. In such a situation, if the breaching party 
views the aggrieved party’s threat to impose $L in reputational harm as credi-
ble,226 he would be better off agreeing to any settlement that cost him less than 
 
226. Given that reputation-based NLSs such as strong negative gossip are costly for an ag-
grieved party to impose and result in no direct pecuniary benefit to her, it is important to explore 
why, apart from a strong retributive instinct (something that is present in many instances), her 
threat to impose them could ever be credible. Consider a situation in which a buyer (B) is trying 
to decide whether to impose such a sanction on a breaching seller (S). If B imposes the sanction, it 
has two distinct effects. First, it imposes a cost on S without resulting in any direct pecuniary 
benefit to B. Second, and perhaps more important, B signals to the market that she is likely to be 
willing to impose such sanctions on those who breach contracts with her in the future. B’s signal 
in this context is credible precisely because the sanction is costly for her to impose and results in 
no pecuniary gain to her. It would therefore be irrational for her to impose the sanction if she 
didn’t plan to stay in the market long enough to reap the benefits of the enhanced “deterrence” 
she has purchased. As a consequence, when B imposes such a NLS, she signals to the market that 
she has a low discount rate, that is, that she is a cooperative type, and by implication, that she ca-
res about obtaining performance rather than a remedy for nonperformance. However, when B 
imposes a NLS, she also signals to the relevant pool of market transactors that she is more expen-
sive to deal with than previously thought. As a consequence, B’s decision to impose a NLS in one 
transaction will affect her future transactional opportunities. 
To more clearly understand how B’s future opportunities will be affected, consider a situation 
where a B transacts with Ss who all select their level of precaution against inadvertent breach at 
the firm, rather than at the transaction, level. This approach to precaution is common in the cot-
ton industry. Most merchant firms keep different levels of inventory, have different degrees of 
diversification of their supply bases, and use a variety of different modes of transportation, each 
with its own associated risk of delay and quality harm, making their precaution levels largely ex-
ogenous as to any one contract, and only imperfectly observable to market participants. Further, 
assume that in any one instance of breach, B will have difficulty accurately distinguishing inad-
vertent breach after optimal precautions have been taken from the type of willful breach that 
transactors view as “laying down on a contract” and strongly indicative of a propensity to be-
have badly in any of a number of ways in the future. In such a situation, B will reason that if she 
imposes the NLS and sends the associated signal to the market, not all Ss will respond to it in the 
same way. Merchant firms who take a low level of precaution (“bad types”), will now view deal-
ing with her as being a great deal more costly, and while merchant-firms who take a high level of 
precaution (“good types”), will also view dealing with her as more costly, the expected increment 
of added cost to them is lower. Because the “good types” take more precaution, their probability 
of inadvertent breach is lower than it is for the bad types, so the expected value of the increased 
sanction is less for good types than it is for the bad types. The “good types” will therefore be 
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$D+$L. Conversely, because imposing a $L reputational loss on the breaching 
party will not increase her monetary recovery, the aggrieved party would be bet-
ter off with any settlement in which she receives more than $D.227 Both parties 
would therefore be better off settling for an amount greater than $D and less than 
$D + $L, than they would be going to arbitration. However, in order for such an 
agreement to be feasible, the aggrieved party must be able to credibly promise 
not to impose the $L in reputational harm, something that it is difficult if not im-
 
more willing than the “bad types” to deal with B. From the perspective of the “good types,” the 
fact that they face higher sanctions in dealing with B creates a benefit for them — since in order to 
obtain a higher price, they are faced with the challenge of establishing that they are “good types.” 
Although a S’s reputation is partially, though imperfectly, revealed through the information 
about his reputation circulating in the market (and perhaps his association membership status), 
the ability of a S to communicate his “good type” status more credibly by willingly assuming the 
risk of a higher sanction is certainly furthered through the sorting engendered by B’s imposition 
of the NLS. 
Once this sorting takes place, and a B who has imposed a quasi-multilateral NLS returns to the 
market to buy again, she will face a situation where fewer people will want to deal with her since 
she is now more costly to deal with (the “sorting effect.”) However, those Ss who do want to deal 
with her will be disproportionately good types — those with a lower probability of breach (the 
“quality effect.”). In market contexts where the “quality effect” dominates the “sorting effect,” B’s 
decision to impose the NLS against S can, up to a point, increase the value of the subsequent con-
tracts she enters into with this and other S’s, thereby making it worthwhile for her to bear the cost 
of imposing the sanction. 
In cotton markets, the “quality effect” should dominate the “sorting effect.” The cash-market 
price of cotton can be obtained in a variety of ways other than search and the number of S-
middleman merchants is very large in relation to the number of B-mills. As a consequence, the 
price effect on a B of dealing with a smaller number of Ss is unlikely to be particularly significant. 
In contrast, the beneficial effect on the value of B’s contracts of dealing with higher quality con-
tracting partners is likely to be significant—execution and coordination costs are likely to be 
lower, and the likelihood that cooperation, once established, will be maintained is also greater 
since, as the probability of inadvertent breach decreases, so will the magnitude of misclassifica-
tion risk. 
However, it is important to note that if the sorting effect were the only desired benefit of im-
posing the sanction, a similar effect could be achieved if B simply demanded the inclusion of a 
huge liquidated damages clause in her contract with S. However, given the industry’s adoption 
of the perfect tender rule, and the fact that tender is never, in fact, perfect, the use of such clauses 
would, as discussed supra text accompanying notes 147-149, give B an incentive to declare that S 
breached solely to obtain this windfall, and while her incentive to do this would be constrained 
by her desire not to get a bad reputation for engaging in holdup, because it is difficult for other 
market participants to gauge the extent of the deviation leading to the rejection, this constraint 
would be highly imperfect. 
227. If, however, the aggrieved party would get the benefit described supra note 226, from im-
posing the NLS of $L, the minimum amount she would accept for settling rather than litigating, 
collecting damages, and imposing the NLS would be $D plus some additional increment repre-
senting the nonpecuniary benefit of imposing the NLS less the cost of doing so. 
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possible to accomplish through the addition of a provision to the settlement 
agreement. One extralegal way to accomplish this, however, is for the transactors 
to immediately enter into another contract.228An aggrieved party’s claim that the 
breaching party is not to be trusted will not be believed if the breaching party can 
produce a contract demonstrating that the parties are continuing to deal with one 
another. Thus, the $L reputation loss is a joint benefit the parties can share if they 
continue to do business with one another. The availability of the hybrid-sanction 
encourages the transactors to deal with one another again, relative to a purely 
monetary sanction of the same magnitude, and may therefore help transactors 
restore cooperation even after it has broken down.229 
The MCE arbitrators sometimes render decisions in a form that can be under-
stood as an attempt to encourage the restoration of cooperation. In situations 
where they think the parties can continue to work together, they sometimes ren-
der a partial decision, leaving some aspects of the outcome to be agreed on by the 
parties. In one case, after deciding liability, the opinion “direct[ed the parties] to 
equitably settle the costs of damages and reasonably incurred expenses.”230 The 
arbitrators’ handwritten draft of the decision [filed with the case record] explains 
that the idea is for Firm A and Firm B to “work together to equitably settle,” 
which suggests that forcing the parties to deal with one another face-to face may 
be viewed as a way to lessen tensions and to reestablish trust. An MCE executive 
confirmed that restoring cooperation is an important reason these types of deci-
sions are made.231 Although there is nothing in the opinion of the arbitrators or 
 
228. Although the magnitude and structure of the hybrid sanctions available in the industry 
could be replicated though an ordinary decoupling scheme in which a portion of any recovery is 
paid to the association’s treasury, the incentives created by the association’s recourse to hybrid 
monetary and nonlegal sanctions would not be replicated. The decoupled monetary sanction 
would not succeed in bonding interior contractual promises nor would it create any additional 
incentive for the parties to enter into a subsequent transaction and thereby potentially restore 
their cooperative dealings. In addition, the absence of the NLSs would make it difficult for the 
transactors to vary their written agreements through credible extralegal understandings. 
229. This might have been more important in the past when both merchant and mill concerns 
were smaller and emotions were an important reason disputes went to arbitration. 
230. MCE Case No. 840 (1991); see also MCE Case No. 827 (1975) (holding, in the context of a 
multi-person and multi-country string trade, that the gin, not the defendant merchants, was at 
fault and directing the defendant to “give full support to [the plaintiff] in their efforts to collect 
this claim”). Sometimes MCE arbitrators try to pressure the parties to work out their problems 
before a hearing. See undated memo in Case file for MCE Case No. 838 (1991) (noting “At meet-
ing on August — 13 [sic] 1991, the firms were asked by the committee to please make every effort 
to class and accept the cotton due on this con-tract. [sic].” They were talked to by “several mem-
bers of the committee” and given a “two week deadline”). 
231. Telephone Interview with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997). 
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any of the applicable rules that says what happens if parties who are directed to 
agree on damages or any other post-arbitration issue cannot, arbitrators’ general 
distaste for repeat litigants creates at least subtle pressure for them not to return 
to arbitration. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
For over a century,232 the cotton industry has succeeded in developing rules, 
norms, and institutions that have made it possible for transactors to create and 
maintain remarkably cooperative contracting relationships.233 At the early stages 
 
232. See Perre Magness, Memphis History Woven in Cotton, COM. APPEAL, May 11, 2000, at CC2 
(noting that the MCE was organized in 1873, and that by 1900, the “ ‘Exchange absolutely con-
trolled the cotton dealings of the Memphis merchant and provided for arbitration of any differ-
ences that arose among its members over sales delivery, or character of the cotton prescribed in 
sales contracts’ ”). 
233. Over the past ten years, however, technological advancements and other market changes 
have occurred that may, over the long run, undermine the ability of industry institutions to pro-
mote cooperation. Changes in mill production methods have made certain types of flexibility 
much more costly. New mill equipment is more sensitive to small differences in cotton quality. 
Mills producing certain types of goods have therefore become much more exacting and much less 
flexible about the precise quality of goods delivered. In addition, as mills have adopted just-in-
time inventory methods, on-time delivery has become more important. Even small delivery de-
lays can cause costly shut downs of production runs. This change in inventory control methods, 
combined with other technological innovations that have greatly increased the productivity of 
mill runs, has increased the cost of responding flexibly to quality shortfalls by negotiating a price 
adjustment, or to delays by accepting goods late and waiving applicable fines. It has resulted in a 
situation where even short shut downs can lead to large losses. As the cost of flexibility increases, 
the likelihood that cooperation, once established, will break down also increases, particularly 
where, as in cotton trading, the probability of certain types of inadvertent breach is high. 
Another change that may affect the likelihood that cooperative relationships will arise and 
endure is the introduction of the relatively objective High Volume Instrument (HVI) method of 
grading cotton. Although HVI classing is too expensive to use on every bale, its cost is going 
down and it may soon supplant reputation as the more desirable bond of quality. Since the need 
to rely on reputation to bond quality made the marginal cost of relying on it to bond additional 
obligations quite small, when HVI classing becomes inexpensive enough to use in everyday 
transactions, the marginal cost of using reputation to bond other aspects of these transactions will 
increase and it is possible that a rapid shift to more formal contracting methods will result. On 
the other hand, because HVI reduces misclassification risk, it may make existing cooperative rela-
tionships somewhat more stable. 
Finally, the move from small firms to huge concerns with multiple agents buying and selling 
for their accounts may also undermine the maintenance of cooperation by making agents less 
willing to be conciliatory when disputes arise. As one merchant who had been in the business for 
a long time explained, today “people are more insistent on proving that they are right even when 
they are wrong, primarily since there is a perceived need to cover your tail within your own 
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of contracting relationships, the reputation-based NLSs, whose use and availabil-
ity is facilitated by industry institutions, play an important role in facilitating co-
operation by supplementing monetary remedies and bonding extralegal under-
standings. As the transactors’ relationship develops, however, these sanctions 
decline in importance as the threat of terminating a mutually beneficial relation-
ship becomes an increasingly powerful motivator of cooperative behavior. The 
reputation-based NLSs, however, remain in the background throughout the life 
of the relationship. They both constrain transactors’ incentives to deviate from in-
terior promises, and become relevant to transactors’ decision-making if they are 
considering making or responding to a decision to enter an end-game situation. 
Together, reputation-based NLSs and the threat of terminating a valuable bilat-
eral relationship work in tandem with the PLS’s provision of monetary remedies 
(which make pure price volatility a largely unprofitable reason to breach a con-
tract) to support highly cooperative contracting relationships. The stability of 
these contracting relationships may be due, in large part, to the fact that the 
framework the industry has created to support them often has more than one 
feature that can satisfy (or partially satisfy) each of the conditions that are gener-
ally associated with the emergence and maintenance of cooperative trading rela-
tionships. By creating these redundancies in the infrastructure of trade, the in-
dustry has reduced the likelihood that real-world events that undermine the 
working or existence of a particular rule, norm, or institutional feature, at a par-
ticular time or within a particular relationship, will lead to the breakdown of es-
tablished cooperative relationships. In addition, the stability of this and other co-
operative-based commercial systems may also be due, in whole or in part, to the 
fact that social norms of honor, particularly when reinforced through group ac-
tivity, and a basic human desire to think of one’s self as trustworthy,234 are more 
powerful motivators of transactional behavior than economic models of behavior 
typically assume.235 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
This Article has explored in some detail the complex private legal system that 
the cotton industry has created to govern transactions among its members. It has 
sought to identify some of the more important benefits created by the system in 
 
company since jobs are no longer life-long as they used to be.” Telephone Interview with Mer-
chant #9 (July 1996). 
234. For a discussion of these considerations in commercial behavior, see generally David 
Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990). 
235. This point is forcefully made in Robert Cooter & Melvin Eisenberg, Norms and Organiza-
tions, 149 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). 
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an effort to better understand the reasons that the industry has found it advanta-
geous to opt out of the public legal system. It has also attempted to identify the 
types of benefits that can be created through the use of private institutions that 
cannot be fully replicated through private contracts and the use of public institu-
tions. However, the Article’s exploration of the benefits created by the PLS re-
veals quite clearly that many of its more important benefits are contingent in 
whole or in part on the industry’s efforts not only to provide a well-developed 
legal infrastructure to support trade, but also, and perhaps more importantly, on 
its efforts to maintain and strengthen the social and informational infrastructures 
of trade, efforts that enabled individual transactors as well as the system as a 
whole to harness the force of reputation-based NLSs. Recognizing the impor-
tance of these reputation-based forces suggests that the barriers to the creation of 
a PLS that is as successful as the cotton industry’s system are far greater than 
merely overcoming the collective action problems of funding the creation and 
operation of a PLS. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a well-developed social 
and informational infrastructure of trade, such private commercial law systems 
can offer transactors, in a variety of industries and transactional contexts, bene-
fits that are either unavailable or only available at great cost through the public 
legal system. Identifying the many benefits that PLSs have the potential to create 
suggests that it might be desirable for the public legal system and legislature to 
actively encourage their creation, or, at a minimum, remove impediments to their 
operation,236 especially since in addition to providing significant benefits to in-
dustry transactors, they are, in the main, socially beneficial,237 especially if certain 
limited regulatory oversights are put into place.238 
 
236. For example, under the Federal Arbitration Act and most state arbitration acts, arbitrators 
are bound to decide cases by applying the law. See Ware, supra note 73. As a consequence, in in-
dustries where social bonds are not strong enough to prevent recourse to the courts, PLSs cannot 
adopt written rules that conflict with the UCC, something that the study PLSs suggests that it 
might be highly desirable for them to do. See Bernstein, PALGRAVE, supra note 65; Bernstein, supra 
note 60; Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Pre-
liminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710 (1999). 
237. There are a number of reasons to think that the cotton industry’s PLS is socially desirable 
from an economic point of view. First, absent information problems or externalities, neither of 
which are present in this industry, ex-ante agreements to resolve disputes through binding alter-
native dispute resolution generally increase social welfare. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996). The presence of coercion or duress is 
another reason that ex-ante agreements to use ADR may not be socially beneficial. Although the 
fact that most cotton associations require their members to arbitrate disputes with other members 
as a condition of membership might be viewed as coercive, because transactors view other, unre-
lated association benefits as nearly indispensable, the available evidence suggests that industry 
participants not only view arbitration as a desirable alternative to litigation, but also consider it 
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one of the primary benefits of trade association membership. Second, the PLS and the other insti-
tutional arrangements that support it appear to promote transactional efficiency without creating 
barriers to entry or other serious anti-competitive effects. Although an industry’s decision to rely 
on reputation-based nonlegal sanctions does create some barriers to entry, since it takes time to 
establish a reputation, the availability of association membership, which provides newer transac-
tors with a valuable piece of non-relationship-specific reputational capital, lowers these barriers. 
In addition, from the time of their founding until the present, these associations have gone to 
great lengths to increase the size of their memberships, consistent with the goal of ensuring that 
only transactors of good repute were admitted. See, e.g., President’s Address, Minutes of the 
SCSA Annual Meeting (April 18, 1936) (“Each member should make it his business to see that all 
of the responsible cotton men in his locality are informed as to the benefits which the shippers’ 
associations have secured not only for their own members but for the trade as a whole. This is 
another matter which the incoming administration would do well to specialize on.”); Minutes of 
the SCA Annual Meeting (April 5, 1957) (“The Southern Cotton Association is designed to effec-
tuate a cohesiveness of our segment in our territory. The groundwork for that lines [sic] in keep-
ing our enrollment at a high level. The best ‘weapon of enrollment’ we can employ is the mem-
ber-to-prospect contact. Lets’s make use of it.”); Minutes of the ACA Fall Board of Directors’ 
Meeting (Oct. 11, 1980) (“The Secretary advised the Directors that he had secured the names of 
non-members of the Association and had requested various members by regions to make the 
necessary contacts in an effort to build-up our membership.”); see also ACA Circular Letter No. 10 
— 1994/1995 (Sept. 27, 1994) (exhorting members to assist in recruiting new members). Moreover, 
the only association that explicitly limits the size of its membership is the MCE whose By-Laws 
provide for a maximum of 132 members. MCE CONST., Art. VI, § 1. In the past, this limit imposed 
a binding constraint that led to a secondary market in memberships. See, e.g., Telephone Inter-
view with MCE Executive (Feb. 1997) (“In the old days the value of membership might be tens of 
thousands of dollars.”). In recent decades, however, this ceiling has not restricted admissions. 
The Exchange currently has only 90 member firms, and the tremendous consolidation that has 
taken place in the industry over the past two decades suggests that this membership limit is 
unlikely to impose a meaningful constraint in the future. Third, most of the group and individual 
benefits created by the system — such as the reduction in the caseload of the public courts, the 
reduction in the deadweight cost of disputing, and the emergence of cooperation — are also so-
cially desirable. 
Fourth, the existence of these domestic institutions, which are part of a network of institutions 
that operate all over the world, facilitates international trade. In the absence of these institutions, 
many transactions involving developing and formerly socialist countries might not occur because 
of the risk of hold-up, the weakened force of bilateral reputation bonds and nonlegal sanctions, 
and the difficulties of obtaining and enforcing judgments. In addition, the cost of dealing with 
foreign transactors, even in countries with well-developed legal systems, would also be quite 
high if the deals were governed by public legal systems. Enforcement problems would remain 
and the applicable laws would still have to be determined by complex choice of law and jurisdic-
tional rules. In addition, a merchant dealing in many countries would have to learn the law in all 
of them. In contrast, the interlocking web of institutions that comprise the cotton industry’s PLS, 
reduces or lowers these barriers to trade by enhancing the strength of group-imposed reputation 
sanctions, and by providing simple sets of rules to govern transactions and well-run adjudicatory 
fora that resolve disputes around the world. The cotton industry has developed a number of ad-
ditional norms and institutional features to attempt to deal with these problems and to facilitate 
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the use and effectiveness of reputation-based NLSs and, at least to some extent, the force of bilat-
eral repeat dealing incentives in transactions between U.S. merchants and overseas buyers. For 
example, the American Cotton Exporters Association and The World Cotton Exporters Associa-
tion, maintain “a list of those parties engaged in the purchase and sale of cotton who have been 
reported by an exporter as being in default of an outstanding export contract and, where indi-
cated, have also failed to honor a technical arbitration award issued by a recognized trade body.” 
http://www.acsa-cotton.org/About_ACSA/Search%20Rules/ about_acsa.html. Before listing a 
person, however, these groups follow strict rules designed to assess the legitimacy of the request 
for the listing, yet another institutional safe-guard against the misuse of reputation-based NLSs. 
The list itself is freely available on the internet. This list is exempt from the United States antitrust 
laws under the Webb-Pomerine Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), as amended 15 U.S.C.A. § 61-65 (1987); see 
also PHILIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 160 (1988) 
(under the “Webb-Pomerine Act, Congress exempted from the antitrust laws agreements or acts 
in the course of export trade by an association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in 
such trade”). The only way to get off the blacklist is to pay 100% of your obligation. According to 
informal norms, once you are on the list, your creditor is prohibited from settling with you for 
less than full payment or he will be informally blacklisted. Although the bar on settlement for less 
than full payment after appearing on the list is imperfectly enforced, this hands-tying arrange-
ment nevertheless increases the aggrieved seller’s bargaining power which may provide a partial 
counter-balance to the fact that he is the transactor most vulnerable to hold-up under the con-
tract. (Source’s name withheld on request). In addition, the industry has taken steps to make bi-
lateral reputation sanctions more effective. Attempting to use the force of these sanctions in in-
ternational transactions is more problematic because transactions are larger, the principals to 
these transactions often do not meet face-to-face, social ties among transactors are weaker, and 
repeat-dealing is less common. However, some bilateral reputation effects are created in the mar-
ket through the use of overseas company representatives and brokers. Both the brokers and rep-
resentatives share information about the behavior of particular buyers, and when one has re-
peated bad experiences with a company, the others respond with an informal boycott or slow-
down of trade. The presence of large numbers of brokers in the market is reminiscent of the ear-
lier days of the domestic trade. Although in some markets, brokers’ main function is to commu-
nicate price information and to bring buyers and sellers together, in other markets, particularly in 
the past, one of their primary functions was to serve as reputation intermediaries. See, e.g., Bern-
stein, supra note 133, at 133 (discussing the role of diamond industry brokers in reducing the pre-
transaction reputational information search cost). 
Finally, it is important to note that one critique that is commonly leveled against private adju-
dication, namely that it creates external social costs by depleting the future stock of judicial 
precedent, should not be viewed as a viable argument against the cotton industry’s PLS. Harry T. 
Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 677 (1986) 
(“The concern here is that ADR will replace the rule of law with nonlegal values. . . . [and that] by 
diverting particular types of cases away from [court] adjudication, we may stifle the development 
of the law in certain disfavored areas of the law.”); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 
1073, 1085 (1984) (“A settlement [as a form of ADR] will thereby deprive a court of the occa-
sion . . . to render an interpretation,” in establishing rules and precedents); John V. O’Hara, The 
New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution: Vanguard of a ‘Better Way?,’ 136 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1723, 1745-51 (1988) (“Arbitration can hinder the ability of courts to establish rules and can 
prevent development of new areas of the law such as intellectual property.”). Although the exis-
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tence of the PLS does slightly reduce the number of judicial opinions issued, this effect is likely to 
be small. Even if cotton disputes were resolved in court, given the highly fact- and industry-
specific issues they raise, it is unlikely that an opinion would be written and precedent created. 
Moreover, to the extent that the creation of precedent or the clarification of existing rules is con-
sidered socially desirable because of its prospective effect on primary contracting behavior, Wil-
liam M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 255 (1979), 
the cotton industry’s private tribunals are likely to create more social benefits of this type than do 
public courts. Although the opinions of these tribunals are not formally accorded precedential 
value, they nevertheless have a strong effect on contracting behavior, particularly when com-
bined with industry efforts to circulate, report on them, and educate members about their con-
tent. This effect on primary behavior may be far stronger than the effect of a state trial court deci-
sion. As for evolution of the rules themselves, industry arbitration tribunals sometimes note in 
their opinions that trade rules need to be clarified or amended, thereby play a role in the rule 
clarification function that is said to be one of the primary benefits associated with common-law 
decision making. 
238. Although at present industry-run PLSs do not, standing alone, create antitrust problems, 
the availability of the antitrust laws to ensure that the associations do not engage in anti-
competitive behavior may be important. In addition, state arbitration laws that require some 
minimal procedural protections before an award is enforceable also enhance the functioning of 
private systems. However, there are some types of regulatory oversight that are viewed as so-
cially desirable for reasons having nothing to do with commercial law that may make it more dif-
ficult for new industries to create PLSs that are also able to capture all the benefits associated 
with a strong infrastructure of trade. For example, anti-discrimination laws make it more diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to maintain socially, ethnically, or gender-homogenous associations, espe-
cially when those groups command economic power. 
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